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Summary
Redefinitions of Death 
Gareth Southwell
In this dissertation I consider the current controversy surrounding the definition of 
death in certain rare situations which arise in response to advances in medical 
technology. In relation to these, I criticise various approaches which seek a resolution 
to such problems, arguing that all of them involve unjustified and unexamined 
assumptions as to the nature of death, and other related concepts. In chapter 1, I 
introduce and define the nature of the problem, arguing that whilst the problem can be 
seen to spring from technological advances, these merely reveal an inherent 
ambiguity. In chapter 2, I examine the so-called 'strictly-biological approach', and 
argue that its premise (that we can treat death as a purely factual matter) is flawed. In 
chapter 3, I support this conclusion with a broader attack upon conceptual 
essentialism, of which the strictly-biological approach can be seen as a foremost 
example. I also argue that this means that the nature of the problem is one that is not 
amenable to the sort of conceptual analysis that many might use to resolve the 
problem. Chapter 4 looks at the idea that biological function - the central criterion of 
the strictly-biological approach - cannot be considered an intrinsic, mind-independent 
feature of the world (and therefore, neither can a strictly-biological definition of 
death). Chapters 5 and 6 look at non-strictly-biological attempts to define death (what 
I term 'partly-biological' views) - namely the capacity for consciousness and personal 
identity respectively - and argue that both these approaches, far from resolving the 
problem, merely shift it to a different ground. In chapter 7,1 present a different picture 
of death as an 'observer-relative' feature of the world (to use John Searle's 
terminology), and argue that the resolution of the problem must have more in 
common with practices (e.g. in sport) where similar ambiguities are occasionally 
faced. In chapter 8, I further explore the consequences of the observer-relative status 
of death, arguing that this means that a much wider degree of variance and mutability 
is possible in relation to the related concepts of 'self and 'death', and that certain 
religious viewpoints and scenarios in science-fiction literature embody just such a 
'dialogue with death' and present us with what I term notions of 'the expanded self. 
Finally, I briefly outline some of the consequences of my arguments for medicine and 
public policy decisions, and suggest certain avenues for future research, arguing that 
rather than seeking to arrive at a single, unified definition of death, we should instead 
search for ways of coping with multiple parallel 'redefinitions' of death.
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Inigo Montoya: We need a miracle. It's very important.
Miracle Max: Look, I'm retired. Besides, why would you want someone the King's 
stinking son fired? I might kill whoever you want to make the 
miracle.
Inigo Montoya: He's already dead.
Miracle Max: [Intrigued] He is, eh? I'll have a look. Bring him in. [They enter. 
Miracle Max examines Westlev.} I've seen worse.
Inigo Montoya: Sir... Sir.
Miracle Max: Huh?
Inigo Montoya: We're in a terrible rush.
Miracle Max: Don't rush me sonny. You rush a miracle man, you get rotten 
miracles. You got money?
Inigo Montoya: Sixty-five.
Miracle Max: Sheesh! I never worked for so little... except once and that was a 
very noble cause.
Inigo Montoya: This is noble sir. His wife is... crippled... children on the brink of 
starvation...
Miracle Max: Are you a rotten liar. 
Inigo Montoya: I need him to help avenge my father, murdered these twenty years.
Miracle Max: Your first story was better. He probably owes you money, huh? 
Where's the bellows cramp? I'll ask him.
Inigo Montoya: He's dead. He can't talk.
Miracle Max: Ooooohhh! Look who knows so much, eh! It just so happens that 
your friend here is only mostly dead. There's a big difference 
between mostly dead and all dead. Please open his mouth. [He 
inserts the bellows] Now, mostly dead is slightly alive. Now, all 
dead... well, with all dead, there's usually only one thing that you can 
do.
Inigo Montoya: What's that? 
Miracle Max: Go through his clothes and look for loose change.'
Why 'Mostly Dead' Won't Do
The above excerpt from the film The Princess Bride illustrates nicely the problems we 
are faced with in determining death. In fact, those things which fuel the comedy of the 
situation are the very concerns that it is my present purpose to investigate. Why
1 Goldman (1995), 'The Princess Bride', scene 13.
should it seem comically absurd to talk of someone being 'mostly dead', or indeed of 
there being such gradations of death? It is common to think as if life and death were 
two sides of the same coin; two mutually exclusive yet directly related opposites. To 
admit of gradation is therefore to court either the comic or the absurd, and not the 
actual or the possible.
One of my central purposes in this thesis is therefore to ask what status such 
assumptions have: do they have a logical or empirical force? What might happen if 
we were to suppose that the life-death dichotomy need not hold? Therefore, my main 
concern will be to seek to answer the question of what sort of thing death is. I believe 
that certain controversies that have arisen comparatively recently in the field of 
medical science (i.e. in the last half-century or so) have provided a key opportunity to 
answer this fundamental question. Heretofore, I contend, important insights into the 
way in which we define death have been hidden, obscured by our technological 
inability to maintain and revive those individuals who had suffered certain physical 
crises. However, with the advent of such technology - and their attendant ethical and 
definitional dilemmas - the nature of our concepts of life and death has been a little 
revealed. It is in this gap, I argue, through which we have been allowed to peep into 
the 'inner workings' of the life-death dichotomy itself, that we can begin to gain a 
deeper understanding of the debate. As Brante and Hallberg point out:
During a controversy, the scientific community becomes less opaque; 
different styles of reasoning are uncovered, and assumptions that during 
'normal scientific' periods are regarded as self-evident become visible, 
as they are both attacked and undermined, and have thus to be 
consciously defended. This process sheds new light on the possible 
relativity of presuppositions and truth claims in science.
In this sense, therefore, whilst I will have a view on whether current attempts to 
resolve the problem are successful, my primary aim is investigative, and concerns the 
nature of death itself. In this light, I may say in advance that I find many of the current 
theories to have missed what I take to be the true character of the problem, and 
thereby to have misunderstood the nature of the controversy. In other words, most 
commentators have been at pains to patch up or else explain away what they see as a 
disquieting aberration: life and death should be separate, distinct, and immutable 
concepts. What's more, even where a greater amount of mutability has been admitted, 
the full consequences of this have not been followed up. 3
My ultimate goal will therefore be to take what I see as the necessary conclusions to 
be drawn from this situation, and to extend them to their ultimate logical possibility. 
As such, the later chapters of this thesis will explore what might be thought of as the 
possibilities of life and death. However, it first needs to be shown why there is a 
problem at all.
Some Provisos
2 Brante and Hallberg (1991), p.390.
3 For instance, Gervais (1986) admits that death cannot be defined by reference to the mere facts of 
biology, but goes on to argue for a variation of the traditional view of death should be adopted (I shall 
return to this later).
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Having spoken quite generally so far of definitions, debates, and problems, I would 
like now to provide a clear context within which to explain these references. Firstly, 
however, it should be noted that, in saying that there is a controversy surrounding the 
definition of death, I am in fact referring to a very specific set of circumstances which 
take place in the emergency and intensive care units of our hospitals. In these 
environments, we are presented with borderline cases by the mere fact that such 
individuals are on the brink of death, and we are trying to save them. However, whilst 
I am not therefore questioning the determination of death in all cases, it should be 
understood that the conclusions reached in relation to these examples will - I argue - 
have a bearing on the notion of death as a whole.
Secondly, in speaking of 'death', in most cases I mean 'human death'. For reasons 
which will become apparent, it is debateable whether there can be one uniform 
definition of death which covers all living creatures. Therefore, whilst I will have 
something to say on this subject, my main concern will be the death of human beings.
Thirdly, a controversy surrounding the definition of death should not be confused with 
difficulties concerning the determination of death: problems of definition relate to the 
difficulties in identifying the necessary and sufficient features which constitute 
'death' (the concept); problems of determination, however, involve difficulties in 
applying criteria based on features already identified. The former is primarily a 
philosophical concern; the latter primarily a technical one. For instance, it may be 
argued that, even if death is defined as the permanent absence of brain-stem function, 
there are currently (some argue) substantial difficulties involved in applying this as a 
general rule in all cases. 4 Therefore, whilst I will occasionally have cause to consider 
such technical problems, I will be mostly concentrating on the controversies 
surrounding definition.
In relation to this last point, it can be seen that any notion of the 'indeterminacy of 
death' must be carefully formulated. For instance, in Edgar Allan Poe's story, 'The 
Premature Burial', the author states:
The boundaries which divide Life from Death are at best shadowy and 
vague. Who shall say where the one ends, and where the other begins? 
We know that there are diseases in which occur total cessations of all the 
apparent functions of vitality, and yet in which these cessations are 
merely suspensions, properly so called. They are only temporary pauses 
in the incomprehensible mechanism. A certain period elapses, and some 
unseen mysterious principle again sets in motion the magic pinions and 
the wizard wheels. 5
Here, the line dividing life and death is seen as indistinct and - so it is implied - 
mysterious and unknowable. However, of what does such indeterminacy consist? Is it 
a diagnostic problem, or a definitional one? Obviously, whilst the two are linked, it is 
important to try to distinguish them. Accordingly, where, in the following chapters, I 
suggest that there is a problem with a certain definition of death, it should not be 
assumed that I am saying that 'we will never be able to diagnose death', or that 'we
4 See, for example, Russell (2000), p.28.
5 Poe (1986), 'The Premature Burial', p.348.
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will never know what death is'. I shall argue, ultimately, that the reason why the 
definition of death is problematic is more because of its status as a concept than the 
presence of any 'mysterious principle'. Therefore, what I argue for is the potential 
variability of the concept of death due to the nature of the concept. Furthermore, that 
there should be any deep mystery which precludes us from ever diagnosing death with 
any certainty, is a sceptical position to do with the possibilities of empirical truth, and 
- the common type of diagnostic problems aside - this is not a question that I will be 
primarily concerned with (for, in light of my overall argument, such sceptical 
problems may take on a different significance).
A Hypothetical Case
In light of the above, I will now illustrate the problem with a hypothetical example. 
However, before doing so, let us now consider some of the ways in which 
advancements in medical technology have given rise to definitional controversy:
  Supplementation and Support of Spontaneous Function: In cases of respiratory 
failure - which may involve simply a difficulty in breathing (such as arises 
from a lung infection) or (in the extreme case) cessation of the function of the 
brain-stem - it is possible to intubate (i.e. place a tube into the respiratory 
tract) and to ventilate the lungs. This allows for the maintenance of breathing 
and the artificial oxygenation of the blood, which in turn allows the heart to 
continue beating and the prevention of brain damage. In cases where there is 
no brain damage and the condition temporary, this is generally sufficient to 
maintain the patient in a stable condition until possible recovery. Similarly, 
kidney dialysis can supplement the performance of a damaged kidney, and 
pacemakers can correct and stabilise an irregular heartbeat. These are only a 
few of the ways in which medical technology is continually causing us to re- 
evaluate which features constitute death. 6
  Organ Transplant: The now almost-routine instance of heart-transplant 
operations (as well as transplantation of other organs) means that, in some 
cases, survival comes down to the mere availability of viable transplant donors. 
Furthermore, the nature of technological advance means that transplantation 
must eventually one day be supplemented or replaced by artificial means (e.g. 
robot hearts, etc.). The significance of the advent of transplant procedures for 
the definitional problem is that we can now no longer rely on the permanent 
failure of organs (the brain aside) as a criterion of death. Furthermore, it may 
be argued also that the fact that the function of certain organs cannot currently 
be replaced is merely a technical problem which will one day be overcome.
6 For an overview of the purposes and practices of an Intensive Care Unit (ICU), see Walton (1987), 
pp.33-8, which the above account is based on.
7 Of course, the advent of transplant technology is one of the main reasons for the debate. See Russell 
(2000), pp.7-11. I will discuss the potential limits to the transplant and replaceability scenario shortly, 
especially in relation to criticisms made by Lamb (1978, 1985). See also Lock (1990, 1995, and 1998), 
who details the cultural reaction to organ transplant in (e.g.) Japan, and highlights the problems that the 
new technology has given rise to. That the problems are different in different societies, of course, is a 
further indication here that we are dealing with conflicts in culturally defined concepts.
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There have, of course, been many other developments - diagnostic procedures, drug 
treatments, nasogastric feeding, defibrillators, cardiac by-pass pumps, and so on - 
which have increased our ability to rescue and maintain the existence of individuals in 
states of perilous health or near-death states. However, I do not plan to document all 
of these, but simply to suggest how such advances have together defeated the 
previously prevalent cardio-pulmonary definition of death, whilst also noting that the 
host of such changes together have given rise to the possibility of situations where the 
determination of death is, at best, controversial.
To illustrate such a possibility, imagine the following hypothetical situation:
A young woman is attending a party and, after complaining of feeling 
unwell, is taken home by friends and put to bed. After fifteen minutes or 
so, the friends check on her and discover that she is not breathing. An 
ambulance is called, and mouth-to-mouth resuscitation is performed, 
resulting in resumed respiration.
On admission to hospital, it is discovered that the cause of respiratory 
failure was most probably vomiting during sleep (which is thought to 
have been due to alcohol), which had in turn caused her to choke and 
cease breathing. She is put on a ventilator to aid her breathing and, 
whilst her body resumes normal function, she is otherwise unresponsive, 
showing no reaction to pain and light, and is diagnosed as being in a 
coma. During this time, an EEC (electroencephalograph) reveals that 
brain activity is present, but abnormal and at a low level.
After a week, she is moved into the ECU (Extended Care Unit) and she 
is fed by a tube. After a while, relatives and staff notice that she begins 
to respond to external stimuli - her eyes occasionally open, and she 
appears to go through a sleep-wake cycle; furthermore, at certain times 
she elicits certain sounds (grunts, coughs, even laughs). However, it is 
quickly realised that these responses are not based on awareness, and 
that they merely represent the functioning of the non-conscious lower 
brain. She is therefore considered to have moved out of a coma and into 
a persistent vegetative state. Furthermore, when a decision is made to 
take her off the ventilator to test for spontaneous respiratory function, 
she continues to breathe unaided. 8
So, what is going on here? Is the patient alive or dead? According to modern medical 
practice, she is most definitely alive. Firstly, let us go in search of some criteria.
In 1968, the report of Harvard Medical School's Ad Hoc Committee9 proposed four 
main criteria for what it termed 'brain-death' (i.e. whole-brain death):
8 Some readers may recognise here the case of Karen Ann Quinlan (more or less). See, for instance, 
Walton (1987), pp.43-5; and, for more detail, New Jersey Supreme Court (1975-6).
9 Chaired by Henry Beecher. See Beecher (1968).
10 Obviously, there has been much discussion as to whether or how to amend and reform these criteria, 
mostly notably by the University of Minnesota Health Centre (Cranford, 1978) and the President's 
Commission (Lynn, 1981). However, the proposed changes are mostly procedural (to do with duration 
of testing, etc.), and differ very little in actual identification of criteria.
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(A) Lack of response to external stimuli (e.g. light, pain) and internal need (e.g. 
hunger).
(B) Absence of spontaneous movement and respiration.
(C) No reflex responses.
(D)A flat EEC (electroencephalograph) reading - not essential, but useful for 
confirmation."
In relation to our above case, we can see that, whilst there was initially a lack of 
response to pain and light (A), the patient eventually regained these and other 
responses (C), the EEG - whilst abnormal - was not flat (D), and it was even later 
found that the ventilator was not required (B). From this, it can be concluded that the 
brain damage suffered by the patient was mainly to the cerebral cortex (housing the 
capacity for cognitive function), and that the brain-stem itself (which is responsible 
for maintaining many of the automatic responses displayed) was largely intact.
In light of the above facts, we can therefore conclude that the patient is in what is 
termed a 'persistent vegetative state' (PVS). It should be noted here that PVS is not 
the same as irreversible coma: in the former, the brain-stem is at least partially intact, 
whereas in the latter, it will not be. Coma is, by definition, an unresponsive and sleep- 
like state; therefore, by definition, PVS is not coma. Coma commonly lasts around 
three weeks (at most), after which coma patients either develop asystole (absence of 
spontaneous contraction of heart muscle), or enter PVS (indicated by the onset of a 
sleep-wake cycle) - either on the way to recovery, or (as with our patient) to persist 
there. PVS is therefore akin to neocortical (or 'higher-brain') death, in that both 
awareness and cognitive activity are absent. 12
The relationship between the various degrees of brain damage, brain death, PVS, and 
coma can therefore be understood as different points along a continuum: 13
Whole-Brain death: In 1959, Mollaret and Goulon 14 coined the term 'coma 
depasse' (irreversible coma) to describe patients with 'no spontaneous 
respiration, no reflexes, polyuria and low blood pressure if norepinephrine was 
not given continuously, and the absence of all EEG activity.' 15 Therefore, 
without such drug treatment and the help of the ventilator, the patient would 
stop breathing and die. This became the basis for subsequent concepts of
" The electroencephalograph (EEG) records the electrical activity of the cerebral cortex from leads 
attached to the scalp. An isolelectric or flat reading is the finding required to establish this criterion for 
brain death.' Walton (1987), p.70.
12 For these distinctions, I have followed Pallis (1985) - see pp.34-5. However, it should be noted that 
many commentators describe PVS as a type of coma; sometimes, as in Browne (1985), this is due to 
confusion or imprecision; at other times, however, it is just due to the use of the term 'coma' in a wider 
sense. Therefore, I shall use coma in Pallis's sense.
13 In listing the range of abnormal brain states which may be relevant to an understanding of this 
discussion, Russell (2000) also includes Akinetic Mutism (p.41). For my purposes, however, the 
condition may be grouped with cases of PVS, since Akinetic Mutism involves a degree of intact brain- 
stem function together with little or no cognitive awareness (an essentially PVS-like state), though the 
causes are different.
14 Mollaret and Goulon (1959). Coma depasse also included death of the nervous system, so it is not 
identical with the modern notion of whole-brain death. 
15 Machado, etal. (2007), p.198.
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whole-brain death, which may be thought of as the most extreme form of 
irreversible coma.
  Brain-stem death: This is where damage is localised to the brain stem and 
where the function of other parts of the brain remains intact (although 
inactive). So, whilst higher brain capacity may be present, since a functioning 
brain-stem is necessary for higher cognitive functions to work, then effectively 
the whole brain is dead. 16 This may be compared to the starter motor in a car: 
there may be no fault with the engine as a whole, but without this central 
component the whole thing will not be able to function. Such patients must be 
maintained on a ventilator, and are considered to be in a state of irreversible 
coma. However, in some cases it may be difficult to determine the full extent 
of the damage, and patients may slip between this and other states (e.g. PVS). 
However, this simply reveals the occasional diagnostic problems involved, and 
for patients whose brain stem has been damaged beyond a certain point, there 
is no positive prognosis (though just what this point is, and when it has been 
reached, are problematic diagnostic issues). 17
  Persistent Vegetative State (PVSj: In these cases, the function of the brain- 
stem is wholly or partially intact, allowing for the continued presence of many 
functions of the autonomic nervous system (e.g. swallowing, coughing, 
blinking, emitting occasional noises, moving limbs, etc.). However, since there 
is often damage to the higher brain (neocortex), there is no cognitive 
awareness attached to these actions and responses. The main distinction 
between PVS and the above two states is therefore that the automatic 
processes that are absent in those cases are present in this one. Of course, this 
will differ from case to case, but PVS patients are usually characterised by the 
presence of a sleep-wake cycle and a range of functions (e.g. response to 
stimuli) generally associated with an at-least-partially-intact brain stem. For 
these reasons, as noted above, some commentators resist the temptation to 
think of PVS as a type of coma (e.g. 'vegetative coma'). 18 It should also be 
noted that patients do occasionally recover from this state, but because there 
are different causes of it, and different degrees of brain damage, this obviously 
differs case by case. However, in relation to this hypothetical case, we shall 
assume for the purposes of argument that the state is irreversible, and that 
there is significant neocortical damage, resulting in the permanent loss of the 
capacity for consciousness. 19
We can, in relation to our patient, therefore, conclude that this is clearly a case of 
PVS: there is intact brain-stem function (with some possible impairment - hence the 
initial need for the respirator), but there is a lack of cognitive awareness.
The Nature of the Problem: the Search for Significant Features
l6 Pallis(1983).
17 See Russell (2000), pp.27-8.
18 See, for instance, Pallis (1985), pp.33-4 and Walton (1987), pp.51-2.
19 For an overview of the relation between PVS and other states, see Russell (2000), pp.39-56.
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Having outlined the different possible types of brain death, and illustrated one 
possible hypothetical scenario, let us now consider what sort of problem such a 
scenario might present for the definition of death.
Firstly, as already stated, the medical profession currently accepts that such a person 
is definitely alive. Therefore, controversies in such situations generally centre not on 
whether the patient is dead, but on whether it is ethical to let the patient die (i.e. that 
life support should be removed).20 However, as we shall see later, there are a growing 
number of commentators21 who, focusing on the capacity for cognitive consciousness 
and notions of personal identity as central to a living human being, argue that such 
individuals as envisaged in the scenario are - to all intents and purposes - dead, and 
should therefore be considered so. Furthermore, in terms of the practical 
consequences of this definition, the repugnance felt by some at the thought of 
removing the organs of an individual whose brain stem is functioning, but who will 
never regain consciousness, is not necessarily shared by another, who might take the 
permanent absence of the capacity for consciousness to be 'dead enough'. For 
instance, as Roland Puccetti argues:
When reasonably assured of a loved one's neocortical death, it would not 
have the slightest interest for me that this person was still breathing when 
prepared for burial, however grisly it might seem to those who have to do 
that. And I should hope those close to me would feel the same way in my 
own case. If someone suggested to me that my body might survive death 
of the neocortex for several months or years, provided it were fed and 
cleaned properly, etc., that would have no greater appeal to me than 
preservation of my appendix in a bottle of formaldehyde. For in the sense 
in which life has value for human beings, I would have been dead all that 
time. What we are talking about is not a living person but a breathing 
corpse. And if the notion of burying a breathing corpse is repulsive, then 
I suggest we simply stop it from breathing. 22
Puccetti therefore implies that, in such situations, we should consider what value a 
human being's life has - both to the individual himself and to others.
Such an approach as Puccetti's therefore provides an interesting contrast to that of 
what I shall term the more traditional 'strictly-biological' approaches23 because, in 
talking explicitly of value, it seems to take a significant step away from consideration 
of death as determinable in a strictly-biological way (i.e. objectively and 
independently of value concerns, or 'extra-biological' concerns - such as ethical 
arguments or issues of personal identity). Puccetti uses such words as 'appeal' and 
'repulsive', considers the relevance of his own and others' feelings, and the value that 
life has for those concerned. For Puccetti, then, the neocortical definition of death is to 
be preferred not because it is significant in a strictly-biological sense, but rather 
because conscious human life is 'the only sort worth havingV And yet, from the 
strictly-biological perspective, any feelings as to what sort of existence is and is not
20 As, in fact, was the case with Karen Quinlan.
21 E.g. Puccetti (1976, 1988), Veatch (1975), Gervais (1986), Green and Wikler (1980).
22 Puccetti, (1976), p.252. The image here of the bottled appendix is borrowed from Flew (1955). 
23 1 shall explain this term in detail in the following chapter. 
24 Puccetti (1976), p.256 (my emphasis).
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'worth having' must be viewed as irrelevant (for otherwise, it would not be an 
objective, strictly-biological definition of death).
Admittedly, not all advocates of such an approach argue that neocortical death allows 
us to treat the body as we wish, and some suggest that we may still consider the body 
or organism itself to be alive whilst the person as such is dead. 25 However, whatever 
the details of the individual position, advocates of such an approach share a 
conviction that consciousness is the feature of most central importance to the question 
of how to define human death.
In the scenario considered earlier, therefore, what position are we to take? The options 
would seem to include the following:
  The patient is actually alive. Of course, this would represent the least 
controversial and most conservative approach. Therefore, proponents of this 
option would argue that the characteristics presented by the hypothetical case 
represent significant features of a living human being (e.g. spontaneous 
function, responsivity, etc.).
  The patient is actually dead. Advocates of this approach (e.g. Puccetti) would 
argue that the absence of the capacity for cognitive consciousness is 
conclusive, and that any residual function is of no significance.
  The patient exists in an intermediary state. It may be argued that the patient 
actually exists in a state somewhere between life and death (a third state), or 
that their status is undecided. Obviously, from most perspectives, this would 
represent an unsatisfactory position, and would arguably simply extend the 
controversy (e.g. if there is doubt as to where the borderline is between life 
and death, then this doubt can be extended to the borderlines between life, 
death, and the third state itself). Accordingly, this is not a position that I am 
aware of anyone adopting as a resolution to the controversy, but rather 
utilising as an illustration of it. 6
  'Death' is an arbitrary concept. Obviously, this would be a radical option. 
However, apart from (arguably) not helping to resolve the controversy we are 
faced with - and therefore what to do with the patient - it is one which calls 
for a complete reappraisal of some of the fundamental concepts which human 
beings employ. Furthermore, that it is an option at all, depends on the answers 
arrived at concerning other fundamental philosophical issues (e.g. our attitude 
regarding the status of the concept of death (whether it has a correlate in the 
'real', mind-independent world), the notion of personal identity, and the nature 
of self). However, I shall return to this possibility in chapter 8 where I 
consider religious and science-fiction examples of what I shall term notions of 
'the expanded self and its consequence for the related notion of death.
However, the situation is not even as straight forward as these options seem to imply, 
because - I shall argue - what we are faced with in defining death are a range of
25 E.g. Green and Wikler (1980).
26 E.g. Jonas(1978).
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competing criteria, of which consciousness is merely one. For instance, it may be 
alternatively argued that the continuing presence of spontaneous function is 
significant, or that the functional integration of the organism as a whole should be 
taken into account. Correspondingly, our attitude to death will not only be shaped by 
what sort of thing we take death to be (i.e. strictly-biological, socially-constructed, 
etc.), but also what characteristics we take to be essential expressions of it.
Competing Criteria
But what are these criteria, and which - if any of them - are sufficient for our 
purposes? Without attempting to be exhaustive, therefore, we may identify the 
following criteria:
a) Spontaneous function
The notion of spontaneous function is an obvious one for the definition of life, 
the ability to breathe unaided being one sign that the brain stem is operational. 
More generally, the ability of an organism to function autonomously is 
generally taken as an indication that it is, in some sense, alive. However, in 
itself, in its presence or its absence, it would not seem to be a sufficient 
condition for determining death. An individual may require something as 
simple as a pacemaker, yet we would not be tempted to say that the lack of 
spontaneous, regular functioning of their heart meant that they were dead. 
Similarly, whether someone requires kidney dialysis because of failure of 
those organs is not a deciding factor in determining their status. Certainly, if 
the person is conscious, then a lack of spontaneity in one or more organs is 
totally irrelevant. Of course, it might be coherent to imagine that almost all 
organs (apart from, maybe, certain parts of the brain) might be replaced by 
technological substitutes so as to create a 'Cyborg'. Such a possibility, as 
Puccetti notes, whilst 'technically outrageous, [...] does not require overriding 
any physiological realities.' 27 Furthermore, Jonas argues that
if we could do for the disabled brain - let's say, the lower nerve 
centers only - what we can do for the heart and lungs, viz., make 
it work by the continuous input of some external agency 
(electrical, chemical, or whatever), we would surely do so and not 
be finicky about the resulting function's lacking spontaneity: the
9K
functioning as such would matter.
Lack of spontaneous function, then, whilst generally taken as a sign of life, 
would seem to represent an insufficient singular condition for the declaration 
of death.
b) Functional integration
One sign of a healthy, living organism is that each of its separate organs or 
parts plays a functionally integrated role in the health and operation of the
27 Puccetti (1976), p.257.
28 Jonas (1978), p.54.
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whole. In other words (some argue), the fact that a dead person still possesses 
a perfectly functioning set of eyes, or intercostal muscles, or even heart, does 
not affect the fact that they are dead because the parts no longer serve a role 
in a functionally integrated whole (which is, of course, the ultimate rationale 
for allowing organ transplantation). As certain commentators argue,29 a lack of 
functional integration can therefore be considered a sufficient criterion for 
determining death. However, others 30 have pointed out that functional 
integration without the possibility of consciousness leaves out something 
central to our concept of a living human being, and that all we are left with is a 
'breathing corpse'. 31
c) Responsivity
A key feature of a living organism is that it can be seen to respond to its 
environment. For humans, the apparent level of response is therefore 
frequently used to establish not only whether an individual is alive or dead, but 
also - in cases of coma - to determine what functions are still active. As a 
criterion for pronouncing death, this concerns not only higher-level responses, 
such as conscious vocalisation, or signs of cognitive activity, but the more 
fundamental, automatic responses, such as pupil dilation, reflex muscle- 
response, and certain physiological reactions to painful stimuli. The test for 
these lower-level responses is, in effect, a test for the functioning of the brain 
stem itself. The deeper question here, however, concerns which sort of 
responses are important and why. In the famous case of Karen Quinlan, due to 
'irreversible brain damage', 32 the patient existed in a persistent vegetative state 
with 'absence of awareness of anything or anyone around her.' 33 Excerpts 
from court proceedings at the time report the consensus of the medical opinion 
of the doctors attendant upon her:
A general synopsis of their testimonies indicates that they found 
Karen comatose, emaciated and in a posture of extreme flexion and 
rigidity of the arms, legs and related muscles which could not be 
overcome, with her joints severely rigid and deformed. During the 
examination, she went through awake and sleep periods but mostly 
awake. The eyes moved spontaneously. She made stereotyped cries 
and sounds and her mouth opened wide when she did so. Cries 
were evoked when there was noxious stimulation. She reflexed to 
noxious stimuli. Her pupils reacted to light, and her retinas were 
normal [...] All agree she is in a persistent vegetative state. 34
As can be seen from the above, certain responses were present, but others were 
absent. Furthermore, whilst medical opinion at the time was that 'there is no
29 E.g. Lamb (1985), Backer (1975), Russell (2000), Pallis (1983).
30 E.g. Gervais (1986), Puccetti (1976). 
31 Puccetti(1976),p.252.





evidence she can continue to exist physically without the respirator', 35 
ironically, when the decision was taken to remove Ms Quinlan from the 
respirator, she commenced breathing of her own accord, living on for another 
10 years. Certainly, the level of response was enough to convince those 
involved that Ms Quinlan could in no way be classed as dead - even though, 
as was mistakenly thought at the time, her brain stem could not maintain 
spontaneous respiration. The level of response, therefore, was the main factor 
in deciding the patient's status, in that it raised her above the category of those 
with 'no discernible central nervous system activity' 37 (a criterion which 
would be required for declaration of brain death as stated by the Ad Hoc 
Committee of the Harvard Medical School).
There would seem to be a range of reactions to this approach. On the one hand, 
there are those, such as the advocates of neocortical death,38 who would not 
consider the sort of responsivity here described as a sufficient sign of life. At 
the other extreme, there are those, 39 who would argue that the organism is still 
alive even when some of these responses are absent, because the functional 
integration of the organism as a whole is still present. Given this range of 
disagreement, it is difficult to see in what way responsivity can be used as a 
conclusive and uncontroversial criterion for determining death. I will return to 
these issues in the next chapter.
d) Consciousness
As already touched upon, the idea that the absence of the capacity for 
consciousness should determine death is associated with neocortical death. 
The neocortex houses the capacity for cognitive function and rational thought, 
but a functioning neocortex is not in itself sufficient for consciousness. The 
ascending reticular activating system (or reticular formation) provides the 
basis of consciousness, but as Puccetti points out:
While a functioning reticular formation in the upper brainstem is 
necessary to consciousness accompanying neocortical functions, 
without the neocortex such paleocortical structures can maintain 
only the crudest sort of wakefulness, and nothing like conscious 
human life. 40
This sort of attitude, however, as already noted, goes well beyond the strictly- 
biological approach, and whether an organism is alive is a very different 
question to whether it is capable of consciousness - let alone, as in Puccetti's
35 Ibid.,p.550.
36 There are a number of cases where long-term coma victims have come back to full consciousness 
after many years - for instance, see Leidig (2003). Obviously, whilst in Karen Ouinlan's case the 
medical evidence suggested that she no longer possessed the neurological means to regain full 
consciousness, there have been cases where the diagnosis has proven incorrect, which is obviously a 
further factor in the decisions and hopes of the families involved in the decision-making process. For 
misdiagnosis involving PVS (regarding which, more shortly), see also Andrews et al. (1996). 
37 Beecher(1968), p.85.
38 E.g. Puccetti (1976), Gervais (1986).
39 E.g. Becker(1976), Lamb (1985).
40 Puccetti (1976), p.252.
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example, whether that consciousness is anything more than the 'crudest sort of 
wakefulness'. Obviously, this would also be true for criteria involving the 
capacity for consciousness, such as notions of personal identity (in terms of 
psychological continuity) or the capacity for social interaction. The suitability 
of this criterion is therefore a complex issue which is intrinsically linked to the 
question of what status the concept of death has, and therefore to what extent 
definitions of death can be considered objective. I shall deal with this issue in 
chapter 4, and specifically in relation to consciousness in chapter 5. There, and 
also later on (in chapter 8), I will look at the possibility that consciousness 
need not be considered an essential feature of a living human being.
However, the theoretical argument aside, there is also the question of the 
degree of diagnostic certainty which may be arrived at in relation to severely 
brain-damaged patients. For instance, a recent study in a hospital unit 
specialising in the rehabilitation of severely brain-damaged individuals has 
shown that misdiagnosis of PVS is more common than might be thought. 41
Of the 40 patients diagnosed as being in the vegetative state, 10 
(25%) remained vegetative, 13 (33%) slowly emerged from the 
vegetative state during the rehabilitation programme, and 17 
(43%) were considered to have been misdiagnosed as 
vegetative.42
Furthermore, of those misdiagnosed,
Fifteen patients were able to make choices, such as selecting 
their previously preferred music tapes from a choice of three. 
Twelve (71%) patients were able to spell out their own short 
messages using the listener scanner technique.
Eleven patients (65%) were able to carry out simple one stage 
and two stage mental arithmetic tasks such as "What is 10 
divided by 5?" and "What is 8 minus 4 minus 1?" Eleven 
patients (65%) were oriented in time, place, and person, and one 
patient was only oriented in person. Thirteen patients (76%) 
were able to recall a name from a choice of three options; and 
eight (47%) patients were able to use listener scanner techniques 
to write a letter to relatives.43
Would Puccetti consider the above to be examples of 'the crudest form of 
wakefulness'? Presumably not, but it remains an interesting question - 
diagnostic problems aside - as to where the advocate of neocortical death 
draws the line.
As can be seen from the above, therefore, there is no general consensus as to which 
criteria are essential or inessential to the definition of death. However, what has been 
largely ignored in the debate so far, I shall argue, are the reasons why such differing




criteria should come into competition in this way. There are, I shall argue, compelling 
philosophical reasons not only as to why such conflicts occur, but which also suggest 
why the approach of most commentators to date has been misguided, or even shallow 
(philosophically speaking).
I shall therefore now attempt to indicate what I think are some of these reasons. 
A Messy Divorce: Origins of Conceptual Ambivalence
The above four criteria represent fairly uncontentious aspects of what would generally 
be thought of as a living human being. In other words, an individual whose organs 
form a part of a functionally integrated organism, which in turn functions 
spontaneously, is responsive to its environment, and facilitates the conscious 
cognitive function of the individual concerned, would be generally considered by 
most to be a living human being. Of course, as already suggested, we may reduce any 
or all of these signs by a certain amount and still uncontentiously retain this 
description; a human being with reduced mental capacity is not the less a human 
being - or alive - for all that; artificial limbs, organs, and other mechanical aids to 
functioning similarly do not force us to revoke such an individual's status.44 However, 
there does come a point - a threshold - where the reduction in the degree, or even 
complete removal, of one or another aspect of a whole, fully-functioning human being 
provides occasion for controversy. It is at this point, I shall argue, that the previously 
unified concept is 'split', and its heretofore inseparable aspects are set at variance to 
one another. Therefore, whereas it was previously unthinkable that a human being 
lacking spontaneous cardiac and respiratory functions could be kept 'alive', or that an 
individual in PVS might live on for years (indeed, that there could be such a state), 
medical technology can now allow such situations. In consequence, such aspects of 
the human being which were once thought of as being inextricably dependent upon 
one another - and thus, their cessation as being necessarily coincident - can now exist 
separately.
So, in a sense, medical advances have provided as many problems as solutions; or, as 
Robert Schwager puts it,
the very success of modern medical science raises both ethical and legal 
questions where previously none existed. For in the past the ability to 
save life was so limited that doing so rarely became problematical. Now, 
however, our abilities in this area are so prodigious that questions about 
their appropriate use arise daily.
If such a scenario is considered in relation to the conflicts within common or 
traditional notions of 'life', 'death', 'person', etc., it can be seen that what has 
happened through advances in medical technology is that the way in which the 
concept (or term) 'living human being' should be correctly applied is now informed 
by competing criteria. Up until now, the criteria and the occasions for applying the 
term have coincided; an individual with no cognitive function could not be kept alive.
44 This is not to say, of course, that such attempts at status reappraisal do not or have not occurred - one 
need only think of how the reclassification of the mentally ill and infirm as 'non-persons' was used by 
the Nazis in the 1930's to justify a programme of active euthanasia.
45 Schwager (1978), p.39.
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However, occasions now exist that allow the divergent application of the term in 
relation to different criteria. Thus, rather like a messy divorce, what was previously 
'ours' must now be separated into 'his' and 'hers', and criteria agreed for that 
purpose. The establishment of agreed criteria is contentious: should 'But my mother 
gave us that!' override an agreement to simply divide things up equally? What about 
sentimental versus financial value? However, unfortunately, few would agree that the 
definition of death should be resolved by the equivalent of a pre-nuptial agreement. 47
To anticipate my argument somewhat, let us seek to give the situation a philosophical 
footing. An analogous philosophical concern can be found in Wittgenstein's analysis 
of what is involved in 'following a rule'. 48 Wittgenstein imagines the following 
situation:
[Person] A writes series of numbers down; [person] B watches him and tries 
to find a law for the sequence of numbers [...] A has written down the 
numbers 1,5, 11, 19, 29; at this point B says he knows how to go on. What 
happened here? Various things may have happened49
By 'various things' Wittgenstein not only means 'different ways of expressing the 
same rule', but also - arguably - different rules. For instance, we might express the 
rule as 'subtracting the penultimate number in the series from the ultimate one, adding 
2 to the result, then adding the result to the last number' (i.e. 19-11=8 + 2 = 10 + 
19 = 29). However, as Wittgenstein points out, he might just simply think:
"What is the series of differences?" He finds the series 4, 6, 8, 10 and says:
Now I can go on. 50
Of course, in a sense, the two rules are the same (in that they produce the same result). 
In mathematical terms, we would say that they are equivalent. 51 However, what if 
certain circumstances arose which revealed that, actually, B was not applying A's rule 
at all, but only one which in all but exceptional and unusual circumstances produced 
an identical result? We would probably say that B had not really grasped A's rule. 
However, what if the rule in question was not one which A had thought up, but was a 
generally applied term familiar to both A and B?
46 I will explain this idea later on in a more technical way by utilisation of Quine's notion of the 
'opacity of reference' of a term.
47 Joking aside, of course, a so-called 'living will' might act in a similar way - as long as the fulfilment 
of its wishes were within the law of the land. However, this would represent, at most, one individual's 
attitude to death and quality of life, and would therefore be likely to differ between individuals. 
Furthermore, to leave the determination of death up to individuals would be an extremely 
unsatisfactory position scientifically, to say the least. 1 shall consider some of these questions in the last
chapter.
48 For a full discussion of this issue, see Kripke (1982). Kripke is sometimes criticised for 
misinterpreting Wittgenstein for his own purposes here (hence the coining of the term 'Kripkenstein' 
by some commentators), but I think for a general introduction to the problem his exposition is fine as 
the controversy centres around what Kripke takes to be Wittgenstein's solution to the problem.
49 Wittgenstein (1967), p. 59 (section 151).
50 Ibid., p.60.
51 Though we might still debate the point here as to whether they meant the same thing (in that they are 
in a sense different expressions of the rule). It depends, of course, on to what extent Wittgenstein is 
read as proposing a behaviourist-type account of meaning (as, for instance, Quine is).
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My point here is that the parallel with the definition of death scenario lies in the fact 
that up until medical practice allowed situations within which individuals might 
diverge in their application of the term 'living human being' (or 'living person'), the 
'rule' applied was (to all intents and purposes) 'opaque'. That is, the features of being 
alive which were significant to the rule-user were, in a sense, hidden. In fact, it is 
perfectly possible that there was no consideration of certain features as 'more 
significant than others, and that the 'rule' applied was the same'in each case (and 
from individual to individual), but only differed after the advent of situations which 
allowed for the diverse application of the same terms (though of course, both options 
are possible).
But why should this problem not be resolvable through conceptual analysis, or 
through the application of the understanding of the biological process of death which 
science has - or at some future time, will have - afforded us? The reason why neither 
of these possibilities represents a solution, I shall argue, is twofold: (1) there is a 
necessary 'opacity' to our linguistic concepts which novel situations can expose as 
ambivalent (where what I have called 'conceptual ambivalence' comes into play); (2) 
whilst there are established means of resolving such ambivalence in certain cases, the 
concepts we are concerned with (i.e. 'death', 'person', etc.) are - in Hilary Putnam's 
phrase - 'epistemically thick' 52 , in that they involve both factual and evaluative 
aspects. Furthermore, it may be the case that the concept of death may actually share 
more of the value side of the divide than the factual side; or even that the concepts 
which interweave with it (e.g. personal identity, autonomy, self, etc.), show that the 
concept of death itself is far more a socially-constructed concern than has previously 
been thought.
We must therefore face the possibility that the type of conflict that competing 
definitions of death represent is something which, as Brante and Hallberg suggest, 
'cannot be terminated by rational means': 53
Can we achieve a better understanding of this controversy by employing 
the concept of incommensurability? Are the problems, perspectives and 
standards of the proponents and opponents partly different? Do the 
mutually adversary perspectives constitute such dissimilar 'discrete 
entities' that they cannot rationally be compared? The difficulty in 
communicating indicates that this is indeed the case. 54
I will return in detail to the notion of conceptual ambivalence in chapter 3 where I 
look at how it relates to the problem of category membership. Also, I will deal with 
the possibility that death is a socially constructed (or, observer-relative) feature of the 
world (and therefore not necessarily purely rational) in chapters 4 and 7. However, 
before progressing to the main treatment, I will now provide a brief chapter outline.
Outline of the Argument
Firstly, in Chapter 2, I will consider the various attempts to resolve this problem to 
date, and consider primarily the attempt to define death as a strictly-biological
52 Putnam (2002), pp.28-45.
53 Brante and Hallberg (1991), p.410.
54 Ibid., p.404.
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problem. This will therefore concern approaches which resist the appeal to what may 
be termed extra-biological criteria (e.g. personal identity, moral arguments), and 
attempt to identify those biological criteria which may be considered necessary and 
sufficient for the determination of death.
In chapter 3, in light of what I take to be the failure of the strictly-biological attempt, I 
look at some reasons why I think such a failure is necessary. In doing this, I define the 
problem as one which is reflected in the general epistemological issue of category 
membership. Furthermore, utilising certain approaches stemming from Quine and 
Wittgenstein, I argue that such a problem is - due to the nature of logic and language 
- one which renders the problem of death irresolvable in purely rational terms (or at 
least, according to a positivist-type view of rationality).
As a consequence of the conclusions of the previous chapter, chapter 4 will look at the 
question of what status the concept of death has. To do this, I utilise some of John 
Searle's epistemological framework, and argue that - even if such a realist perspective 
as Searle's were true - death cannot be considered anything other than a human- 
centred, 'observer-relative' feature of reality. I furthermore argue that it is for this 
reason that the concept of death cannot be ultimately grounded in absolutely rational 
terms, and which therefore also gives rise to the problems of category membership 
considered in the previous chapter. Finally, in concluding that death is an observer- 
relative phenomenon, I also reveal the true reasons why any attempt to define human 
death in strictly-biological terms must fail.
Chapter 5 begins the consideration of extra-biological features of the human being in 
relation to the definition of death, and begins the analysis of 'partly-biological' views. 
Firstly, the status of consciousness itself is considered, and its relation to Searle's 
distinction between 'intrinsic' and 'observer-relative' features of the world is 
discussed. In addition, contemporary controversies regarding the nature of 
consciousness are examined, and their significance to the death debate is weighed up. 
Finally, I consider the question of whether the permanent absence of the capacity for 
consciousness may provide us with a necessary and sufficient criterion for human 
death.
In chapter 6, I consider various personal-identity-based attempts to present a 
successful definition of death. Also, and aside from the analysis of individual 
accounts, I consider the question of whether any personal-identity-based approach can 
free itself from the type of problems and limitations identified in previous chapters.
Having concluded the observer-relative status of the concept of death, chapter 7 looks 
at what this means in general terms for our application of it. Death is therefore 
compared with other similar types of concept and the general debate concerning the 
distinction between facts and values. Finally, light is shed on controversies concerning 
our application of the concept of death via analogy with philosophically equivalent 
scenarios (e.g. sport and games).
Chapter 8 begins to 'stretch' the concept of death, and to consider it in relation to 
extensions of its possible application. Religious and science-fiction scenarios are 
considered, and various examples are used to illustrate the problems we face in setting 
limits to the concept. Given the possibility that the concept of death has more breadth
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than may have first been imagined, are certain concepts of 'immortality' made viable? 
Is it even possible that such interpretations may allow for a more rational foundation 
for certain religious doctrines?
The final chapter returns to the everyday world and briefly looks at what possible 
consequences there may be for the foregoing conclusions in relation to practical 
concerns (i.e. medicine and law). Given that the concept of death is part of the 
socially-constructed public domain, and that we are faced with multiple possible 
parallel definitions of death, what rights or responsibilities are attendant upon 
individuals or organisations concerning death? Is there room for individual choice 
concerning our interpretation of what death is? Or must the wise legislate for the 
protection of the populace?
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2. A Biological Definition of Death
Introduction
In the search for a clear and uncontroversial definition of death, the first port of call 
would intuitively seem to be an attempt to isolate sufficient biological criteria. In most 
people's eyes, a living, functioning body is the essential prerequisite for 'being alive'; 
it would only be natural, then, to consider the definition of death to involve certain 
biological facts. For centuries, death was determined by the cardio-pulmonary 
method; that is, whether the patient was seen to maintain spontaneous heartbeat and 
respiration. Comparatively recently, 1 much controversy has been provoked by the 
suggestion that some form of 'brain death' provides a more accurate means of 
determining death. However, whilst some of the consequences of adopting such a 
criterion will be of interest later, my initial focus in this chapter will be to investigate 
the very notion that a strictly-biological definition of death is in fact possible. I say 
'strictly' here because I wish, first of all, to distinguish between two ways in which 
biological criteria may play a part in the definition of death. Firstly, it may be argued 
that the determination of death is a strictly-biological matter, and that the fulfilment of 
biological criteria provides both necessary and sufficient conditions for declaring an 
individual 'dead'. I shall therefore refer to this hereafter as the 'strictly-biological 
view'.
On the other hand, however, it may be contended that whilst certain biological criteria 
may provide necessary conditions for the determination of death, they do not provide 
sufficient ones; in other words, the assertion that certain biological facts about the 
patient's condition provide us at most with criteria which are relevant to - and may 
even be necessary for - the determination of death, but which are not sufficient in 
themselves to constitute death. For instance, it may be argued that, in cases where 
brain damage has rendered cognitive brain states impossible, but the body and 'lower' 
brain are still alive (such as in cases of persistent vegetative state), then the decision to 
declare the patient dead is not a strictly-biological one, but rather rests on certain 
extra-biological factors such as our concept of a person, or moral considerations as to 
what rights such a being is entitled to. In other words, there is a sense here that even 
where there is no dispute over the facts, what the facts mean is still open to debate -
1 Recently, that is, in relation to the whole of human history: the Ad Hoc committee of the Harvard 
Medical School to Examine the Definition of Brain Death published its report advocating brain death 
as a criterion for death, 'A Definition of Irreversible Coma', in 1968. See Beecher (1968).
2 It is not my concern here to enter into the debate about whether such brain death actually represents a 
new criterion, or whether in fact the 'traditional' cardio-pulmonary method was actually brain death 'in 
disguise', but rather to investigate whether a strictly-biological definition of death is in fact possible. 
The actual status of brain death criteria in relation to the traditional methods of determining death is 
discussed at some length in chapter 2 of Gervais (1986), where she rejects the view that there is any 
strict commonality between the two.
3 1 would distinguish here between those criteria which are necessary for the determination of death, 
and those which are relevant to it. For instance, it is a fact that many would consider to be relevant to 
the determination and definition of death that an organism may lack spontaneous function, but that fact 
may not in itself be necessary for death, for some may hold that death may take place whilst 
spontaneous function is still intact.
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perhaps because, ultimately, death is not a thing which may be strictly determined by 
'the facts'. I shall refer to this as the 'partly-biologicall view'.4
Obviously, adherents to the first view will deny that it is wise, or even possible, to 
make such a distinction. It may be argued that whilst there may be controversy over 
precisely which criteria are necessary, the fact is that medical science has - or one day 
will have - resolved these controversies, and provided us with a clear (and strictly-) 
biological definition of death. The second view, on the other hand, seems to reject the 
idea that death can be explained by a reductive appeal to purely biological criteria, 
suggesting instead that any successful definition must necessarily involve features and 
concepts which take into account the wider features of being a human person (such as 
being conscious, having social relationships, personal identity, and so on). However, 
this rejection would seem to come with its own problems: if the concept of death 
cannot be defined in a strictly-biological manner, how is consensus as to its meaning 
and application to be arrived at? Does such an approach leave the door open to the 
dangers of indeterminacy, whereby what death is becomes a battleground of 
competing values and conventions?
I will examine in subsequent chapters the relative merits of the various partly- 
biologically views, but now I will first address the question of whether death can be 
considered a strictly-biological phenomenon.
The Strictly-Biological View
It is not my place to enter into medical debates concerning which biological criteria 
may or may not constitute the loss of a certain capacity, or to decide under what 
circumstances the death of a particular organ takes place; and whilst such issues as 
whether consciousness resides in a certain part of the brain, or whether localisation of 
certain cognitive functions is in fact possible may occasionally be relevant to my 
discussion, I cannot ultimately pass judgment upon the truth of any of these questions. 
In one sense, therefore, in dealing with the issue of identifying sufficient biological 
criteria for the determination of death, I am completely reliant upon the truth of the 
picture of human functioning established by experts in the field of medical science.
However, having said this, it is important to distinguish between so-called 'medical 
facts', and any ontological or moral consequences which these may be said to have. 
As philosophers, it is with these inferences that we should be primarily concerned, 
and one of the main purposes in exploring the problematic issues which surround the 
determination of death in certain cases is to establish at just what point such issues 
become a legitimate philosophical concern. Therefore, in order to do this, we must 
along the way determine to what extent - if any - death can be considered a strictly- 
biological matter. In this sense, there will therefore be occasions when it will be 
necessary to distinguish between assertions of medical fact (on the one hand), and the 
ontological, moral, and metaphysical conclusions which some commentators think are 
entailed by them (on the other). Consequently, I will question the legitimacy of such
4 This is similar to a point made in Gervais (1986), p.2, where she argues that there is a 'decision of 
significance' involved in deciding which biological criteria are relevant to the determination of death. 
This point is of some importance, and I shall return to it in more detail in subsequent discussion.
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inferences, and whether, in fact, they are so closely entailed by statements of medical 
facts as such philosophers think.
To begin with, it should be acknowledged that the strictly-biological view has 
(arguably) the weight of common sense and public opinion on its side. 5 For many, the 
notion that death is anything other than a purely biological matter therefore sounds 
like a strange way of talking. Isn't it straightforwardly obvious that the determination 
of death merely involves biological criteria? What role might a philosopher play in 
this debate anyway? There are, of course, a large number of philosophical treatments 
of the subject of death, but a large percentage of these to date deal with what might be 
termed the existential consequences of our ultimate demise. 6 However, in the context 
we are concerned with here, death is problematic in a different way, for - at least on 
the face of it - it is not what death means to us that is important, or how we should 
face life in consequence of death's inevitability, but what in fact it is, and how it may 
be clearly defined.
However, the first question to address here is what is meant by 'a strictly-biological 
definition of death'. I will take this phrase to refer to a view of death that denies the 
relevance of certain moral and metaphysical concerns - whilst they might be relevant 
in the wider context (e.g. the ultimate fate of the organism) - to its definition. The 
proponents of such definitions make two main assumptions: (1) the definition of death 
is a factual concern involving biological criteria only, and (2) it is possible in this way 
to operate in a realm of facts divorced from 'external' considerations (e.g. moral or 
metaphysical concerns).
Since (2) is the wider, more theoretical assumption, I will first address (1), using the 
issues which arise there as a jumping off point for the more abstract debate (whilst I 
will touch upon (2) towards the end of this chapter, it will be more directly addressed 
in subsequent chapters).
Death as a Biological Fact
The treatment of death as a factual concern involving only biological criteria supposes 
that the controversies surrounding this debate can be allayed by appeal to purely 
biological matters of fact. As Karen Gervais puts it:
The biologists have claimed that it is possible to put forth a strictly- 
biological definition of death. They assume that death is essentially a 
biological phenomenon, and that the effort by moralists to define human 
death fails because it confuses a quality-of-life issue with a definitional 
problem. 7
5 In Western secular society at least.
6 See, for instance, Luper-Foy (1987), Nagel (1979), Rosenbaum (1989), Cox (1999), and Schultz 
(2000), which consider such questions as whether or not death can always be considered a misfortune 
for the person concerned, the significance and legitimacy of various attitudes towards death, and other 
existential questions.
7 Gervais (1986), p.46. Note that by 'biologists' and 'moralists', Gervais is characterizing two of what 
she thinks of as the three main approaches to the definition of death (the third she labels the 
'ontologists'). However, in doing this, Gervais is merely following a tripartite distinction first made by 
Green and Daniel Wikler (1980). Thus, what I term the 'strictly-biological view' covers the biologists.
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The implication of such a biological approach is therefore that this 'definitional 
problem' can be solved by the isolation of the correct criteria. Versions of the strictly- 
biological approach therefore usually concern the sufficiency of one of the following 
sets of possible criteria:
  The cardio-pulmonary method (the 'traditional' definition): the cessation of 
heartbeat and breathing.
  Organismic death: the death of the whole organism.
  Whole-brain death (the definition currently adopted in the US): the irreversible 
cessation of all brain activity (due to neurological damage caused by anoxia 
(lack of oxygen) for example).
  Brain-stem death (the definition currently adopted in the UK): when 'the brain 
stem has been damaged from whatever cause in such a way and to such a 
degree that its functions (which include the neural control of cardiac and 
pulmonary function) are irreversibly destroyed'. 8
  Neocortical death (or 'higher-brain' death): the irreversible loss of the capacity 
for cognitive thought, rationality, consciousness, etc. (though functional 
integration may still be possible).
I will therefore now briefly consider these approaches in the light of prevalent 
criticism, before going on to point out what I personally consider to be the ultimate 
problems for the strictly-biological view in general.
The Cardie-Pulmonary Method: Jonas and Evans and Pre-rational Attitudes
Prior to the advent of medical technology that allowed for the artificial maintenance 
and prolongation of life (e.g. the ventilator, heart-transplant techniques, etc.), the 
traditionally accepted criteria for determining death were the cessation of spontaneous 
respiration and heartbeat. Thus, in Shakespeare's King Lear we find Lear seeking to 
confirm the presence of life in his daughter, Cordelia, by the presence of breath:
Lend me a looking-glass; 
If that her breath will mist or stain the stone, 
Why then she lives. 9
The misted mirror might therefore be thought of as one of the first technological aids 
in the diagnosis of death.
However, as Tom Russell rightly points out, the diagnosis of death has long been a 
problematic and complex issue, and it should not be assumed that there was ever a 
'Golden Age of Heart and Lungs'. 10 Rather, we should take the persistence of the 
cardio-pulmonary criteria as a sign of the importance of these features in our concept 
of a human being. For instance, spontaneous respiration and heartbeat go a long way
whilst the 'partly-biological view' covers the moralists and ontologists, and any other non-strictly- 
biological view.
8 Department of Health (1998), p.l.
9 Shakespeare (1972), V.3.259-61.
10 Russell (2000), p.l 1.
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towards explaining the disquiet we feel at the living, breathing, but (in some cases) 
irreversibly unconscious patient in a persistent vegetative state.
This said, given the growing number of arguments advanced in support of brain-death 
criteria (some of which we shall consider shortly), and its increasing acceptance in 
medical practice, it might be assumed that the cardio-pulmonary criteria must now be 
considered obsolete. However, this is not wholly the case, and there are still advocates 
of a heart-lung centred approach. Two such advocates that I will briefly consider here 
are Hans Jonas and Martyn Evans.
Firstly, Jonas argues that adopting brain-death criteria ignores the significance of the 
functioning of the rest of the organism for our concept of a living human being. In this 
regard, the continued beating of the heart and potential for spontaneous respiration in 
a brain-dead patient is still a sign of the 'residual continuance of the subject', 12 and 
must therefore be respected. In this sense, Jonas is primarily concerned with resisting 
the potential abuses of the existence of beating-heart potential transplant donors. 13
Similarly, Evans argues that
Disputes about which functions 'count for life' [...] are not, and never 
have been, purely scientific. They are disputes among rival conceptions 
of what human life essentially is: that is, they are essentially 
metaphysical disputes. Since science is, and must remain, silent on such 
disputes, how can they be settled? 14
For this reason, Evans considers 'our primitive, pre-rational reactions and attitudes' 
to provide us with grounds on which to base our moral attitudes to the near-dead. So, 
because of the moral repugnance that is generally felt at the thought of the 'cremation 
of the "beating heart cadaver'", 16 we must reject the adoption of brain-death criteria 
which would allow this to happen.
Therefore, modern proponents of the cardio-pulmonary method (such as Jonas and 
Evans) need not necessarily be proposing an alternative method of determining death 
(as if they advocated a return to the (outdated) practices of a hundred years ago), but 
are rather seeking to set a conservative threshold to the declaration of death. The issue 
is therefore not that some version of brain-death criteria does not in fact account for 
the cessation of those features which it is claimed to be responsible for; in other words, 
Jonas and Evans do not seem to be arguing that there is more going on in the human 
being - in a biological sense - than brain-death advocates assume. Rather, it would 
seem that they simply see the notion of the person as more deeply embedded in our 
primitive reactions and attitudes (as Evans calls them) than do the brain-death 
advocates. Furthermore, ignoring these reactions does not leave us with a 
scientifically respectable definition of death, because the alternative attitudes (i.e.
Jonas (1974).
Ibid.,p.58.
As is notoriously the case in China - see, for example, Wang (2002).
Evans (1990), p.229.
Thid..n.230.15 Ibid.,p.  
16 Ibid
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those which involve brain-death criteria) are nonetheless based on similar, non- 
rational attitudes at to what is significant about a person.
This is a position with which I have a particular sympathy - though I do not 
necessarily wish to propose a return to the cardio-pulmonary method, or indeed to 
advocate the sort of appeal to primitive reactions that Evans and Jonas seem to 
suggest. However, I do feel that the recognition of what might be called 'extra- 
biological features' of the person - which includes personal identity, social role, the 
emotional reaction provoked by their status, etc. - provides a better way-in to 
understanding what human death really is. 17
I will return to this point repeatedly over the course of the following chapters, but for 
the moment it will suffice to note that an approach such as that of Jonas and Evans 
serves to widen the debate in fruitful ways. So, whilst there are those aspects of (for 
instance) Evans's approach which directly address the more technical issue of whether 
or not brain-stem death is an empirically clear enough diagnostic candidate, there is 
also the recognition that what we are faced with here are competing criteria (some of 
which are biological, and some of which are extra-biological). So,
brainstem criteria for human death must in any case be perceived as in 
competition with other rival criteria for death since scientific criteria 
arise out of a given conception, and do not adjudicate among different 
conceptions 18
This seems a Wirtgensteinian point: our concepts are not neatly circumscribed by a 
rational boundary, but are interwoven with our pre-rational reactions within the 
'forms of life' in which they have their setting. For instance:
It is what human beings say that is true and false; and they agree in the 
language that they use. That is not agreement in opinions but in forms 
oflife. 19
Such agreement therefore is not a matter of rational agreement in what we hold to be 
true or false, but rather in the common practices we share, in that which 'has to be 
accepted, the given' ('forms oflife'). 20 It is that we agree in such primitive reactions 
that we can agree rationally - if we did not, then the whole basis of meaning would 
disappear. A further consequence of this, of course, is that we cannot neatly divorce 
certain aspects of our concepts form one another (not, at least, without distorting them 
or acting arbitrarily), and furthermore - for instance - we should not ignore or seek to 
'explain away' those aspects of our concepts which no longer fit a rational reductive 
account, for they may be an integral part of our 'form oflife'.
To return to the significance of beating heart criteria, in this sense, many advocates of 
brain-death criteria who have criticised the cardio-pulmonary method would seem to 
have missed the significance of this aspect of the debate. For instance, in arguing
17 It is an important question as to whether human death is in fact of a different kind to death in the 
natural world in general. I will consider this later on.
18 Evans (1994), p.4.
19 Wittgenstein (1967), p.88, s.241.
20 Ibid., p.226.
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against Jonas and Evans, Tom Russell construes the point as being whether or not 
brain-death criteria are sufficient for determining death. So, his arguments focus on 
such questions as whether, since the hypothalamus controls the homeostasis of the 
organism (including spontaneous respiration, heartbeat, etc.), we can consider lack of 
homeostasis as coterminous with death. Russell further points out that the function of 
the heart itself is a reflex that can be kept going long-after the rest of the organism has 
failed, and that therefore we must reject the cardio-pulmonary criteria as 
insufficient. 21 I shall return to Russell's position shortly, but it should be observed 
here that he treats Jonas and Evans's position solely as providing competing 
biological criteria for death, whereas - I argue - the position is more complicated and 
subtle than that: technical arguments aside, death, they suggest (and I agree), is not 
something which can be decided in purely biological and scientific terms. 22
It may be objected here that, in siding with Jonas and Evans on this point, I am 
favouring the irrational over the rational. However, I think this misses its mark in 
assuming that our concepts can be completely rationally grounded. I shall return to 
this issue in detail in the next chapter.
Organismic Death: Laurence C. Becker and the 'Being/Has Been' Boundary
Rather than focusing on specific organs or processes, some commentators have 
chosen to argue that death should be construed as death of the organism as a whole. In 
exploring this view, I will concentrate one of its main advocates, Laurence C. Becker.
In his article 'Human Being: The Boundaries of the Concept',23 Becker argues that the 
main focus of any attempt to define death should centre on the stage at which the 
biological organism of the human being ceases to function as a whole. In consequence, 
Becker rejects not only non-biological approaches to defining death (such as appeals 
to the quality of life of the patient, or his or her right to life, or even personal-identity- 
based arguments), but also biological approaches which single out the failure of 
specific organs within that organism (for instance, the brain or heart) as a sufficient 
criterion for declaring death.24
A human organism is dead when, for whatever reason, the system of 
those reciprocally dependent processes which assimilate oxygen, 
metabolize food, eliminate wastes, and keep the organism in relative 
homeostasis are arrested in a way that the organism itself cannot reverse 
[...] Loss of consciousness is not death any more than is the loss of a 
limb.25
21 Russell (2000), pp. 140-6.
22 As Evans himself states, methodological problems aside, 'my principal objection to the brainstem 
conception of death is itself a conceptual one; [...] science cannot adjudicate between rival 
conceptions.' (Evans 1994, p.7).
23 Becker (1975).
24 As will be seen shortly, in this respect Decker's position is similar to that of Russell (2000). However, 
whilst both may be said to identify homeostasis as a significant feature, Becker refuses to identify a 
locus for this process, whilst Russell identifies the hypothalamus in the mid-brain. This said, points 
which count against Becker may also count against Russell.
25 Becker (1975), p.353.
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Becker's approach is therefore a holistic one which looks to the state of functioning of 
the organism as a whole. It should be noted here, however, that it is possible to 
distinguish between (1) 'death of the whole organism', and (2) 'death of the organism 
as a whole'. We can argue, for instance, that 'death of the whole organism' requires 
the death of each and every organ in the body, whilst 'death of the organism as a 
whole' merely requires the permanent loss of the integrative functioning of the whole 
organism. " Since the former can occur long after medical practice has 
uncontroversially pronounced death (especially if we define organism to include not 
just organ function, but life processes in general), then (1) is generally too 
conservative a criterion. Therefore, in talking of 'death of the organism', (2) is 
generally intended.
In taking this approach, Becker considers both the beginning and end of life, arguing 
that the beginning - or the 'becoming/being' boundary, as he calls it - should be 
marked by the completion of the generative phase of development of the foetus, 
whilst the end of it - the 'being/has-been' boundary - should be marked by the 
disintegration of the functional organisation of the organism. The fact that the 
organism is kept alive by artificial means is not in itself a reason to consider that 
organism dead; 'it is simply an organism kept alive mechanically'. 27
In the light of this definition, we can see that Becker views death as a process, rather 
than an event. The gradual failure of individual organs thus represents the process of 
dying, a process which is only complete when the system as a whole cannot be 
functionally maintained, either by its own means, or artificially. It is this holistic 
approach, therefore, which characterises Becker's opposition to the adoption of brain 
death as a sufficient criterion for death itself.
Brain death is not a definition of death, not even a criterion of death. It is
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merely a criterion for deciding when coma is irreversible.
Becker therefore wishes to distinguish between a clear, biological definition of death, 
on the one hand, and moral prescriptions for the near-dead on the other. To consider 
someone in a state of irreversible coma 'dead' is, for Becker, 'rigging the definition of 
death'. 29 Rather, Becker is content to allow his 'being' and 'has-been' boundaries to 
define the concept of a human being, and for the moral arguments to take place 
separately. This means, for Becker, that whether the patient is alive or dead does not 
directly entail the presence or absence of moral obligations.
People live, but sometimes in such hopeless conditions that one may 
morally and legally give up trying to save them. People die, but 
sometimes can be revived. Their death does not in itself relieve us of 
moral obligations toward them. The reversibility of death is more likely 
the moral divide. [...] The morality of dealing with the dead, whether
26 See Jonas (1978), pp.53-4, where he defends himself against the charge of confusion in the use of 
these two terms.




reversibly dead or not, is a matter for further argument. It is not settled by 
this definition. 30
It can be seen here that Decker's definition of death leads him into talk of 
'reversibility'. This is somewhat puzzling: having defined death as the functional 
disintegration of the organism, Becker seems to imply that, because death is a process, 
there may be some doubt as to when exactly the functional disintegration has reached 
an irreversible stage: 'people die, but sometimes can be revived'. This interpretation is 
borne out by Seeker's reference to the recovery of a 5-year-old boy who had been 
submerged in icy water for 22 minutes. 31 Here, although the boy appeared completely 
dead, he in fact made an almost total recovery. So, Becker implies, his 'death' was 
'reversed'. Death is therefore reversible in the sense that we may decide to continue 
heroic efforts beyond a point where it would be acceptable - legally and morally - to 
give up.
This is where Becker's view becomes confusing. Having been at pains to define death 
in strictly-biological, non-moral terms, his introduction of the concept of reversibility 
seems to undermine his efforts. To say that death becomes reversible in relation to 
legal and moral concerns would seem to suggest that such extra-biological factors 
have a role in determining when we might consider someone dead (if moral 
considerations can reverse death, then whether someone 'recovers' from death is 
partly a moral decision). Furthermore, in the above case, it would seem more natural 
to talk of the boy as not actually being dead, rather than that his death was 'reversed'. 
Becker has already suggested that death is a process (in as much as functional 
disintegration is gradual), so why then does he insist on reversibility? Processes, of 
course, are sometimes reversible, but it is arguably better to think of 'death' as the last 
stop on the journey of 'dying'; so, someone is 'dead' when the process of dying is 
complete. It would therefore seem to be more in keeping with his other views for 
Becker to talk of death as an extended and potentially shifting point (in relation to 
knowledge and technology) at the end of the continuum of dying. However, to present 
death as a distinct point which we can go beyond and return from suggests that what 
has been defined is not death at all, but rather something which resembles it (just as, 
in the boy's case, hypothermia might). In such a case, it is the process of dying which 
has been reversed, and not death itself.
It is somewhat surprising, in the course of reading Becker's paper, to reach this point 
of confusion. It seemed that, up until that point, Becker had distinguished clearly 
between cases of death from functional disintegration of the organism, and cases 
where individuals were technically alive, but where it might be morally permissible to 
withdraw artificial support and heroic efforts. Furthermore, given his rejection of 
brain death as a sufficient criterion for death itself, it would seem that moral 
arguments could be supplied to justify the withdrawal of artificial support from the 
irreversibly comatose without actually labelling them 'dead'. However, the 
introduction of the possibility of reversibility muddies this distinction, for instead of 
saying, 'Although this person is still a human being and is therefore technically alive, 
we may make a moral decision to remove life support', Becker now seems to be 
saying, 'There are certain occasions when a person may appear dead and, whilst it
30 Ibid., pp.357-8.iDia .j-> i o  
31 Ibid., p.357, n.19.
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would not be immoral to discontinue heroic efforts, successful continuation of those 
efforts may "reverse" the patient's death'.
Whether Becker is trying to simply allow for the frailty of human knowledge in 
diagnosing death, or the progression of technology and its role in 'reversing' death, is 
unclear, but it would seem that he cannot on the one hand complain of the attempt to 
'rig death' (in the case of supplying a moral divide), whilst on the other admit the 
possibility of reversing it according to moral criteria - especially after having been at 
such pains to draw a non-moral divide in the first place. Wouldn't it have been 
simpler to say, in the above case, 'We thought the boy was dead, but we managed to 
bring him back'? Becker's approach would therefore seem to leave us with possible 
instances where it is open as to whether someone is actually alive or not, for even 
though we have all the biological facts, their interpretation is subject to the possibility 
of reversal.
This point of confusion aside, there remain other problems with Becker's view. First 
of all, it may be argued that a purely organismic approach to death leaves out a great 
deal of what is significant about the concept. This is highlighted by Gervais:
Becker's position commits us to the claim that someone who has been 
decapitated, yet whose body is being maintained so that "those 
reciprocally dependent processes which assimilate oxygen, metabolize 
food, eliminate wastes, and keep the organism in relative homeostasis" 
(353) continue in stride, is alive.
Here, we are left with the somewhat absurd situation that a headless body can be 
considered alive. But why is this absurd? Perhaps Becker would argue that the role of 
the 'lower' brain has been replaced by artificial means, and that what we are left with 
is no different to someone in a state of irreversible coma whose higher cognitive 
functions will never return. However, even if Becker could defend himself in such a 
way, Gervais has a point: the reason we find such an example initially absurd is 
because it violates in a number of ways our traditional notions as to what is essential 
to a human being: firstly, it is difficult to imagine that a body existing without a head 
is a human being - except maybe in nightmares or horror films (though we might 
imagine a head existing without a body); 33 secondly, the permanent absence of 
consciousness is brought home to us in the most graphic way (whereas a body with its 
head intact, even though it has suffered irreversible loss of higher cognitive function, 
still goes some way to suggesting to us - merely as a result of bodily integrity - that
32 Gervais (1986), p. 57 (the number in brackets in the quoted passage refers to the page of Becker's 
article which she is quoting from).
33 In fact, the picturing of a headless body as purposively alive is a key component of the horror we feel 
(as is wonderfully brought out in the film Sleepy Hollow - Burton, 1999). It is not simply the 
unnaturalness of this situation which is unnerving, but the impossibility of what this suggests (i.e. that a 
headless body can to all other intents and purposes be 'alive' and possess features common to a 
'normal' body - e.g. intent, awareness, etc.). Ultimately, I will argue, the reason for this disquiet is the 
central role played by the capacity for conscious thought and volition in our concept of a human being. 
For instance, in Bram Stoker's Dracula (1993), it is the presence of consciousness and purpose 
together with the absence of other conventional signs of life which completely unnerves the human 
characters presented with the 'undead' vampire.
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the person still in some way exists). 34 So, whilst Gervais's point may not be decisive 
against Seeker's views for the reasons given, the hypothetical situation does highlight 
that the reason we may find Becker's concept of integrated organic functioning of the 
organism plausible is that it is a necessary condition for the those aspects of a human 
being which we also find essential (e.g. consciousness, responsivity, etc). It is only 
when this is made explicit to us by the decapitation example that these conceptual 
assumptions become apparent, and we begin to find Becker's solely biological 
account more difficult to accept. I am not here suggesting that such assumptions are 
correct, or even that they are coherent (I will leave such questions for the moment). 35 
However, what I am suggesting is that it is difficult to see how the concept of death 
can ever be completely disentangled from such extra-biological views of the person. 
This point, which I shall explore in greater depth later on, therefore suggests that not 
only is a strictly-biological definition of death difficult to imagine, but it is also at 
odds with certain common concepts of life and death. 36
I will return to Becker later where I will summarize what I think are the more 
fundamental underlying issues with the strictly-biological approach. However, in the 
above discussion, I have tried not only to show that Becker's position is internally 
incoherent (as in his use of the idea of the 'reversibility' of death), but also to suggest 
that an organismic definition of death can - under certain conditions - be made to 
ignore key aspects of the concept of a human being; furthermore, that 'human 
organism' and 'human being' are not coterminous (the latter, in my meaning, having a 
broader, extra-biological aspect). However, before moving on to more general 
discussion, I will now look at three other biological approaches, all of which centre 
around the functional capacity of a single organ: the brain. Brain-centred approaches 
may be divided into three sub-categories: brain-stem, whole-brain, and higher-brain 
(neocortical) criteria. Discussion of the latter, since it is closely linked with arguments 
to do with personal identity and consciousness, I shall keep to the later chapters which 
are dedicated to these topics. Similarly, as regards whole-brain death criteria, we are 
faced with the question of whether positing the absence of total brain function is an 
overly conservative criterion for determining death.
34 Some advocates of the cardio-pulmonary criteria reject the idea that such a decapitated body could 
still be considered 'alive' on the grounds that the heart is still beating, because such heartbeat as 
persists would not be 'seriously persistent', and its 'normally integrated environment would be 
disrupted' (Evans 1994, p.7). Evans's point here, of course, is that the cardio-pulmonary case is not 
undermined by the decapitation scenario.
35 Ultimately, in later chapters, I will be very interested in whether these 'assumptions' can be cashed 
out rationally, and what status they in fact possess.
36 It should be noted that in referring to common concepts or notions I am not seeking to accord such 
things any special or privileged status. Furthermore, when I talk of 'the common concept of death' or 
'competing notions as to what a person is', I am not assuming that these are clearly defined concepts 
(though, of course, sometimes they are - as when they form part of a philosophical theory), or that 
there are a finite number of them, but merely that in the debate concerning the definition of death, the 
conflict should be seen as stemming from the application of competing notions (whatever they are). 
Obviously, it is the job of philosophical analysis to clarify such concepts, whether to show that they are 
confused or in some way borne out. So, in defining death, the role of philosophy must be to determine 
to what extent common concepts of what is and isn't a living human being can be in some way justified. 
It will be my argument, however, that such justification - whether in terms of biological criteria or 
conceptual analysis (as to what is meant by 'death', 'human being', etc.) - cannot ultimately resolve 
the issue. I shall return to this in more detail in the latter sections of this chapter.
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The report of the Harvard Medical School's Ad Hoc Committee in 1968 37 first began 
the shift away from heart and lung centred criteria for the determination of death, and 
this was followed by the report to the President's Commission in 1981, 38 which 
helped establish these criteria as standard practice in the USA. However, many 
commentators have argued that this represents an unnecessarily conservative 
standpoint, and that - without necessarily resorting to personal-identity- or 
consciousness-based arguments - more parsimonious criteria are a more legitimate 
and accurate means of determining death. Furthermore, as Peter Black notes, the 
whole-brain death approach contains a wide range of criteria, it being variously 
argued that it is 'enough to describe a state from which survival of bodily function has 
not been seen', 'it is necessary to predict widespread severe brain necrosis on post- 
mortem examination', or that there must be a flat EEC or 'an arteriogram that shows 
no intracranial filling'. 40 Clinical precision and medical need alone would therefore 
seem to argue for a refinement of brain-death criteria.
However, the move away from whole-brain centred criteria should not necessarily in 
itself be seen as an advance in technological knowledge and understanding, and there 
are those who propose retaining the whole-brain death approach based on tutiorist 
principles (i.e. if in doubt, take the safer course). For instance, in Walton (1987), we 
find:
In whole-brain death, therefore, the highest standards of probability are 
satisfied that there is no possibility of return to a level of function 
compatible with any form of awareness.41
Moreover tutiorist concerns still persist in some quarters as to the adequacy and 
certainty of more parsimonious criteria,42 so we may still argue that this debate is not 
yet medically resolved.
However, aside from these worries, the debate reveals similar issues to those already 
raised by Jonas and Evans: science cannot necessarily adjudicate on socially- 
embedded concepts such as personhood and quality of life, and these in turn will 
decide what the respective criteria mean. So, in asking the question, "Is whole-brain 
death too conservative a criterion for death itself?" we need to consider whether a 
more parsimonious criterion (e.g. brain-stem death) can act as a sine qua non for the 
totality of the range of related concepts as to what constitutes a living human being.
I will therefore consider the question of the adequacy of whole-brain death criterion 
by consideration of its more slim-line offspring: brain-stem death.
Brain-Stem Death: Pallis and Lamb and Functional Integration
In considering brain-stem death, I shall look at two of its main proponents: 
Christopher Pallis and David Lamb.43
37 Beecher(1968). 
38 Lynn(1981).
39 E.g. Puccetti (1976), Pallis (1983), Veatch (1975), to note some early opponents.
40 Black (1978a),p.338.
41 Walton (1987), p.99.
42 See Russell (2000), p.28, and Evans (1994), p.3.
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Pallis's position, in his own words, 'seeks to combine philosophical and physiological 
considerations.' 44 However, the locus of these considerations is the function of the 
brain-stem:
The loss of the capacity for consciousness and of the capacity to breathe 
relate to functional disturbances at opposite ends of the brain stem, 
while the former is also a meaningful alternative to 'the departure of the 
soul'.45
For Pallis, then, the death of the brain stem accounts for the permanent cessation of 
the dual aspects of the living human being: the 'departure of the soul' (in Pallis's 
modern sense of the capacity for consciousness and related concepts of psychological 
personal identity), and the loss of functional integration of the organism ('cessation of 
the function of the "organism as a whole'" as Pallis calls it).46
When the human organism has irreversibly lost the crucial capacity for 
consciousness and the ability to breathe (and thereby to maintain a 
spontaneous heart beat), and when moreover it has lost such important 
responses to its environment as the homeostatic maintenance of 
temperature and blood pressure (which are mediated through or by the 
brain stem), in which sense can it be said to be an independent 
biological unit?47
Brain-stem function, then, for Pallis, is the prerequisite of a wider concept of the 
organism than is found in other definitions. In as much as a functioning brain stem is a 
condition of consciousness, I will deal with the consequences of this later (where the 
role of consciousness itself as a criterion is considered). However, in relation to the 
other consequence of cessation of brain-stem function - the loss of functional 
integration - this is a concern which he shares with David Lamb. Therefore, I shall 
now turn to an analysis of Lamb's views, considering the conclusions reached there as 
applicable to this aspect of Pallis's criterion also.
Whilst also favouring a brain-stem approach, David Lamb is at pains to establish a 
strictly-biological definition of death. Lamb argues, in line with Becker, that the idea 
that death 'must be socially or legally defined by morally relevant characteristics [...] 
would [...] be dangerous' because 'appeals to social, religious, and moral criteria 
come both from advocates and adversaries of euthanasia' and 'the issue of defining 
death should not be confused with the quality of residual life or with the decision on 
when, if ever, lives should be terminated'. 48 Furthermore, Lamb states that any appeal 
to personal identity is inappropriate, and that any such attempt would create a
43 There are many others who share this view, but for my purposes Pallis and Lamb, as two of the 
earliest advocates, represent the range of positions. Others, such as Russell (2000) and Gervais (1986), 
use brain-stem death in conjunction with (or as a basis for) other criteria, so I discuss these separately.




48 Lamb (1978), p.145.
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conceptual rift with 'one kind of death for humans and another kind for other life 
forms.' 49
However, Lamb's main point of disagreement with Becker is over his attitude to 
brain-stem death. For Becker, the death of the brain stem is not - because of the 
development of artificial means of maintaining heartbeat and respiration - equivalent 
to the death of the organism; the brain is just another organ with a particular 
functional role in the organism as a whole. It is only the irreversible demise of the 
organism itself which constitutes death. However, Lamb considers this to be an 
avoidance - or ignorance - of the facts. He argues that, since 'the brain-stem, not the 
heart, is recognised as the specific area which regulates all vital processes', 50 death of 
the brain stem means that:
The heart and other organs can never again function naturally. At most 
the heart and lungs can be mechanically operated for two weeks. But 
during this period one would be merely ventilating a corpse. There are no 
reversals of brain-stem death. 51
Lamb also criticizes Becker's holistic approach by arguing that in defining death as a 
process with no distinct endpoint, Seeker's view ultimately entails a vague and 
problematic definition of death. Lamb considers this an unacceptable consequence of 
the traditional cardio-pulmonary definition.
Confusion over the "reversibility of death" reveals the limits of an 
exclusive reliance upon traditional criteria. Faced with the possibility of 
unlimited resuscitation, Becker is committed to talk of death as a 
reversible event. 52
As has been already pointed out, this is a problem for Becker: either someone who is 
revived from the brink was not really dead in the first place, or the 'being/has-been' 
boundary is a vague and shifting one. Becker seems caught between the two positions: 
he doesn't want death to be defined in social, moral, or legal terms; and yet, he 
doesn't want to imply that discontinuation of medical efforts is always morally 
culpable. The latter, certainly, is a genuine concern, as it involves the sort of extra- 
biological factors that Becker and Lamb wish to avoid (whether you are dead or not 
should not depend, for instance, on arguments to do with who most deserves the 
ventilator). However, given a definition of death as a process which allows for 
occasional 'reversals', this seems unavoidable.
(But why, it may be asked, is the notion of irreversibility so important? Aside from 
the already noted concern that extra-biological (e.g. moral) factors should not play a 
part in determining when someone is dead, it might be argued that there is nothing
49 Lamb (1985), p. 93. I will discuss the personal identity approach to the problem later where, in 
discussion of the view's proponents (such as Gervais), I consider this objection of Lamb (for, 
conversely, it may be that, given the widely differing characteristics of living organisms, the concepts 
of 'being alive' and 'individual identity' that we utilize for humans may not be easily applicable to 
other species).
50 Lamb (1978), p. 146.
51 Ibid., p. 147. 
52 Ibid.,p.l51.
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wrong with the general notion of the reversibility of death in strictly-biological terms. 
So, a person may be in a state of death (just as they are in a coma), and they may 
recover. This is not a point that Lamb directly addresses, but we might argue that 
irreversibility is central to the concept of death, and that - without it - death is not 
death at all. Answering this question fully, however, involves a conceptual analysis of 
death (something that I shall undertake in a later chapter), so I shall not address the 
issue here. However, for the moment, and in sympathy with Lamb, we might question 
how exactly a concept of death as reversible could be distinguished from other serious 
illnesses. In light of this, the inscription on comedian Spike Milligan's gravestone - 
'Told you I was ill' - takes on a whole new meaning! Lamb's concern, therefore, is to 
maintain the binary and mutually exclusive relationship between the concepts of life 
and death - though why he (or anyone) should want to do this, I shall examine in 
detail later on.)
Lamb seeks to avoid the reversibility problem by attempting to define death as a 
distinct event: that of irreversible brain-stem death.
The brainstem contains (in its upper part) crucial centres responsible for 
generating the capacity for consciousness. In its lower part it contains the 
respiratory centre. It is death of the brainstem [...] which produces the 
crucial signs (apnoeic coma [lack of capacity to breathe spontaneously]) 
which doctors detect at the bedside, when they diagnose brain death. 53
So, for Lamb, what he terms 'systematic death' (the definition favoured by Decker) is 
only ever 'a mechanism for causing brain death and it is only lethal if it lasts long 
enough for certain critical areas of the brain to die.' Therefore, even if systematic 
death occurs, the ultimate cause of death is damage to that part of the brain which 
ultimately controls the systematic process. In other words, aspects of the system may 
fail - such as heartbeat and respiration - but may be restarted. However, if the brain 
stem is damaged, then those processes can never be restarted so that spontaneous 
function is resumed. Thus, for Lamb, artificial respiration of the brain-dead is literally 
'ventilating a corpse'. 55
However, it is not solely the inability to resume spontaneous function that Lamb 
considers a sign of death. Firstly, Lamb argues that the brain stem is the 'critical 
system' of the organism. As such, it is responsible for the integration and functioning 
of the sub-systems and organs which constitute the organism. Hence:
Given that life is essentially a matter of organisation, the moment of 
death is not the cessation of breathing and circulation but when breathing 
and circulation lack neurological integration. 56
Thus the cessation of spontaneous respiration and heartbeat only entail death when the 
critical system that controls and regulates them (the brain stem) can no longer 
function. For Lamb, this is true even when respiration and heartbeat are maintained by 
artificial means. This is because when the brain stem dies
53 Lamb (1985), p. 5.
54 Ibid., p.4.
55 Lamb (1978), p.147. 
56 Lamb(1985),p.26.
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a point has been reached where the various subsystems lack neurological 
integration and their continued (artificial) functioning only mimics 
integrated life. [...] The death of the brain is the point beyond which 
other systems cannot survive with, or without, mechanical support. 57
This is an important point, and one which we shall return to shortly. In current 
medical experience, death of the brain stem soon results in significant functional 
disintegration of the organism as a whole - even where life support mechanisms are in 
use. Thus for Lamb, the idea that the function of the brain stem can be substituted by 
mechanical life-support is fundamentally wrong, for these aids do not in fact replace 
the function of the brain stem at all.
what they actually substitute for are the functions of the intercostal 
muscles and diaphragm, which without neuronal drive from the 
brainstem cannot function spontaneously
It is as if, Lamb implies, we had picked up a dead body and made lifelike motions 
with its arms and legs; what we have is a semblance or mimicry of life, and not the 
genuine article. The other important assertion that Lamb makes, therefore, is that the 
function of the brain stem is irreplaceable, and consequently, not only does its demise 
represent the loss of its integrative faculty, but more importantly the irreversible death 
of the organism. This concept of irreversibility is vital for Lamb for two reasons: (1) 
he wishes to avoid the notion, inherent in Decker's definition, that death is in any way 
uncertain or may shift according to circumstance (you're either dead or you're not); 
(2) in order for death to be defined in a strictly-biological sense, death of the brain 
stem needs to be a sufficient criterion for death per se.
(1) is linked to Lamb's desire for clear, medically applicable criteria that can be used 
to disambiguate the status of those near death. As such, brain-stem death therefore 
allows us to treat death as a definable event, rather than what Lamb considers to be 
Becker's somewhat nebulous conception of death as a process. The second reason is 
linked to Lamb's desire to exclude non-medical criteria from his definition. Brain- 
stem death just is the death of the organism, and he has little patience with any 
suggestion that this is not the case, or that the functions of the brain stem may one day 
be replicated by artificial means.
Before moving on to my criticisms of Lamb, it is important to point out that Lamb's 
equation of death of the organism with brain-stem death means that those patients 
whose brain-stem function is intact, but whose 'higher' cognitive capacities will never 
return, are still alive. This includes those in a persistent vegetative state, but more 
broadly those individuals who - for whatever reason - can never employ such 
cognitive faculties again. Lamb is quite rightly afraid here that using a criterion of 
lack of capacity for consciousness (or neocortical death) might, via a slippery slope 
argument, lead to the classification of the mentally deficient as 'dead'. 59 However, he
57 Ibid., p.37.
58 Ibid., p.39.
59 See, for instance, Alexander (1949), where the author describes the way in which the principle of 
relieving suffering was exploited by the Nazis for their own political purposes. He then considers the 
possibility that a similar change in emphasis away from amelioration and towards rehabilitation (where
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also correctly points out that the capacity for consciousness itself cannot be isolated in 
the 'upper' brain (or cerebral cortex), and that key components for awareness (such as 
the reticular activating system) are actually situated in the brain stem itself. On the 
other hand, Lamb rejects 'whole-brain death' as essentially too conservative, in that if 
brain-stem death is indeed a sufficient criterion (which he thinks it is), then such 
caution is unnecessary. In other words, why wait for the whole brain to die, when the 
brain's significant feature (as far as being alive is concerned) is the functional 
integration of the organism supplied by a working brain stem. Lamb's position is 
therefore, in a way, a refinement of Becker's position: using brain-stem death as a 
criterion for death per se allows us not only to treat death as a definite event (as 
opposed to a process), but also to pinpoint the sine qua non of true functional 
integration (the brain stem).
The main point at which I wish to take issue with Lamb is the idea of the 
irreplaceability of the brain stem - which, incidentally, is a position he would seem to 
share with Pallis. 60 This concept is fundamental to Lamb's definition in that it allows 
him to argue that there is no conflict between the cardio-pulmonary method of 
determining death and his own brain-stem death criterion. The latter, he simply states, 
is a definition 'where none previously existed'.
That is to say, in a very important sense, the traditional cardio-respiratory 
concept never provided adequate criteria for death and, in the light of 
contemporary knowledge about the mechanics of brain death, irreversible 
cardio-respiratory arrest was merely an indication that brain death was 
imminent.
All previous indications of death then can be seen as precursors of the true cause. 
However, it can now be seen that, as true indicators of death, they were simply 
inadequate - and at times misleading. Lamb is at pains to point out that brain-stem 
death is not something that it is possible to recover from, and that any purported 
'reversals' represent an inadequate application of the criteria (i.e. misdiagnosis), 
rather than a failure of the criteria themselves. Accordingly, the example that Becker 
uses of the boy who revives after being submerged in icy water is rightly criticized by 
Lamb on these grounds: it is well documented, he points out, for such cases (i.e.
the 'nonrehabilitable sick' (p.44) are marginalized, becoming 'second-class patient[s]' (p.45)) might 
lead to a similar situation developing in America. Alexander's point is that it is this change in emphasis 
itself which must be resisted; once this point is passed (as it was in Germany), then abuses of the 
quality of life argument become both harder to resist and more likely. A parallel contemporary situation 
is alleged by Wang (2002), which is a testimony given before the Subcommittee on International 
Operations and Human Rights of the U.S. House of Representatives. Wang is a former doctor at a 
Chinese army hospital (now seeking asylum), and details his experiences in removing body parts for 
transplant from executed prisoners, some of which had their executions 'botched' so that they were still 
technically alive when certain organs were removed so as to ensure that they were viable. Many of 
these prisoners were executed for crimes as minor as tax evasion, and the process of organ procurement 
seems to have been driven by bribes to officials, and a thriving black-market. Typically - in the case of 
kidney transplants, for instance - the cost of procuring organs was expensive, and only affordable by 
high-ranking officials.
60 See Pallis (1985), p.33: 'Whereas the functions of lungs and heart can (for a while) be taken over by 
a machine, those of the brain cannot.' However, it is unclear whether Pallis considers this to be a 
conceptual impossibility as Lamb does.
61 Lamb (1985), p.19.
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hypothermia) to eventually result in revival, and thus it would simply be medically 
wrong to consider this a case of 'reversal'.
Having established, to his own satisfaction, the irreplaceability of the brain stem, and 
the subsequent irreversibility of death according to this criterion, Lamb proceeds to 
respond to certain key objections. The one I want to concentrate on here concerns the 
question of the replaceability of the function of the brain stem; Lamb considers this to 
be empirically impossible, and yet it is surely not his place to say so. As Green and 
Wikler point out, in criticism of Lamb:
development of a more perfect mechanical substitute is merely a 
technological problem. 62
Furthermore, as Byrne et al. observe:
any declaration that a cessation of function is absolutely irreversible is a 
presumption, even if well-grounded, which is contingent upon the current 
state of medical knowledge and on the availability of adequate life- 
support systems in concrete circumstances.
These seem like coherent objections, and ones which undermine one of the central 
tenets underlying Lamb's definition. For, if it is at least theoretically possible to 
replace the functions of the brain stem, then death of the brain stem itself only 
provides a 'reversible' definition of death - something which Lamb was determined 
to avoid.
Lamb, however, rejects the very notion that the brain stem may be replaceable, 
considering it 'a conceptual and practical impossibility.' 64
At the current level of scientific thinking, brain transplantation does 
not even amount to a logical possibility since its very plausibility 
would entail a radical departure from accepted canons of plausibility 
and possibility.65
And furthermore:
The point is that, given existing concepts of living organisms, skills, 
theories and resources, this is one technological problem for which no 
solution can be imagined in the foreseeable future. To use an expression 
of Wittgenstein's: if that were possible then anything could happen. 66
It is tempting to feel sympathy for Lamb here. As he points out, philosophical 
literature abounds with examples imagined or drawn from science fiction where such 
things such as brain transplants, molecule transporter technology, and doppelgangers, 
are all utilized to explore the limits of logical possibility. However, Lamb argues,
62 Green and Wikler (1980), p.l 13 (quoted in Lamb 1985, p.38).
63 Byrne, O'Reilly and Quay, (1985-90), p. 1988.




whereas this may give us insight into the notion of personal identity, such a technique 
has its limits, and its use as a get-out clause in empirical matters becomes both tedious 
and artificial.
However, it is equally hard to ignore the point that Lamb's critics (myself included) 
are making here. Lamb's assertion is an empirical one, based on contingencies 
concerning the current state of scientific and technological progress. His view that 
such procedures as imagined in science-fiction scenarios do 'not even amount to a 
logical possibility' jar somewhat with the concessions that the limitations we are 
dealing with here are 'existing concepts' and the 'current level of scientific thinking'. 
So, even if we take Lamb's point, this does not elevate the status of his assertion that 
the brain stem is irreplaceable out of the realm of the merely contingent (that is, 
unless Lamb wants to do away with the distinction between logical and contingent 
truths - which I assume he does not, merely wishing to limit the role of the former in 
undermining his argument).
However, this question aside, there might in fact be a reason to doubt the assertion 
that the artificial replacement of brain-stem function is currently wholly beyond our 
technological means. As Tom Russell observes:
Ventilation can be maintained in an individual with a high cervical cord 
transaction (which has resulted in paralysis of breathing) by stimulating 
the nerves that normally carry the impulses needed for spontaneous 
respiration by means of an implanted nerve stimulator; the patient so 
treated appears to be breathing spontaneously. There is no technological 
reason why this technique could not be used in patients in whom the loss 
of spontaneous respiration was a result of brainstem dysfunction. 67
In addition to this, Russell also makes the observation that clinical evidence suggests 
that diagnosis of brain-stem death (according to present UK criteria) does not in fact 
entail the death of the totality of the brain stem, and the pituitary gland and other areas 
outside the brain stem continue to function. So, it would seem, potential 
technological advances aside, it may even be currently debateable as to whether brain- 
stem death is as sufficient a criterion as Lamb thinks it is.
Finally, it may also be argued69 that Lamb's definition, like Becker's, leaves out the 
relevance of consciousness for a definition of death. If the brain stem can be shown to 
be theoretically replaceable (or its dysfunction partially remedied, as Russell argues), 
then it ceases to be the critical system that Lamb considers it to be, since its role can 
be filled by artificial means. In such a case, we are left with the possibility that, as 
mentioned earlier, a decapitated individual whose systematic functioning was 
artificially maintained would still be 'alive'. As Gervais points out, the role of the 
higher cognitive functions are ignored, the emphasis instead resting on the integrated 
systematic functioning of the organism as a whole - albeit, in this case, a headless one 
On the other hand, however, if we take Lamb's position to include the cessation of 
consciousness (in as much as a functional brain stem plays a key role in the capacity
67 Russell (2000), p.21.
68 Ibid., p.28. This point is also made by Evans (1994), p.3, who cites Evans and Hill (1989).
69 As does Gervais (1986), pp.73-4.
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for conscious awareness), then his criterion ceases (arguably) to be strictly-biological 
(a point I shall return to in chapter 5).
Tom Russell and Homeostasis
The final position I shall consider in this chapter is that of Tom Russell. In Brain 
Death: Philosophical Concepts and Problems (2000), Russell argues that the key 
feature of a living being is homeostasis (the ability to maintain metabolic equilibrium). 
So, basing his position on a definition of life proposed by the physicist Erwin 
Schrodinger, Russell argues that the absence of homeostasis is a sufficient criterion 
for death because the organism's incapacity to maintain metabolic equilibrium results 
in the death of the organism as a functioning whole (in physics terms, this may be 
thought of as a state of maximum entropy, where low entropy - where the organism 
has 'a higher energy content than the environment' - is the optimum state). In 
biological terms:
It is necessary to maintain the physical and chemical properties of the 
fluids in which the cells lie within a narrow range in order to ensure the 
continued function of those cells [...] This maintenance of the "internal 
milieu" of the organism is referred to in humans (and other animals) as 
homeostasis. 71
Furthermore, as a consequence of adopting this definition, Russell is able to propose a 
uniform definition of life (and consequently death), and to avoid the twofold 
definition necessitated by a position that values a solely human property (such as 
higher cognitive function or personhood). Russell defends this move on three 
counts: 72
  The twofold distinction between human and non-human species is not justified 
morally as it affords humans special treatment (i.e. it is the basis for 
speciesism).
  The neocortical approach excludes certain human individuals (e.g. 
'anencephalic new-borns, new-borns generally, the comatose, those in the 
persistent vegetative state, foetuses and the severely mentally disabled.' 73
  The neocortical approach is a value-based distinction, and not one based on an 
understanding of organic function (which, Russell argues, the definition of 
death should be). Consequently, Russell quotes Lamb approvingly: 'A human 
being without identity is just as alive as any other living human being.' 74
Therefore, in rejecting a twofold definition (and with it, the neocortical approach to 
human death), Russell is attempting to propose a strictly-biological definition of 
human death which can also apply to animals and other creatures. Obviously, due to 
the variance in biological features among humans and animals, the physiological 
reasons for the maintenance (and cessation) of homeostasis will be different. However, 
in terms of human death, what then is the biological locus of homeostasis?
70 Schrodinger (1944).
71 Russell (2000), p.92, but see pp.90-2 for full explanation.
72 Ibid., p.103-4.
73 Ibid., p. 104.
74 Lamb (1985), quoted in Russell (2000), p. 104.
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The question now becomes one of establishing where this capacity for 
homeostasis resides in an intact human being. This is a relatively 
straightforward question to answer inasmuch as physiologists have 
demonstrated the fact that the hypothalamus in the human brain is 
responsible for the control of homeostasis, and that damage to a variety 
of areas within the hypothalamus results in imperfect control or loss of 
control of some of the facets of homeostasis. From such evidence, it is 
reasonable to deduce that the capacity for homeostasis resides in the 
hypothalamus. It follows from the preceding argument that permanent 
loss of function of the hypothalamus would result in permanent loss of 
homeostasis. 75
Obviously, therefore, whole-brain death would certainly result in permanent cessation 
of homeostasis, but what about brain-stem death, or some less conservative criterion? 
The problem, Russell points out, is that
it is simply not possible with current investigative technology to detect 
the permanent loss of hypothalamic function prior to the occurrence of 
whole brain death as measured by current standards and tests. Whilst, 
therefore, I have argued that permanent loss of hypothalamic function is 
a sufficient condition for death, in practice I must accept that whole 
brain death is a sufficient condition for death if death is accepted as the 
permanent loss of control of homeostasis.
The hypothalamus is a comparatively small area that sits below the thalamus in the 
mid-brain (and, as such, is distinct from the brain-stem). As such, its function is 
difficult to monitor or test, and its role in the diagnosis of death - whilst potentially 
theoretically sound (if we accept Russell's arguments) - is currently practically 
unworkable. Russell's problem, then, is a practical one: in practical terms, he must 
accept whole-brain death as a criterion; in theoretical terms, cessation of 
hypothalamic function is sufficient. Therefore, whilst whole-brain death is, as he says, 
'over-sufficient and not specific',77 it will have to do.
In analysing Russell's position, however, I am not primarily concerned with whether 
homeostasis is a sufficient criterion for the presence of life, or even whether the 
hypothalamus is in fact the centre for homeostatic control. Both, to a certain extent, 
are biological concerns, and are therefore to be argued against on those grounds. 
However, what I do make objection to is his assertion that homeostasis is the 
essentially defining feature of the living organism, and that therefore the homeostatic 
functioning of the organism is the defining feature of a living human being; the 
former, in as far as it refers to the 'organism', may be fine; the latter, however, posits 
this criterion in relation to the 'human being', and as such, I shall argue, is a value- 
driven move.
As I hope is clear from my criticism of the biological view so far, the main problem 
that arises in strictly-biological approaches is that they seek to determine an essential




feature of a human being. However, this, in itself, is a value-laden enterprise - and, as 
such, is open to contradiction by opposing or differing sets of values. In the next 
chapter, I shall argue that the problems surrounding the definition of death arise 
largely from difficulties in isolating the essential features of a concept. Accordingly, 
in Russell's case, he wants to argue that homeostasis is essential to the concept of 
human life.
I would further argue that, since human beings and other animals are 
biological systems and will therefore cease to exist (i.e. die), then it is at 
least logical that this death should be expressed in biological terms. 
Since death is common to human beings and animals, it would follow 
that a function, the loss of which would uniquely constitute death, must 
be common to human beings and animals. 78
However, there is a fallacy here. This is the form of the argument:
  Human beings and animals are biological systems.
  The death of biological systems must have something in common.
  Therefore, animal and human death has something in common (i.e. cessation 
of homeostasis).
The problem lies in the first premise: even if, in a sense, human beings are just 
biological systems, it does not necessarily entail that their death merely consists in the 
death of the organism. After all, without being in any way mystical or dualistic, there 
is an important difference between animals and humans, and that is our capacity for 
cognitive consciousness. It is this capacity, which facilitates language and conceptual 
thought, which in turn gives rise to notions of personal identity and selfhood, social 
practices and human values (from which the concepts of 'death', 'self, etc. - I shall 
argue - cannot be wholly divorced). So, to make Russell's first premise explicit, it 
should read:
  Human beings and animals are solely biological systems.
In other words, that is all a human being is: a biological system. And yet, isn't it 
obvious that we are more than that? It is these very features which give rise to notions 
of value and the quality of life (and which lead such as Puccetti to talk of 'breathing 
corpses'). It is because of the fact that a human being is so much more than a 
collection of organs maintained in homeostasis that the very problem of defining 
death has arisen. And yet, whilst Russell argues that 'religious and philosophical 
concepts of death are flawed', and which in turn leads him to propose a biological 
approach as the only one which is 'workable', this would seem to entail an 
essentialist move which is neither wholly justified nor inescapable.
In should be noted here that, in one sense (and from one point of view), human beings 
are only biological systems; we are made of biological parts, and (some will argue) 
nothing more. However, even if this is true, is does not mean that what a human being 
is (their significance) can be reductively explained by reference to the biological
78 Ibid., p. 115.
79 Ibid., p. 119.
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organism. My point is therefore that, whilst 'human organism' may account, in one 
sense, for the totality of what a human being is, in another sense it leaves out what is 
significant about that organism (i.e. that it enables us to be conscious, to socially 
interact, to have values, etc.). This can easily be illustrated by scenarios where 
biological function is absent or in some other way compromised: would it matter that 
this were the case if (for instance) consciousness was maintained by some other 
means? If synthetic bodies were possible, would we consider such individuals 'dead'? 
I think not. Nor, conversely (as noted earlier, in relation to Lamb) need we feel 
compelled to value a headless body whose functional integration (lower brain) were 
maintained artificially.
In conclusion, then, Russell's position would seem to entail similar problems to others 
already considered. So, whilst he cogently argues - for example - that consciousness- 
based approaches leave us with all sorts of practical and theoretical difficulties (e.g. as 
to when permanent unconsciousness is reached, what we mean by consciousness, 
etc.), this is not in itself a conclusive reason for adopting a strictly-biological 
approach. Furthermore, Russell's essentialist assertion as to the nature of human 
beings is effectively weak - especially when it is realised that the concept 'human 
being', whilst it does certainly admit of a strictly-biological interpretation (in that - it 
may be argued - we are merely biological machines), is also one that may be 
interpreted according to a much wider set of extra-biological criteria.
Summary of Problems with the Strictly-Biological Definition
Let us now look at the general problems with this type of approach. Given the above 
objections to the respective views considered, it would seem that these strictly- 
biological definitions fail because they attempt a purely organismic definition of 
death. ' Furthermore, this failure shows that a strictly-biological concept of death - 
even if it were possible - would exclude key aspects of our notion of what a human 
being is, and therefore of what his or her death entails. This implies, arguably, not 
only that a strictly-biological definition will necessarily leave something out, but also 
that the definition of death must necessarily include what Gervais terms 'a decision of 
significance',
that is, a decision that there is a certain feature (or cluster of features) 
whose permanent absence constitutes the death of the person. 82
In the case of biological criteria, the significant features include the lack of 
spontaneous respiration and heartbeat, lack of responsivity, indications of brain-stem 
damage, etc. More importantly, perhaps, it also includes the ability to be conscious. 
As Gervais argues:
Since we do not declare death when the lower brain can no longer 
support respiration and circulation, but only when the upper brain is also 
permanently destroyed, the permanent absence of consciousness has an
80 Ibid., p.l 18. I consider some of these issues in chapter 5.
81 Aside, of course, from Pallis's use of brain-stem death as the indication of the cessation of the 
capacity for consciousness and therefore the 'departure of the soul' (so-called), which I shall return to 
later.
82 Gervais (1986), p.2.
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undeniable and crucial bearing on the decision to declare death. If the 
source of organismic functioning per se is of no consequence in a 
decision that someone is dead or alive - as the use of the brain-death 
criterion implies - then consciousness has become, with the adoption of 
that criterion, the sine qua non of human life. 83
Gervais uses this approach to argue for a neocortical, personal-identity-based 
definition of death. However, because this forms the basis of an argument which 
utilizes notions of personal identity and the capacity for consciousness, I shall leave 
treatment of these issues to later on where I will discuss them in detail. It is sufficient 
for the moment, then, to note that it is one criticism of the strictly-biological definition 
that, in focusing solely on biological criteria, certain significant features which we 
associate with a human being - such as the capacity for consciousness - may be 
omitted, leaving us with the seemingly absurd consequence that an individual can still 
be thought of as alive who completely lacks the potential for consciousness of any 
sort (e.g. is headless). This apparent absurdity leads us in rum to question which 
indications of death are significant and why (i.e. what the absurdity consists of, and 
whether it may be considered a rationally grounded reaction). 84 However, as this 
suggests, such indications are not significant in themselves, but are rather imbued with 
significance in relation to the clutch of values and directives that inform those 
common notions which are being employed.
Finally, to briefly return to the question of whole-brain death criteria (as promised 
earlier), whilst it can be seen from the above that the use of brain-stem death criteria is 
problematic, this does not necessarily mean that a tutiorist return to a wider set of 
criteria (such as whole-brain death) necessarily solves the overall problem. As I have 
argued, not only are biological criteria merely a part of our wider concepts of what is 
meant by 'living' and 'dead', but the adjudication as to how these terms are applied is 
not solely medical science's to make. There are, as Gervais, Jonas, and Evans observe 
(in different ways), good reasons why we cannot ignore the role that the culturally 
derived aspects of the concepts of life and death cannot be ignored, and which an 
appeal to death criteria must therefore account for. In this sense, Pallis's other use of 
brain-stem death to indicate 'departure of the soul' will have to wait until a later point.
Conclusion
In this chapter I have distinguished between two competing approaches to the 
definition of death (only the first of which has so far been explored): what I have 
termed the 'strictly-biological view' (following Gervais), which attempts to define 
death by reference to purely biological criteria; and what I have termed the 'partly- 
biological view', which considers biological facts to be merely relevant (i.e. not in
83 Ibid., p.44.
84 Actually, I think Gervais is wrong here to criticize Lamb for denying the role of consciousness 
altogether. As Lamb points out, the ARAS (Ascending Reticular Activating System) plays a key role in 
consciousness, yet is situated in the brain stem. Thus, to say that citing a functioning brain stem as the 
key indicator of life is to exclude consciousness is not completely correct; but nor is it correct, as 
Gervais suggests, to single out the neocortex as the sole possessor of our 'higher' functions. The truth 
is that the two parts give us different things, neither of which we would want to do without: the 
neocortex houses the higher cognitive functions, whilst the brain stem houses - among other things - 
the ARAS, which allows us - among other things - to 'wake up' and switch our conscious attention. I 
will examine these arguments in more detail when I look at consciousness and personal identity later on.
-42-
themselves sufficient) to the definition of death, which must necessarily take into 
account other, extra-biological features of the human being (e.g. their moral status, the 
notion of personal identity, etc.). The former view, I have argued, necessarily leads to 
conceptual absurdities (such as the headless but living human example), or else 
provides an insufficiently clear account of death, so that it becomes 'reversible' 
(Becker). This latter position, whilst not perhaps objectionable in itself, leads into 
deeper questions concerning the concept of death (i.e. assumptions concerning its 
binary opposition with life, the need for finality and irreversibility that some see as 
essential to it), and I will address these questions in the following chapters.
However, in conclusion, I consider the strictly-biological view to be necessarily 
flawed. The reasons for this, I argue, are that not only does such an approach 
necessarily ignore certain key features of the human person (such as personal identity, 
the capacity for consciousness, etc.), but it is ultimately an attempt to define certain 
strictly-biological criteria as constituting the essence of a human being. In this sense, 
it also reveals an ignorance of the type of concept that death is. Death must, I shall 
argue, be considered in a manner which sees biological facts as relevant, but not in 
themselves sufficient for defining what death is (i.e. the partly-biological view). It is 
this view that I will now explore in the following and subsequent chapters.
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3. Death and the Problem of Categorization
Introduction
So far, I have outlined a number of attempts at defining death from what may be 
termed a 'strictly-biological' perspective, together with criticisms of these definitions 
which suggest that the general approach is at best problematic. However, in this 
chapter I want to give more fundamental reasons as to why I think the strictly- 
biological approach fails in general, and that the problem faced in clearly defining 
death is not necessarily eliminable via conceptual analysis (of what a 'human being' is, 
what we mean by 'death', etc.), or resolvable through advances in scientific 
knowledge. In doing this, I shall treat the definition of death as a problem of 
categorization in as much as death is a state which we would differentiate from the 
state of being alive; thus, these two states are categories with (it is commonly thought) 
mutually exclusive membership, and in defining death we are primarily concerned 
with making rationally explicit those essential features which determine exclusive 
membership of one category or another. This is not to deny, of course, that many 
different types of factor influence the decision - moral concerns, metaphysical notions, 
practical considerations, and so on - but I merely point out that the ultimate point of 
the discussion of these aspects of the issue is to arrive at a conclusive disambiguation 
of problematic cases in favour of one category or another (i.e. life or death). As such, 
I aim here to consider the problem of category membership as a pivotal issue for all of 
these debates. Furthermore, if it can be shown that there is a fundamental problem 
with the very notion of distinct category membership (at least in relation to the 
concept of death), then it will aid our general understanding of the debate as a whole.
I will begin with the observation that, in human history, category formation is initially 
motivated by cultural concerns. As an anthropological claim, this is not a contention 
that I can defend with any rigour, but its plausibility provides a possible context for 
the sort of logical problems that I argue are at the centre of the categorization process, 
and therefore at the centre of the definition of death debate. I then go on to consider 
the scientific process whereby we progress from intuitive notions of category 
membership ('intuitive kinds') to more scientifically robust notions ('theoretical 
kinds'). In relation to this process, I then consider examples of category conflict (such 
as we are faced with in the definition of death), and try to show how such conflicts in 
fact stem from deeper metaphysical commitments to do with the nature of universals 
(specifically, the rationalist assertion that certain concepts - such as death - are 
immutable, and are defined by essential features). I then proceed to attack this 
essentialist position (and variations thereof), before outlining an alternative 
conception of the nature of category membership and its application to the definition 
of death.
False Beginnings
Categorization is a practice which it would seem is ubiquitous for its utility, allowing 
us to group and distinguish things in terms of their possession of common features. 
Obviously, the sort of criteria employed in this process will differ according to the 
purpose of the grouping: for example, an anthropologist may find that particular tribes 
class certain plants together because they are edible, because of their location, for
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their use in rituals or medicine, or for other reasons. However, overridingly, research 
among tribal peoples has shown that 'organisms are grouped into named classes 
primarily on the basis of overall perceptual similarities.' 1 This suggestion, which 
seems 'obvious (to biologists) but somewhat surprising (to cultural anthropologists)',2 
perhaps goes some way in accounting for the remarkable similarity in prescientific 
classification of natural phenomena in cultures throughout the world. For instance, 
regarding the plant categorization employed by peoples in geographical locations as 
diverse as Mexico and China, it has been found that the
broad taxa [employed] are reminiscent of classical Greek and Latin 
plant classification (tree, vine, herb). These three major groupings, it 
might be speculated, represent such distinct perceptual discontinuities 
that their recognition may constitute a substantive near-universal in 
prescientific man's view of the plant world. 3
Underlying such practices, then, would seem to be the idea that there are 'natural 
kinds' of things - in other words, that the world consists of organisms and other 
natural phenomena, each type of which may be distinguished from its neighbour by 
virtue of the possession of distinct characteristics or features. Such naive 'folk 
biology', as it may be called, would therefore seem to be the foundation upon which 
later categorical sophistications - of which Aristotle's concepts of 'genus' and 
'species' would be an early scientific example - are built. Furthermore, the 
classification process would seem to be most concerned initially with the 
establishment of a certain level of intermediate prototype. For example, according to 
this view, the term 'oak' would precede not only the more abstract and more inclusive 
'tree', but also the more specific - but more concrete - 'white oak', the latter two 
representing later sophistications upon the initial, intermediate category. Thus, the 
birth of a fully-fledged system of categorization can be seen to grow in two opposing 
directions from this intermediate point.
Tree Oak White Oak
Generic Intermediate Specific 
Term Term Term
The wider import of this is that the picture of categorization which it presents can be 
seen to parallel the development of robust categories in scientific inquiry. The 
establishment of prototypes or generic ideas at a 'basic level' represents a sort of 
initial theory as to the composition of the world; it says, 'there are different, distinct 
types of thing in the world'.
That the process of categorization should begin at this level is, perhaps, unavoidable. 
Our knowledge of what establishes a 'type' of thing, as well as our understanding of 
the underlying structures that such groupings are based on, are later sophistications; 
the first step in establishing groupings is to identify common elements - which, as we
1 Berlin (1978), p.10.
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid., p. 14.
4 See Rosch (1978), and her theory of basic level' categories (from which the above example is taken); 
also Berlin's complementary discussion of generic ideas' (see above).
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shall see, can often turn out to be misleading: genetically, for example, we frequently 
find that species X has more in common with species Y (which, in terms of appearance, 
it doesn't resemble), than it does with species Z (which it does resemble).
However, it may also be argued our initial attempts at identifying natural kinds are 
testament to the unavoidably anthropomorphic tendencies of human understanding. 
Scientifically speaking, we might say that human beings have trouble dealing with 
both the very big and the very small, and our greatest scientific challenges therefore 
lie in the quantum and stellar worlds, which our 'middle' world of human desires and 
motivations least resembles. For instance, as James Ladyman observes, quantum 
physics has shown that we are fast running out of candidates for mind-independent 
properties:
None of the primary properties of matter listed by Locke and other 
corpuscularians are now regarded as true properties of the ultimate 
constituents of matter. Even mass is now regarded as a secondary 
property produced by the "rest mass" of things in a certain frame of 
reference. The only candidates for primary properties that physical 
science now ascribes to things, such as charge, isospin, spin, "colour- 
charge", and so on, lack any counterparts in our experience, so we can 
hardly say the sensations they produce in us resemble them. 5
The reason why the modern concepts of quantum physics 'lack any counterparts in 
our experience' is that the concepts we use to deal with everyday life (the 'middle' 
world) are not ultimately fit for describing the subatomic world. So, whilst such 
developments may or may not reveal an inherent incommensurability between human 
understanding and the world, it does at least reveal that our first attempts at such an 
understanding are likely to be anthropomorphic - and ultimately false.
Therefore, humans begin their search for knowledge not from some set of mythic, 
absolute first principles or divine overview, but from a more conveniently human, 
intermediate perspective. However, as Nietzsche points out, such false beginnings are 
not as harmful as we might think; and point, in fact, to the real driving force behind 
such 'errors':
The falseness of a judgement is to us not necessarily an objection to a 
judgement [...] The question as to what extent it is life-advancing, life- 
preserving, species-preserving, perhaps even species-breeding; and our 
fundamental tendency is to assert that the falsest judgements [...] are the 
most indispensable to us [...] to renounce false judgments would be to 
renounce life, would be to deny life. 6
This is a point taken up in numerous places in Nietzsche's writings - for instance, in 
the short essay, 'Truth and Falsity in an Ultramoral Sense', where he argues that it is
in a limited sense only that man desires truth: he covets the agreeable, 
life-preserving consequences of truth; he is indifferent toward pure,
5 Ladyman (2002), p. 144.
6 Nietzsche (1990a), section 4, pp.35-6.
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ineffective knowledge; he is even inimical toward truths which 
possibly might prove harmful or destroying. And, moreover, what after 
all are those conventions of language? Are they possibly products of 
knowledge, of love of truth; do the designations and the things 
coincide? Is language the adequate expression of all realities?7
Nietzsche is here making two suggestions: (1) what we commonly think of as truth is 
not in fact as disinterestedly objective as we like to suppose; (2) a non- 
anthropomorphic and 'objective' truth (if, in fact, there could be such a thing) would 
not necessarily serve human purposes best. In this sense (to return to the notion of 
categories), our immediate interests are frequently served by the identification of 
significant groupings which may not (and probably do not) correspond with the way 
the world is in itself (which, incidentally, is a priori unknowable - in this sense, 
Nietzsche's position is a form of antirealism - I will return to this point shortly). 
Therefore, we prefer those ways of seeing the world which have 'life-preserving 
consequences' and eschew both 'pure, ineffective knowledge' and truths which may 
prove 'harmful or destroying'. For Nietzsche, therefore, the ways in which humans 
see the world is riddled with convenient fictions which serve some positive, life- 
promoting purpose (even if that purpose is simply to hide the inherently inimical 
nature of the world from us).
Can we therefore consider the notion of category to be an example of this human need 
to assert an arbitrary order ('false judgements') upon an otherwise chaotic world of 
experience? Furthermore, can we view the type of conflict which we face in defining 
death to spring from this gap between human concepts and reality, as something 
which actually reveals this as a fact?
The question to be considered here therefore is that, given that the categorization 
process begins in intuitive, anthropomorphic groupings for a variety of useful, 'life- 
advancing' purposes (but which may ultimately prove unreliable), does it ever get 
beyond that? Nietzsche may be interpreted as saying that we do not; we simply evolve 
more sophisticated anthropomorphic 'falsehoods'. Ultimately, I will argue that the 
problem we face in determining death is caused by a reluctance to accept Nietzsche's 
point, and a determination to treat the problem as rationally soluble. However, before 
reaching that discussion, we need to give this question its full due: do we advance 
from value-laden, mistaken, 'intuitive kinds', to the discovery of scientifically robust, 
objectively true 'natural kinds'?
Intuitive, Natural, and Theoretical Kinds
The world continuously upsets many of our intuitive, psychological, and utility-driven 
attempts to order and compartmentalise it. The need which therefore arises to revise 
and adjust categories begins, of course, a refining process which is itself the birth of 
science. W. V. O. Quine, in his essay 'Natural Kinds',8 puts this very well in relation 
to the concept of colour:
7 Nietzsche (1965), p.506. 
8 Quine(1969b).
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Nothing in experience, surely, is more vivid and conspicuous than color 
and its contrasts. And the remarkable fact, which has impressed scientists 
and philosophers as far back at least as Galileo and Descartes, is that the 
distinctions that matter for basic physical theory are mostly independent 
of color contrasts. Color impresses man; [...] But color is cosmically 
secondary. [...] Color is king in our innate quality space, but 
undistinguished in cosmic circles. Cosmically, colors would not qualify 
as kinds. 9
It is the inadequacy of such 'intuitive kinds', as Quine calls them, that leads - by a 
'trial and error process of theorizing' - to the development of better-equipped 
'theoretical kinds'. 10 This helps us to develop an understanding of the deeper, more 
significant features that sometimes unite apparently dissimilar specimens under one 
kind, or conversely, separately categorize those things which on the surface appear to 
be of the same kind. For instance:
A crude example is the modification of the notion of fish by excluding 
whales and porpoises. Another taxonomic example is the grouping of 
kangaroos, opossums, and marsupial mice in a single kind, marsupials, 
while excluding ordinary mice. By primitive standards the marsupial 
mouse is more similar to the ordinary mouse than to the kangaroo; by 
theoretical standards, the reverse is true.
Intuitive kinds, therefore, act as a basis for the process of refinement and development 
which ultimately produces theoretical kinds; the latter form, in turn, a more 
efficacious means of predicting, explaining, and controlling our natural environment. 
So, from intuitive groupings of things according to basic, immediately apparent 
criteria (such as visual similarity), the process of categorization is refined to a point 
where classifications and groupings can occasionally seem, according to 'primitive 
standards', counter-intuitive.
On the one hand, then, the process involved here is therefore developmental: over 
time, intuitive kinds give way to theoretical kinds as our desire for categories with 
greater explanatory power drives us forward. Thus, a theory which predicts the 
physical behaviour of all falling apples is more powerful than one which just 
describes that of a single apple, or only of Cox's Pippins. Furthermore, a theory which 
can not only account for the descent of all apples, or all fruit, but for all physical 
bodies in freefall, is the most powerful of all. However, as the Dark Ages exemplify, 
this development is by no means inexorable; progress may stagnate, and may even 
enter into reverse, where dogmas and tenets of belief are considered inviolable.
The important consideration here for the analysis of the concept of death - at this 
point in my argument, at least - is whether the above picture to some degree provides 
a framework for understanding the problem. In other words, would the assertion that 
our basic notions of kind are intuitive and inadequate (i.e. based on a rudimentary 
criterion of similarity and category membership) provide us with a model of the 
conflict which we are faced with concerning certain individuals who are near death?
9 Ibid., p. 127.
10 Ibid., P .128.
"ibid.
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However, it may be argued, even if this is a suitable model, couldn't this conflict be 
resolved? Mightn't it be possible, by the refinement of the criteria for membership of 
these categories, and thus through the development of more sophisticated theoretical 
kinds, to establish a procedure for generating robust categories (which we might then 
apply to the death debate)?
The above question is not dissimilar to the one asked by advocates of eliminative 
materialism in the field of philosophy of mind, where, if we eliminate the troublesome 
terms, we may replace them with more efficient concepts. As John Searle puts it:
If the theory goes, the theoretical entities go with it: to demonstrate the 
falsehood of folk psychology would be to remove any justification for 
accepting the existence of the folk psychological entities. 12
Here too, in the relation to the definition of death, we are arguably faced with a 'folk 
belief regarding what constitutes a living person, and there are also attempts to 
'eliminate' such concepts in favour of more conclusive and reductive ones. Are such 
moves viable, or merely an attempt to gerrymander our conceptual boundaries? Let us 
consider some possible models of conflict resolution.
Conflict and Resolution in the Development of Categories
What is the process of conflict which provokes the development from intuitive kinds 
to theoretical kinds, and what persuades us to abandon categorical schemes based on 
the former in favour of the latter? If it is true that the formation of initial categories is 
based upon immediately apparent features (such as physical appearance), then the 
frustration of these categories only comes about when less obvious features become 
apparent. To recall Quine's example, 'color is cosmically secondary', 13 and so 
humans have discovered that not only do all red things not necessarily agree in their 
physical composition, but also that there is no 'red stuff that is uniformly responsible 
for embodying or producing the colour red. Furthermore, knowing that something is 
red does not help us to predict its behaviour or fix its physical composition, hi short, 
colour classification is a poor tool for the furthering of our scientific understanding of 
the world.
Firstly, if our notion of kind does not adequately allow us to explain why certain 
things are similar or dissimilar, then there will be a corresponding failure in our ability 
to predict the behaviour or reaction of the things in question under certain 
circumstances. Furthermore, such inadequacy will also lead to a limitation in our 
ability to utilise said things, leading either to its inappropriate use (such as arsenic as a 
green dye in wallpaper, or lead in petrol), or else a failure to realise a potential use 
(e.g. the surgical use of maggots to clean infected wounds). This is not to say that 
such rudimentary groupings cannot be useful or correct - of course they can ('brown 
eye-colour is genetically dominant over blue eye-colour') - but it depends on the 
purpose. However, for scientific purposes, intuitive and rudimentary kinds tend to be 
either of limited use or ultimately misleading.
12 Searle (1992), p.6. Eliminative materialism is associated with such thinkers as Churchland (1981) 
and Stich (1983). 
13 Quine(1969b), p. 127.
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We may talk about this process of the refinement of categories in terms of the 
inclusion or exclusion of a category's members according to their possession of 
certain properties. Thus, the utilisation of 'red things' as a category may be seen to be 
useless for many purposes, because the other features possessed by its members are 
too many and too disparate, and thus for many purposes the category itself must be 
abandoned. However, on other occasions, the category may persist in the light of new 
information regarding its members (e.g. all instances of phosphorescence may 
indicate the presence of the same chemical); but certain members may need to be 
reclassified to another existing category, be made to form a subclass within the 
original category, or be removed to form a discrete class of their own. As I have 
already pointed out, in scientific settings, such examples of reclassification, 
abandonment of categories, and creation of new schemes of classification, do not 
necessarily represent failure, but rather are a symptom of progress. This progress is, in 
turn, measured in practical terms: a greater ability to explain, predict, and utilize 
according to the new theory.
However, on certain occasions, this process can give rise to conflicts and difficulties 
which do not seem to be so readily resolvable. An example of such a situation would 
be where a would-be member of a particular category possesses, equally, sufficient 
characteristics to include it in either of two categories (what I will term the 
'intermediate case' scenario). This can be simply represented in the following Venn 
diagram:
Category A Category B
As can be seen, X shares a number of characteristics with both categories A and 5, but 
which category should A" be grouped under?
At this point, I need to preface the following discussion with some definitions. In 
considering the potential resolution of category conflict, I am going to consider 
various possibilities. However, the viability of certain possibilities will differ 
according to the degree to which realist or antirealist positions are held. Accordingly, 
I will first define what I understand by these terms.
I take realism (or metaphysical realism) to stand for the view that there is a mind- 
independent reality which can in turn be understood by human beings.' However, 
since most realists also subscribe to the view that we cannot perceive this world 
directly, but only via mental representations or ideas (ideaism), then most forms of
14 For the distinction here between realism and antirealism I have followed Ladyman (2002), chapter 5, 
pp. 129-61, which also informs much of the following discussion.
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realism are indirect (i.e. representative or causal realism). As such, this implies some 
sort of correspondence theory of truth - as, for example, held by John Searle, 15 who 
argues that truth may be defined as 'the variety of ways in which statements can 
accurately represent how things are'. 16 Thus, realists believe that our ideas in some 
way correspond to (describe, represent, etc.) mind-independent facts or states of 
affairs. Furthermore, we may distinguish between realism regarding the existence of 
mind-independent reality (metaphysical realism) and realism regarding the existence 
of discrete concepts or universals (conceptual realism). The former is a still widely- 
held doctrine, whilst the latter is a somewhat outdated view, which is best exemplified 
by Plato.
On the other hand, antirealism may be taken to stand for the view that, whether or not 
such a mind-independent reality exists, we cannot know it. Most antirealists also 
subscribe to ideaism, but, unlike realists, argue that truth cannot be understood as the 
correspondence of our views to a mind-independent reality, because such a reality is 
unknowable; they will therefore usually favour some definition of truth which argues 
for its origin in (for example) instinctive drives (Nietzsche), social conventions (social 
constructivism), 17 or some other explanation which attempts to account for truth in a 
way that is internal to human linguistic and social practices (e.g. a form of coherence 
theory). 1 It should be noted, however, that antirealists are not committed to the idea 
that the mind-independent world does not exist (as with Berkeleian idealism), 19 but 
merely that knowledge of a mind-independent reality is impossible, and that we must 
therefore find some other basis for our concepts. 20
In light of the above, we may therefore construe the problem of the definition of death 
differently to the extent that we adopt realist or antirealist approaches to the concept 
of categories. If, for instance, we were to consider categories A and B as fixed, 
mutually exclusive and irreducible, then X may represent a genuine problem for us 
(and, arguably, as it currently does in our applications of the concepts of 'alive' and 
'dead'). 21 In this case, such an approach might picture a category as an irreducible 
feature of a mind-independent reality. However, if we are pliable in our notion of 
what defines categories A and B, considering them mutable or even dissolvable, then a 
number of ways of dealing with .Y present themselves. Of course, this latter position is 
not antirealist per se, but only in relation to categories and classification systems (that 
is, it is a rejection of conceptual realism). After all, one may reject the notion of 
categories altogether and still be a realist regarding the world.'"
15 See Searle (1995), chapter 9, Truth and Correspondence', pp.199-226. 
I6 lbid.,p.213.
17 For example, Kuhn (1962) - according to some interpretations, at least.
18 Such as, arguably, Wittgenstein - see, e.g., Wittgenstein (1974).
19 See, for instance, Berkeley (1975).
20 Accordingly, antirealism can take many forms, and philosophers can be antirealists to different 
degrees and in different respects. The same is obviously true of realism. However, I shall try to be 
specific about which aspects of these views are relevant to the point under discussion.
21 For sake of convenience, I have drawn categories A and B as overlapping. However, in illustrating 
the problem, it should be understood that A and B are mutually exclusive and that it is only the 
existence of X which makes them overlap Gust as the existence of ambiguous near-death situations 
makes the otherwise mutually exclusive categories of 'alive' and 'dead' overlap).
22 See the section below, 'The Redundancy of Categories and the Death of Natural Kinds'.
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However, there would seem to be an underlying, implicit commitment to maintaining 
the binary opposition between 'life' and 'death' in many solutions to the problem. But 
if we regard certain categorical groupings as inviolable, then our options for conflict 
resolution are limited: in the absence of a third option (or, for instance, a spectrum of 
alternatives), we are left with binary possibilities, and any problem case must be made 
to fit one or the other. In relation to the binary categories of human life and death, 
therefore, might it not be possible to provide a resolution to the problems faced in the 
death debate by rejecting the basis of this binary opposition?23
Conceptual Realism and Conceptualism
But what is the basis of this opposition? As already noted, neither metaphysical 
realism nor antirealism need involve a commitment to the idea that certain of our 
concepts are fixed and inviolable. However, in as much as antirealism is a broadly 
empiricist position, then for such a position to argue that our concepts are in some 
way fixed it would need to be shown that there is a natural limit to our conceptual 
definitions. Consequently, a position which holds that 'death' is a fixed concept with 
definite boundaries must either spring from conceptual realism, or else some 
empiricist position which accounts for conceptual limitation in non-rationalist terms 
(which we may term conceptualism). The latter position, however, would also seem to 
allow for a degree of contingency regarding the form of concepts in that they are 
based on non-rational or natural factors (e.g. human physiology, the features of human 
language, etc.), and the degree to which our concepts are fixed would therefore seem 
to rely on the extent to which the determining features of human life which influence 
concept formation are themselves fixed; accordingly, I will designate varieties of 
conceptualism 'liberal' or 'conservative' according to the extent that they lean toward 
conceptual realism or nominalism respectively (this is an important point, as will be 
seen later on in this chapter). For the purposes of this chapter, therefore, I will 
concentrate on conceptual realism and conceptualism, which I argue supply the main 
(implicit) assumptions underlying many attempts at resolving the present definition of 
death controversy. (I will consider the more general question of the truth of 
metaphysical realism, and its relevance to the debate, in following chapters.)
In the terms of medieval scholasticism, conceptual realism and conceptualism both 
take their place along a continuum on which nominalism may be found at the other 
extremity. Nominalism may be considered as broadly antirealist in that it would 
seem to deny any connection between a mind-independent reality and our concepts; 
however, conceptualism may be either realist or antirealist (in the metaphysical sense) 
depending on how it views the process of concept formation. For instance, causal 
realists such as Locke and Searle hold to a form of conceptualism in that they believe 
that, although a mind-independent reality exists, our concepts are human constructs. 
However, this is different from nominalism in that there is a sense in which our 
concepts are related to reality, and that they are therefore not arbitrary. As William H. 
Youngren puts it:
23 1 will at times refer to life and death as binary concepts (you are either alive or dead), and that this is 
a traditional and conventional assumption. However, this is not to say that the signs of death have 
always been fixed and identifiable - on the contrary, anxiety and uncertainty to do with the diagnosis of 
death seems to stretch right through from antiquity to the present day (see Russell 2000, pp.1 -11). 
24 See Stanilard (1972), pp.26-7; also Youngren (1980).
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Instead of maintaining with the realist that universals are special 
immaterialist entities existing either apart from or in particular objects, 
or with the nominalist that (in Hobbes's words) there is "nothing in the 
world universal but names", the conceptualist maintains that universals 
are concepts or ideas in the minds of human beings. Thus the reason 
that a general term can be rightly applied to a particular thing is not (as 
for the realist) that the particular thing manifests or instantiates a 
certain universal or (as for the nominalist) simply that the word is in 
fact applied to the particular thing. For the conceptualist the reason is 
rather that the particular thing is related in a special way to a certain 
concept or mental entity: as Locke often puts it, the thing "agrees 
with" or "conforms to" the concept.25
Furthermore, an antirealist might also be conceptualist if they hold that human 
concepts are to an extent determined - e.g. by cultural forces or competing values. 
Different varieties of conceptualism may also be distinguished depending on the 
degree to which our concepts are more or less determined. So, we might consider a 
conceptualist to be conservative if he considered human concepts to take a 
determinate form, and liberal to the extent that they allowed for a potential variance in 
the form of concepts.
As such, the conceptual landscape may be described accordingly:
(A) Conceptual Realism. An account of general terms and the form of 
concepts by appeal to mind-independent universals (e.g. Plato). This may 
be distinguished from metaphysical realism, which simply holds that there 
is a mind-independent reality.
(B) Conceptualism. The attempt - such as that of the early empiricists (Locke, 
Berkeley, Hume), but also later ones (e.g. Wittgenstein) - to account for 
general terms via empiricism without appeal to universals. In this sense, 
conservative forms of conceptualism (Wittgenstein) attempt to set limits to 
concept formation and the meaning of terms (e.g. by appealing to 'the 
logic of our language' and 'forms of life'). 26 More liberal forms of 
conceptualism may however admit the possibility of conceptual mutability, 
whilst also admitting that there are factors and limits which save us from 
total nominalism. As already noted, conceptualists may be realist or 
antirealist to the extent that they see a mind-independent reality as in some 
way limiting or necessitating our concepts.
(C) Nominalism. The position that our designation of general terms is, to some 
extent, arbitrary, and may be revised accordingly. However, as Youngren 
notes, 'it is such a difficult position to hold consistently that finding a true- 
blue nominalist who is also a first rate thinker is almost impossible'^ 7
,27
25 Youngren (1980), p.707.
26 See Wittgenstein (1967). Wittgenstein, and the linguistic turn in general, may be considered an 
inheritor of certain empirical traditions. In this sense, it may be considered a conservative variety of 
conceptualism. 1 shall discuss what I consider to be the limitations of such conservative conceptualism 
in chapter 8.
27 Youngren (1980), p707.
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(William of Ockham, who is often thought of as a nominalist, is actually a 
conceptualist, 28 and 'even Hobbes cannot consistently hold to his 
nominalism'). 29 Consequently, nominalism often collapses into 
conceptualism, for few can hold that all our concepts are completely 
arbitrary. However, should such a position exist, then it would be 
antirealist.
Perhaps these distinctions are best illustrated by different and opposing examples. For 
instance, Wittgenstein argues that certain forms of discourse are meaningless because 
they seek to go beyond the limits of language, and - as Felicity McCutcheon points 
out - he believes that 'We cannot access a reality independent of the concepts we use 
to think about it'. 30 In this sense, Wittgenstein comes close to antirealism: it is not that 
he does not believe in a mind-independent reality, 31 but he believes that (like Kant) 
we cannot have access to it, and furthermore that we may reach a conceptual limit to 
our enquiries. However, Wittgenstein also rejects conceptual realism, in that he 
proposes that our concepts do not make sense in virtue of their relation to a rational 
universal, but rather within the context of human practice and discourse. In this sense, 
Wittgenstein is a conceptualist, in that he holds that (a) there are no rational universals, 
but that (b) there are factors which limit possible concept formation. (If he had 
rejected (b), he would be a nominalist.) I shall therefore term Wittgenstein a 
conservative conceptualist?2
In comparison with this, we may consider Nietzsche's approach. For instance, the 
notions of cause and effect are seen as explanatory conventions which may have no 
reality in their own right, as possibly is the case with the desire to attribute a causal 
centre to agents or events (what he terms 'atomism'). 34 For Nietzsche, then, whilst (a) 
he also rejects conceptual realism, he holds that (b) whilst there are factors which 
determine concept formation, there is a sense in which the potential variance of our 
concepts is much greater. So, whilst Nietzsche would also reject nominalism, we find 
that the factors which determine our concepts are less restrictive. Nietzsche may also 
be thought an antirealist - and perhaps with more cause. I shall therefore term 
Nietzsche a liberal conceptualist.
(These two versions of conceptualism will be important for my overall argument. For, 
whilst I may not ultimately wish to argue that we may define death in whatever way 
we wish (i.e. nominalism), I will eventually propose that adopting something like 
liberal conceptualism may allow us to view the whole debate from a new perspective. 
I will deal with this possibility in chapter 8.)
28 Ibid., p.707-8.
29 Ibid., p.708.
30 McCutcheon (2001), p.25.
31 As has been pointed out, the existence of a mind independent reality is not one that many 
philosophers would attack; it is our access and relationship to it that is controversial. See, for instance, 
Page (2004), pp.255-6, and Rorty (1997), p. 160. However, Wittgenstein's antirealism is a contentious 
point - and McCutcheon herself rejects this view of him.
32 It may be controversial to designate Wittgenstein in this way, but it is I think defensible. After all, if 
we see conceptualism as holding the middle ground between realism and nominalism, then 
Wittgenstein's linguistic approach (which is both anti-essentialist and seeks to prescribe limits) can be 
viewed in this way. See Youngren (1980), pp.724-6.
33 Nietzsche (1990a), section 21.
34 Ibid., sections 12, 17, and 20.
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Returning to our general definitional problem (the 'intermediate case' scenario), it can 
be seen that the options open to us in resolving the problem will differ according to 
the attitude adopted in relation to the nature of our concepts. Regarding the options of 
the nominalist view of categories (or even a more liberal conceptualist), there are a 
number of moves which are possible. For instance, let us imagine that a new breed of 
animal (X) has been discovered, that it shares genetically a number of characteristics 
with dogs and cats respectively (let category A stand for 'Dog' and B for 'Cat'). Now, 
the options for dealing with animal A'are as follows:
(1) To create a new, hybrid category of 'Dat' (or 'Cog' - or whatever) for animals 
just in possession of those same characteristics as X.
(2) To redefine 'Dog' so as to include X (whilst redefining 'Cat' so as to exclude 
it).
(3) To redefine 'Cat' so as to include X (whilst redefining 'Dog' so as to exclude 
it - i.e. the reverse of (2) above).
(4) To combine the categories of 'Cat' and 'Dog' into a larger set, so that X is a 
subset of the larger category (i.e. it is another example of a species of which 
cats and dogs are also members).
There may be other options than these, but the above four will serve to illustrate the 
sort of possibilities available.
So, in relation to the above possible resolutions to the problem, we are left with two 
main positions:
(a) The concept of death cannot be revised, because there are factors which 
limit concept formation (a conceptual realist or conservative conceptualist 
position). 35
(b) The concept of death can be revised, because there is at least a degree of 
mutability to our concepts (moderate nominalism/liberal conceptualism), 
and at most a complete arbitrariness (extreme nominalism).
Possibility (a) is therefore the main stumbling block for any possible revision of the 
concept of death in order to accommodate the intermediate case scenario. Therefore, 
if we take the problem of the definition of death as being of this sort, then certain 
cases (X) seem to have equal claims for membership of either category ('being alive' 
or 'being dead'). If we accept the validity of presenting the problem in this way, then 
the proponents of (b) have at least four options:
(1) To admit that Xs represent genuine intermediate cases and therefore constitute 
a distinct third category ('neither living nor dead').
35 As an intermediate point on this continuum, conceptualism may be considered either as a form of 
moderate realism, or moderate nominalism. I shall return to this point later when I examine 
conceptualism in more detail.
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(2) To admit that the current way of defining 'being dead' is incorrect, and to 
adjust the criteria accordingly to include cases of X.
(3) To admit that the current way of defining 'being alive' is incorrect, and to 
adjust the criteria accordingly to include cases of X.
(4) To combine the categories of 'being dead' and 'being alive' so that X is a 
subset of the larger category.
As can be seen, the above options parallel those in the animal A'scenario. Interestingly, 
the equivalent of options (1) and (4) in that case would represent - in the context of 
the definition of death - more problematic and controversial moves. However, any 
objection to this could only be made by a conceptual realist, who would consider such 
options conceptually invalid, or a conservative conceptualist, who might object on 
some non-rationalist basis (e.g. that there were linguistic limits to our concepts). If, 
however, we reject both the conceptual realist and conservative conceptualist 
approaches, with their attendant rigidity, we may still avail ourselves of a number of 
nominalist, or liberal conceptualist solutions. However, in doing so, we are presented 
with options which are at least highly controversial, and at worst - in the eyes of some 
- morally repugnant.
Most attempts at resolving the definition of death controversy to date have centred 
around options (2) and (3) - i.e. by redefining or extending the definition of 'being 
alive'/'being dead' so as to include or exclude the problematic cases. (These 
approaches, although their metaphysical allegiances often remain unstated and 
unexplored, are by and large conservatively conceptualist in nature.) These options 
are the most popular in that they retain what appears to be a vital ingredient of any 
solution for the proponents on either side - that is, the mutually exclusive, binary 
nature of the definition ('alive' or 'dead'). However, since options (1) and (4) both 
disrupt this opposition (option (1), by introducing a third category: 'neither alive nor 
dead'; option (4), by making all categories subcategories of one greater category - 
and thus doing away with the distinction altogether), they have been correspondingly 
ignored by most advocates.
So, to summarize: I have so far argued that the problem of the definition of death can 
be stated as a problem concerning categorization. Furthermore, I have argued that 
similar types of problem only present difficulties for conceptual realists and 
conservative conceptualists, and that there are both realist and antirealist solutions to 
such problems. However, of the four identified options, when applied to the definition 
of death debate, two of these options would result in controversial or bizarre situations.
To illustrate this concretely, let us now return to the patient in PVS first discussed in 
Chapter 1. Proponents of options (2) and (3) would argue, according to a range of 
criteria, that the person was either alive or dead (and that our current conception of 
both categories should be altered). However, imagine now that someone proposes 
option (1) - that the person is neither alive nor dead, but actually exists in an 
intermediate state. According to this position, however, such a person is not in an 
indeterminate state - in other words, the proponent of option (1) is not arguing that 
we do not know whether they are alive or dead; rather, it is being argued that they
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satisfy certain criteria for being in a state which is neither 'alive' nor 'dead'. For 
instance, this position is briefly considered by Geoffrey Scarre:
One response to such cases would be to abandon the normally 
unquestioned assumption that death is an all-or-nothing affair. Perhaps 
we should describe PVS subjects as occupying a halfway house 
between life and death, analogous to the way in which we might 
describe twilight as a state between day and night [...] As failure of 
brain function is a matter of degree, it may seem reasonable to regard 
life and death as matters of degree too, so that someone who has 
reached a certain point of decline might be deemed to be more dead 
than alive. 36
Of course, a proponent of option (2) or (3) can argue that we do not know - even 
cannot know - that a person is alive or dead under certain circumstances (such as 
when we do not have access to the required technology); this sort of approach would 
be in keeping with general metaphysical realism (i.e. we may be wrong, or not 
currently possess enough knowledge, to decide the issue, but there is a definite answer 
to be found). The proponent of option (1), on the other hand, is instead arguing that 
there is a genuine state between life and death which is not the result of a lack of 
knowledge on our part; in other words, indeterminate cases are not simply waiting to 
be disambiguated, they are a third state. (The latter position would therefore seem to 
imply some liberal conceptualist position, which allows for a degree of conceptual 
flexibility in line with novel situations, whilst also denying that our concepts are 
completely arbitrary.)
Conversely, adopting option (4) has the effect of resolving the problem by not only 
dissolving the mutual exclusivity of the categories of 'life' and 'death', but also of 
admitting a range of stages or states between which it is impossible to clearly 
differentiate. It is as if we were to say, 'We shall no longer have the separate colours 
"green" and "blue", but instead adopt one category to cover the whole spectrum of 
colour shades which we shall term "greater turquoise'". 37 (This would be a liberal 
conceptualist/nominalist position).
The point I am trying to make here is that the viable options regarding the resolution 
of category conflict will differ depending on the conceptual approach adopted (or 
assumed). However, there are legitimate and established ways of resolving 
ambiguities and difficulties involving categorization besides options (2) and (3). The 
problem, therefore, exists only for those philosophers who would hold to the binary
36 Scarre (2007), p.8
37 Or, perhaps, to use Nelson Goodman's example, 'grue' (see Goodman 1983, p.73 onwards). 
Goodman's use of the term, however, is not directly used to illustrate some problem with the notion of 
categories, but rather to illustrate certain problems involved in formulating a sound theory of inductive 
reasoning. However, there is a parallel here between Goodman's problem of induction and my own 
case of problems involving category membership; as Goodman points out, 'the problem of prediction 
from past to future cases is but a narrower version of the problem of projecting from any set of cases to 
others.' (p.82). In relation to induction, Goodman's point is that, without a clear understanding of the 
difference between lawlike and accidental relationships between evidence and hypothesis, then we are 
left with many possible and contradictory hypotheses. In relationship to category membership, 
therefore, we can see that the problem can be stated as how we can identify a particular set of features 
(those possessed by the 'dead') so that all future cases of being dead will possess those features.
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opposition of life/death, and would see this as being prescribed in some way (i.e. 
conceptual realism or conservative conceptualism). 38
Death and the Excluded Middle
Before moving on to a more detailed consideration of the type of conceptual approach 
which lies at the bottom of the intermediate case scenario, it is necessary briefly to 
consider whether this problem may be resolved by alternative logical concepts. It may 
be argued, for instance, that the need to maintain a binary opposition between certain 
categories (i.e. 'life' and 'death') stems from a certain view of what is logically 
possible. For instance, Aristotle's notion of the 'excluded middle' 39 proposes that 
something must either be or not be the case; or, in Leibniz's formulation:
every proposition is either true or false. That is false which is the 
contradictory of the true; those propositions are contradictory which 
differ only in that one of them is affirmative and the other negative. 
These principles are such that it is vain to demand a proof of them. 40
In relation to our context, therefore, a person must either be 'dead' or 'not dead', and 
no intermediate cases are permissible.41
Occasionally, in the history of philosophy, attempts have been made to undermine this 
'law' of logic and to show that it does not obtain in all cases. So, until Bertrand 
Russell's theory of definite descriptions attempted to resolve them, certain paradoxes 
seemed to suggest that there were particular types of statement that where not either 
true or false (e.g. the famous statement, 'the present king of France is bald'). 42 
Similarly, other philosophers have attempted to argue for 3- or many-valued logic 
systems, 43 where the Aristotelian binary opposition is replaced with one or more 
intermediary possibilities. As well as these examples, we may point to the many- 
valued logics found in certain schools of Indian philosophy and religion, where - for 
instance - Jainism proposes a logic with a total of seven possible forms of judgement,
38 1 will explore the possibilities open to a liberal conceptualist in chapter 8.
39 See Aristotle (1924), 4.4; and Humberstone (2000).
40 Leibniz (1973), 'The Nature of Truth', p.93.
41 There is some discussion of possible intermediate states in the literature, and the possible 
consequences for medical practice; for instance, Waylard Gaylin's use of the concept of the 'neomort' 
in Gaylin (1974). However, such discussions tend to treat intermediate states as problematic, rather 
than as a putative resolution: see, for instance, the film The Island (Bay, 2005), which takes the organ- 
harvest scenario to a shocking, sci-fi driven conclusion; Jonas (1978), pp.55-7, which echoes Galyin's 
vision of bodies being used as organ banks and vehicles of "in vivo' research, and decries the 
'cowardice of modern secular society' which, through its fear of death, seeks to redefine it in the 
'relentless expanding of the realm of sheer thinghood and restricted utility' (p.58). The quoted passage 
from Scarre (2007) above suggest that he is slightly more open to the possible coherence of the idea, so 
that - whilst he recognises the problems inherent in the intermediate state - he considers that 'there 
seems to be no compelling reason for rejecting a conceptual shift that would permit more nuanced 
descriptions to be given of a subject's state' (Scarre 2007, p.8).
42 See Bertrand Russell (1973).
43 Also termed 'non-classical' logic systems, for instance, the idea of 'truth degrees' in the intuitionist 
logic of Kurt Godel, or the 'fuzzy' logic developed for use in certain computing contexts by (e.g.) L. A. 
Zadeh.
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five of which contravene the law of excluded middle (e.g. 'S is P, and S is also not-P').44
However, the opposition between 'alive' and 'dead' is not of the same type as 'A' and 
'not A'. The reason for this is that there is no logically necessary reason for us to 
equate 'A' with 'dead' and 'not A' with 'alive'. Rather, we may only equate 'A' with 
'dead' and 'not A' with 'not dead', which leaves the possibility of any other number 
of intermediate states which are 'not A' (i.e. 'not dead') in the same way that 'not 
being a cat' may involve being any number of other different things.
Therefore, whilst it would be interesting to examine these possibilities in relation to 
our current concerns, it is not really necessary. It is not the law of excluded middle 
which is responsible for the strict adherence to options (2) and (3) above, but rather 
the desire not to abandon the 'binary opposition' of'life' and 'death', and therefore an 
underlying metaphysical commitment to the nature of concepts. As I have already 
argued, the only purely logical reason for maintaining this opposition is the assertion 
that 'life' and 'death' represent inviolable and mutually exclusive categories of which 
we have direct knowledge via intellectual intuition (conceptual realism) or else some 
empirical limit imposed by - for example - 'the logic of our language', as it may be 
called (conservative conceptualism). Let us now therefore consider this position in 
more detail.
Essentialism. Significant Features, and Family Resemblances
In the remaining sections of this chapter, I will examine various criticisms of the idea 
that our concepts have a definite shape or form. As such, I will be attacking two 
positions already discussed above: conceptual realism and conservative conceptualism. 
As noted there, the former springs from metaphysical realism (though metaphysical 
realism does not necessarily entail conceptual realism), and assumes that our concepts 
have a determinate form and can be objectively apprehended. Accordingly, this 
position is not widely held in contemporary philosophy. However, the remnants of its 
influence can be found in conservative varieties of conceptualism, which is an attempt 
to fix or limit the meaning and form of concepts without appeal to universals. As 
noted earlier, conceptualists may vary according to the degree of mutability that they 
allow, and which is in turn related to the factors which they identify as determining 
the limits and meaning of concepts (which in turn will be linked to their metaphysical 
realism or antirealism). Therefore, whilst conceptualism in general rejects the
44 Chatterjee and Datta (1960), pp.80-86. Jainism is generally considered to espouse a relativist - 
though non-sceptical - philosophy, generally known as Syadvada. The seven logical possibilities are 
therefore all prefaced with 'syad', meaning 'somehow', 'in some way', or 'it is possible that' (e.g. 
'somehow S is P') to indicate that the judgement is only true from a certain point of view or in a certain 
context. As well as affirmation and negation, therefore, Jainism allows for a third possibility - 
'somehow S is and is not P' - where contradictory contexts or aspects are considered together. 
However, this does not imply a violation of the principle of contradiction, but merely a recognition of 
the chronological and aspectual contexts of logical judgements. A fourth possibility, therefore, 
'somehow S is indescribable', simply suggests that no judgement is possible if no context is specified. 
The seven possibilities therefore embody all possible combinations of the three qualities (affirmation, 
negation, and indescribability). However, the debate concerning the existence, nature, and significance 
of such logical possibilities as Western philosophy does not traditionally recognise has a long history in 
Indian philosophy (within which we may include Buddhism), and marks a point of difference between 
different philosophical schools, serving to classify them according to their realist or nihilist tendencies.
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rationalist concept of universals, its attempt to fix and limit the meaning of terms and 
the nature of concepts makes it a target for nominalists and other varieties of anti- 
essentialist. It is this notion of essentialism which I therefore consider conceptual 
realism and certain forms of conceptualism to share, and which I will for the purposes 
of this discussion consider to be a key feature of those approaches which attempt to 
maintain the binary opposition between the concepts of 'life' and 'death'. Any 
criticism of essentialism will therefore be taken to apply to both conceptual 
approaches. I will also more specifically argue that the strictly-biological approach 
discussed in chapter 2 can be better understood as an essentialist attempt to define 
death in purely physical terms (and which, as such, is also open to the general 
essentialist criticisms considered).
Essentialism is commonly characterised as the view that something possesses specific 
characteristics which define its essential nature. So, in relation to the concept of a 
triangle, we might say that its essential features consist in having three sides, internal 
angles that add up to 180 degrees, and so on. In other words, the 'essential properties 
of a thing are the ones it needs to possess to be the thing it is.' 45 Without the 
properties already stated, the geometrical shape under consideration would not be a 
triangle.
In relation to the definition of death, the strictly-biological view is therefore an 
example of an essentialist approach which is based solely on physiological criteria. In 
other words, the search for those biological features which determine conclusively 
whether a person is alive or not assumes that the concept of death must entail a finite 
set of criteria. But does it? As I have argued so far, the search for a clear definition of 
death is an example of the general scientific process of the refinement of categories; 
starting out as 'intuitive kinds', we refine our notions in order to arrive at 'theoretical 
kinds'. However, whilst this undoubtedly proves useful, there is a great difference 
between the usefulness of a category and its ultimate validity. The essentialist position 
therefore implies the existence of 'natural kinds' - i.e. objects or phenomena 'which 
have some theoretically important property in common.' 46 To view death as a natural 
kind is therefore to suppose that there exist a definite set of features which constitute 
it.
To sum up, then, the strictly-biological approach
(1) Views death as a natural kind consisting of essential features;
(2) Views the search for essential features as the refinement of an ongoing 
theoretical kind;
(3) Implies, consequently, a conceptual realist or conservative conceptualist 
position in relation to our knowledge of those essential features;
(4) Adopts an attitude to the concept of death whereby its validity as a category, 
its binary opposition to life, etc., is held to be true (e.g. by intellectual
45 Yablo (2000), p.254.
46 Daly (2000), pp.612-3.
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intuition, in the case of conceptual realists, or some natural or linguistic 
delimiting factor, in the case of conservative conceptualists). 47
As noted above, it is the combination of these views which lead to the problem in the 
first place. If the concept of death were not held to be in fixed binary opposition to life 
(i.e. by introducing an intermediary state, etc.), and that concept were not seen as a 
natural kind possessing essential features, then the controversy might be resolved 
another way (e.g. by some liberal conceptualist approach).
If we are to attack this view - which I aim to do - we must therefore focus on the 
notion of essentialism. Without it, the above four positions crumble, and the problem 
of the definition of death is - if not resolved - then at least set on a different footing 
(which I shall explore later in chapter 8). Of course, the issue underlying this 
discussion has an ancient pedigree, and is more generally known as the problem of 
universals. For instance, in Plato's dialogues, we find Socrates asking questions 
such as 'What is virtue?', 'What is courage?', and so on. However,
Socrates always emphasised that in asking "What is X?", he was not 
asking to be given illustrative examples of X, nor to be told what kinds 
of X there are. 49 What he wanted was a general definition of the 
quality of X, which would then serve to guide us in deciding what we 
ought to say about particular cases. For example, people sometimes 
disagree about whether a particular type of action should really be 
called "courageous". According to Socrates, such disputes can be 
settled only by first discovering the correct definition of courage. He 
seems, in fact, to have regarded the discovery of such definitions as a 
precondition of any fully rational thought. °
So, in considering the definition of death, we can shed light on the controversy by 
considering whether or not it is actually an example of the problem of universals: in 
other words, we may imagine Socrates asking "What is death?", and seeking a 
conceptual realist's answer in terms of the identification of essential features.
One of the most famous attacks on essentialism occurs in Wittgenstein's 
Philosophical Investigations. In the opening sections, Wittgenstein considers certain 
sections from the writings of St. Augustine, which, he says, 'give us a particular 
picture of the essence of human language.' 51 There, Augustine presumes a one-to-one 
relationship between words and thoughts (or words and objects). It is a similar 
position to one held centuries later by John Locke, where he considers the way in 
which general terms come about:
47 Incidentally, it may be denied by advocates of a strictly-biological definition of death that they hold 
proposition (4). However, if they do not, then they must ask themselves why they do not take another 
approach to defining death (e.g. a moral one).
48 See, for instance, Stanilard (1972).
49 Which, incidentally, is what Wittgenstein (and other non-essentialists) do offer - of which, more
shortly.
50 Stanilard (1972), pp.1-2.
51 Wittgenstein (1967), p.2.
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Thus we may conceive how words, which were by nature so well 
adapted to that purpose, come to be made use of by men, as the signs 
of their ideas; not by any natural connexion [...] but by a voluntary 
imposition, whereby such a word is made arbitrarily the mark of such 
an idea. The use then of words, is to be sensible marks of ideas; and 
the ideas they stand for, are their proper and immediate signification. 52
The point is here that, for Locke, words are fairly arbitrary labels which designate 
distinct ideas. Accordingly, when we come to Locke's account of general terms 
(which is most relevant to our discussion of category membership), we find
That which general words signify, is a sort of things; and each of them 
does that, by being a sign of an abstract idea in the mind, to which idea, 
as things existing are found to agree, so they come to be ranked under 
that name; or, which is all one, be of that sort. Whereby it is evident, 
that the essences of the sorts, or (if the Latin words pleases better) 
species of things, are nothing else but these abstract ideas. 53
Thus, for instance, in the formation of the general term 'man', we 'make nothing new, 
but only leave out of the complex idea [we have] of Peter and James, Mary and Jane, 
that which is peculiar to each, and retain only what is common to them all.' 54 Locke is 
therefore proposing a conceptualist account of general terms: he denies that universals 
exist, other than in the sense that we abstract the general resemblances that exist 
among groups of individual instances. However, in doing this, he would also seem to 
be essentialist in that he does imagine that there is some set of properties that is 
'common to them all' - in this sense, therefore, his conceptualism is essentialist (i.e. 
what I have termed conservative conceptualism). The reason this essentialism remains 
implicit, however, is because the essentialist assumption lies not in the discovery of an 
independently existing idea (the rationalist's universal, which the British empiricists 
rejected), but rather in the nature of the world (or rather our experience of it): the idea 
that there is an essential group of natural features designated by the term 'man'. So, 
whilst the linguistic sign that is attached to the general idea is fairly arbitrarily 
assigned, the general term itself is far from arbitrary, for - as Youngren observes - 
'the mind takes its cue from the actual undisputed existence of what Mill was later to 
call natural kinds'. 55 It is these natural kinds, therefore, that the empiricists still appeal 
to. The mind therefore becomes adept at recognising these qualities which already 
exist in nature. Even in Hume, therefore, we find
Here, then, is a kind of pre-established harmony between the course of 
nature and the succession of our ideas; and though the powers and 
forces, by which the former is governed, be wholly unknown to us; yet 
our thoughts and conceptions have still, we find, gone on in the same 
train with the other works of nature.
52 Locke (1997), p.363.
53 Ibid., pp.371-2.
54 Ibid., p.369.
55 Youngren (1980), p.710.
56 Hume (1975), An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, p.54.
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Therefore, even with those who explicitly oppose conceptual realism, a subtler form 
of essentialism creeps in.
If we now relate this to the concept of death, we arrive at a definition based on an 
analysis of all the things that we consider to be 'dead'. In this way, we build up a set 
of essential properties which may then be used to designate what we really mean by 
'death'. However, as Wittgenstein points out, there is a deep problem with this view. 
The central difficulty lies in the identification of those characteristics, features, or 
meanings which can be said to be essential to all uses of that term. In a famous 
example, Wittgenstein discusses the possibility of identifying what all uses of the term 
'game' have in common.
Consider for example the proceedings that we call "games". I mean 
board-games, card-games, ball-games, Olympic games, and so on. What 
is common to them all? [...] For if you look at them you will not see 
something that is common to all, but similarities, relationships, and a 
whole series of them at that. [...] Look for example at board-games, with 
their multifarious relationships. Now pass to card-games; here you find 
many correspondences with the first group, but many common features 
drop out, and others appear. When we pass next to ball-games, much that 
is common is retained, but much is lost. - Are they all 'amusing'? 
Compare chess with noughts and crosses. Or is there always winning and 
losing, or competition between players? Think of patience. In ball games 
there is winning and losing; but when a child throws his ball at the wall 
and catches it again, this feature has disappeared. Look at the parts 
played by skill and luck; and at the difference between skill in chess and 
skill in tennis. Think now of games like ring-a-ring-a-roses; here is the 
element of amusement, but how many other characteristic features have 
disappeared! And we can go through the many, many other groups of 
games in the same way; can see how similarities crop up and disappear. 57
Given this shifting nature of definition, the problem for the essentialist lies in 
identifying just those features which are common to all uses of a term (or, for our 
purposes, all members of a category). However, as can be seen from the example, this 
is arguably impossible; for, as Wittgenstein points out, the overall picture is one of 'a 
complicated network of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing', where features 
which unite a certain number of games are not common to others: many games 
involve competition, but many do not; for some, amusement is a common feature, yet 
in other cases this very same feature unites activities that in other ways are very 
dissimilar (so much so that they almost seem to share more in common with things 
that we do not call games - e.g. rugby and war). Faced with this problem, we have a 
limited number of choices: (1) to abandon strict essentialism in favour of some other 
model, or (2) to redefine those things we call 'games' (or 'dead') in line with a 
definition motivated by (e.g.) cultural or moral factors.
57 Wittgenstein (1967), pp.31-2 (section 67).
58 Ibid., p.32 (section 67).
59 That is, to take a nominalist and or liberal conceptualist approach. This is explored in subsequent
chapters.
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Option (1) is what Renford Bambrough opts for in his theory of 'family 
resemblances' - and what he claims Wittgenstein, in introducing this metaphor, is 
also suggesting that we employ. 61 However, there are good reasons for considering 
this form of revised essentialism (conservative conceptualism) to be as unworkable as 
pure essentialism (and, arguably, a misinterpretation of Wittgenstein). Dick 
Beardsmore, in his paper 'The Theory of Family Resemblances', provides a telling 
criticism of this view in terms of being a member of a family:
Unfortunately, what makes the members of a family into a family has 
nothing whatsoever to do with family resemblances [...] For the unity 
of a family is not the unity of a pattern of family resemblances. My 
sharing the Churchill family face will not make me a member of the 
Churchill family, and had the son of Lord Randolph lacked it, he 
would still be one of the family's most distinguished members. 62
Beardsmore's point is a valid and important one: category membership is not merely a 
case of possessing a certain quantity of characteristics, but is rather decided by the 
presence of significant ones. 63 In Beardsmore's example, looking or not looking 
sufficiently like members of one's family is, ultimately, less important than actually 
being genetically related, and in certain circumstances, certain features - such as, in 
this case, genetic relationship - have correspondingly greater weighting than others. If 
no difference between the significance of features is made, if 'being genetically 
related' were simply one other characteristic which we take into account along with 
'having the same nose', 'having the same eyes', etc., then absurd consequences arise 
(such as Beardsmore's membership of the Churchill family). Similarly, what makes 
an animal a member of a particular species is not just the possession of enough 
characteristics, but rather the possession of specific characteristics. 64 For example, 
from a quantitative view of its features, rugby may have more in common with war 
than it does with solitaire; nonetheless, we consider rugby and solitaire both to be 
games, whilst to consider war a game (unless in a metaphorical sense) would be 
highly inappropriate - the significant feature here being the presence of 'the intention 
to take life'.
60 Bambrough (1960).
61 I am not really concerned with whether Wittgenstein is in fact proposing this hypothesis at this point 
of the Philosophical Investigations, though I think it is safe to say that even if he is, he later goes on to 
reject it. This is not to say, however, that Wittgenstein ends up putting forward some sort of 'extreme 
nominalist' position (i.e. that the only things games have in common is that we call them 'games'). 
Rather, Wittgenstein ultimately seeks to undermine the possibility of such a nominalist position being 
true by attacking the associated possibility of a completely private language (which a nominalist 
position would implicitly support). For discussion of these points in relation to the family resemblance 
argument, see Stanilard (1972), pp.68-83.
62 Beardsmore (1992), p. 146.
63 This is an especially important point when we come to consider the definition of death controversy 
because many arguments for drawing the boundary one way or another centre on the presence or 
absence of certain features of the individual which are seen as essential to that person being said to be 
alive (or dead). For the moment, however, I wish to continue to deal with the issue of categorization in 
abstract terms so as to better highlight the process and its attendant problems.
64 An example of this approach would be the recognition of different species according to a DNA 'bar- 
code' (i.e. a sequence of DNA which is more or less specific to each species). However, even with this 
there are difficulties, for the same problems of marginal and borderline cases will arise (where common 
ancestors are of different species) - see Amos (2005) and Lever (2008). Incidentally, this is not a fatal 
point for our contentious example above; 'sharing a common ancestry with both cat and dog' can easily 
be added as one of the features possessed by animal 'X', thus preserving its ambiguous status.
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On the other hand, however, I do not think that Beardsmore is proposing a different, 
revised-essentialist view; he is merely pointing out that the theory of family 
resemblances, as a form of watered-down essentialism (for 'single common feature' 
read 'group of interconnected common features'), is just as unsuccessful in 
accounting for what general terms have in common as traditional essentialism is. 65 In 
this way, it can therefore be seen that many forms of conservative conceptualism are 
no more than the ghostly remnants of conceptual realism.
At this point it may be objected that in seeking to arrive at an absolute definition of 
what a 'game' is, we are merely dealing with a very general cultural phenomenon (as 
opposed to a strictly scientific one), and that we should not be surprised at the lack of 
uniformity or precision. This is an especially important point when we come to 
consider the nature of the boundary between life and death. When we talk of games, 
or any other cultural phenomenon, can we clearly distinguish between culturally 
relative concepts and 'scientific' ones? If so, then perhaps it may be possible to arrive 
at a strictly-biological definition of death; but if not, then the concept of death would 
appear to be open to the same mutability and variance that cultural concepts have. For 
instance, the 1975 film Rollerball envisages a popular sport where death is an 
accepted part of the game - hence the tagline: 'The next war will not be fought - it 
will be played.' 66 However, surely the same cannot be true of death? hi other words, 
there must be something - the conceptual realist or conservative conceptualist would 
like to think - which limits and determines our concept of death (and therefore 
distinguishes the search for a correct definition of 'death' as a distinct type of pursuit 
from that of the search for the significant features which define what a 'game' is).
Of course, this is simply the view mentioned above (proposed by Quine) that we may 
arrive at theoretically robust kinds of thing through the critical development away 
from our first, instinctive notions of category (in other words, through scientific and 
empirical investigation, which establishes more significant resemblances than mere 
physical appearance - for instance). The significant features thus identified therefore 
seek to provide a non-relative basis for category membership.
But is such an approach really immune to the anti-essentialist criticisms which 
Wittgenstein's comments embody? In other words, is it possible to identify just those 
significant features which constitute the concept of 'death'? If construed within an 
analysis of our linguistic practices, then it would seem that what 'death' is, and what 
'games' are, represent similarly problematic questions. However, as I have suggested, 
the possibility that the question concerning the definition of death may be resolved in 
a way that is not open to the question of what a game is rests on the idea that the two 
questions are of different types. In seeking to defend a position which argues that 
'death' may be uncontroversially defined in a way which avoids the problems faced in
65 It is difficult to say what position Beardsmore holds, exactly, since his arguments are largely focused 
on discrediting Bambrough. However, it is safe to say that he is, in following a certain interpretation of 
Wittgenstein, defending a non-essentialist position.
66 Rollerball (Jewison, 1975). However, this is a now ubiquitous dystopic theme in film and literature, 
and other examples abound - e.g. The Running man (Glaser, 1987), which marries futuristic game- 
show and corporate-fuelled despotism, and Iron (Lisberger, 1982), a virtual reality twist on the theme. 
However, such science fiction treatments are, to a significant degree, reworkings of one of long- 
established death games: the Roman gladiatorial arena.
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defining 'game' (i.e. the strictly-biological view), we are therefore seeking to 
privilege the former pursuit - but on what basis? In the following section, I shall 
argue that such a move is inherently problematic. 67
Ontological Relativity and Opacity of Reference
So far I have argued that the problem faced in defining death can be fruitfully 
understood as an example of the more general problem of category membership. In 
light of this, I have shown that different resolutions to this problem are possible 
depending on the conceptual approach adopted (i.e. conceptual realist, conceptualist, 
or nominalist). However, I have then argued that both conceptual realism and 
conservative forms of conceptualism share an essentialist approach which leaves them 
open to certain well-established criticisms. It is this essentialist commitment, I argue, 
which is at the bottom of many current attempts to define death (especially the 
strictly-biological approach). In this section, therefore, I want now to provide further 
reasons for rejecting essentialism, which I will also argue explain the nature of the 
definitional problem itself. It is these reasons, which stem from Quine's notions of the 
'opacity of reference' and 'Ontological relativity', which I argue provide further 
corroboration of my criticisms of essentialism, and also show why a conceptual 
reduction of 'death' to strictly-biological features (and a resolution of category 
conflict via that method) is - at best - highly problematic. 68
In his essay 'Ontological Relativity', Quine points out that the only successful and 
coherent way in which we can identify guiding principles or criteria (such as the 
verification principle of the logical positivists purported to be) is where one 
conceptual scheme is discussed in relation to another one:
What makes sense is to say not what the objects of a theory are, 
absolutely speaking, but how one theory of objects is interpretable or 
reinterpretable in another. 69
Thus, there is always, for Quine, a 'background theory with its own primitively 
adopted and ultimately inscrutable ontology'. 70 Thus, we may interpret a conceptual 
scheme within a background theory (such as we may identify what the chemical 
constitution of a substance is), or even explicitly reduce one conceptual scheme to 
another one (such as chemistry has been reduced to quantum physics); however, what 
we cannot do is seek some absolute reduction of the background theory to rational 
first principles which do not in themselves involve irreducible, non-rational 
assumptions.
If this is true, then the implications for the definition of death are considerable. Firstly, 
there would seem to be nothing to privilege a strictly-biological definition over
67 I shall consider Putnam's notion of the so-called 'entanglement of fact and value', and its relevance
to this issue, in chapter 7.
68 In the following discussion, I do not attempt to defend Quine's theories against all his critics - 
though I consider some. Rather, having noted some strong criticisms of essentialism, I try to show how 
an alternative conception of language (such as an antirealist or nominalist might favour), would allow 
us a clearer understanding of the problem we face in defining death.
69 Quine (1969a), p.50. 
70 Ibid.,p.51.
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competing theories (such as a personal-identity theory). Secondly, if the attempted 
reduction leaves out what others take to be significant features for the purpose of a 
clear, unambiguous, strictly-biological definition (e.g. ignoring persistence of 
spontaneous function), then the reduction could also be considered an unsuccessful 
one. Thirdly, if it can be shown that the attempted reduction retains features which are 
not strictly-biological (as I will argue the notion of function is in the next chapter), 
then the reduction will also fail on this count. This last point brings to mind the other 
well-noted problem that besets such reductive enterprises - i.e. the difficulty involved 
in distinguishing between analytic and synthetic properties. 71
However, all this talk of systems, theories and schemes has led some philosophers to 
criticise the intelligibility of this picture. Donald Davidson, 72 for instance, has pointed 
out that such philosophers as Thomas Kuhn, Paul Feyerabend, and B. L. Whorf (and, 
of course, Quine himself), have argued that there can exist differences between 
conceptual schemes that are so great as to represent an incommensurability in terms of 
translation. Thus, for instance, Whorf 73 has argued that certain aspects of the Native- 
American Hopi language suggest an ontology different to that of English, and which 
therefore represent a metaphysics which cannot 'be calibrated' with our own. 74 
Furthermore, such a picture provides an antirealist backdrop to the way in which such 
concepts as death and self evolve, and accordingly what status they have.
The categories and types that we isolate from the world of phenomena 
we do not find there because they stare every observer in the face; on the 
contrary, the world is presented in a kaleidoscopic flux of impressions 
which has to be organized by our minds  and this means largely by the 
linguistic systems in our minds. We cut nature up, organize it into 
concepts, and ascribe significances as we do, largely because we are 
parties to an agreement to organize it in this way   an agreement that 
holds throughout our speech community and is codified in the patterns of 
our language. 7
Of course, the above picture is not necessarily tied to the notion of differing 
conceptual schemes that Whorf and Quine favour. We may, in fact, consider the 
above merely as a picture of the whole of language (in which case it takes on a 
Wittgensteinian flavour). As such, it is an antirealist view which would allow for a 
liberal conceptualist or nominalist perspective. However, let us first consider the 
relevance of differing conceptual schemes for the general argument.
Davidson is sceptical of such methods of analysis and the very notion of differing 
conceptual schemes. For instance, he argues, if Whorf uses 'English to convey the 
contents of sample Hopi sentences', and 'Kuhn is brilliant at saying what things were 
like before the revolution using - what else? - our post-revolutionary idiom', then
71 The seminal treatment of which is, of course, Quine (1961).
72 Davidson (1984).
73 Whorf (1956a); also, see Whorf (1956b), where he concludes (similarly to Quine) that the grammar 
of a language may be relative to that language (and therefore distinct from others). This idea is known 
as the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, as it is generally considered to be a position that first put forward 
(independently) by Whorf and Edward Sapir.
74 Quoted in Davidson (1984), p. 184.
75 Whorf (1956b), pp.213-4.
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isn't there an inherent contradiction involved here? In other words, if we can 
understand the 'alien' ontology enough to know that it is different, then don't we 
simply understand their ontology? If this is true, then the differences are not really 
those between incommensurable conceptual schemes, but rather those which may 
exist between people holding different beliefs. As Davidson points out, in any 
situation where communication takes place there must exist a charitable interpretation 
of another's utterances. As he puts it:
charity is not an option, but a condition of having a workable theory [...] 
whether we like it or not, if we want to understand others, we must count 
them right in most matters. 76
Thus, for communication to be possible at all, there must be a common ground of 
shared beliefs. So, whilst, as the use of the word 'charity' implies, there is obviously 
room for error and misinterpretation, 'it may be more natural to speak of differences 
of opinion' rather than radically different conceptual schemes. 77
Davidson's point here is a sound one, I think. However, I do not think that in rejecting 
talk of conceptual schemes we need also dismiss the aspects of the idea of ontological 
relativity which - I will shortly argue - can be used to bring out important features of 
the controversy concerning the definition of death.
Firstly, Quine's notion of the 'indeterminacy of translation' can be seen to involve the 
related, but not inseparable notion, of 'inscrutability of reference'; it is the latter 
which leads, it may be argued, to the former. Thus, because terms are, beyond a 
certain point, inscrutable and cannot be analysed further (or at least, not without 
involving further terms which are themselves open to analysis), we may be sceptical 
about whether terms to be translated from another language are indeed equivalent to 
certain terms in the language into which they are to be translated. So, Quine's famous 
fictitious example involves having to translate the foreign word 'gavagai' into English. 
Faced with certain clues, and through interrogation of native speakers, the translator 
settles on 'rabbit' as an apt translation. The problem, however, for the translator, is 
that, unbeknown to them, 'gavagai' actually means 'rabbit part' and not simply 
'rabbit'. However, because the translation of it as 'rabbit' seems to fit all uses of the 
term 'gavagai', the discrepancy is never noticed. Furthermore, even if it were, there is 
nothing to preclude the existence of other discrepancies, which ultimately stem from 
the utilisation of an ontology alien to ours. But how to test for this ontology? We 
cannot, Quine argues, because in doing so we simply supply our own. On one level, of 
course, Quine's point (like Wittgenstein's parallel point about rule following) 78 
concerns difficulties involved in ostensive definition: the translator infers the meaning 
of 'gavagai' from seeing it used by native language users. However, there is a deeper 
point here (and with Wittgenstein also) which applies to the general use of terms in 
any language: no matter how explicit we seek to be in our explanation and definition 
of such terms, there is always the possibility that there is a lurking 'opacity' which 
certain circumstances will reveal (I shall return to this shortly).
76 Davidson (1984), p. 197.
77 Ibid.
78 See Wittgenstein (1967), p. 59 (section 151) and following, and also the discussion of this point in 
chapter 1 above.
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One difficulty in Quine's argument should be noted at this point. How can the 
ontologies be different if, at bottom, the terms of reference are inscrutable? In other 
words, what is there for the two respective ontologies to differ about if there is no 
'ultimate fact of the matter' concerning the reference of terms? If you say 'gavagai' 
and I say 'rabbit', and in every practical situation we agree in our use of the term (i.e. 
it throws up no confusion or conflict of which either party becomes aware), then 
where in fact does the difference in ontologies lie? The difference between the two 
ontologies envisaged by Quine may therefore involve a misunderstanding which it is 
not impossible to resolve, but merely highly difficult. It therefore represents a 
practical epistemological hurdle - i.e. a problem concerning how I might be sure - 
rather than one which it is impossible to resolve in principle. I may go my whole life 
believing that, by 'gavagai' and 'rabbit' respectively, we mean the same things. 
However, because that situation has not arisen does not mean that it could not arise.
The issue here, then, is whether epistemologically, Quine's gavagai problem 
represents a mere difficulty, or an impossibility. In other words, is it just unlikely that 
we may find out, or is it in fact out of the question on logical grounds? It would seem 
that Quine wants to argue for the latter case. If so, then there would seem to be a 
further difficulty: how does he know? For, paradoxically, if there is an 'alien 
ontology' that we can, by definition, never be a party to, then how can we know that it 
is incommensurably different from our own? Surely this implies knowledge, at least 
to some extent, of the alien ontology in question?
In utilising Quine's arguments for my own purposes I will therefore be careful to 
distinguish between these two forms of interpretative difficulty: the first involves an 
epistemological difficulty which it may be possible, under certain circumstances, to 
resolve; the second type involves an impossibility which, by definition, cannot be 
overcome. The first position, I argue, is simply a natural consequence of the 
inscrutability of reference, whilst the second cannot be held without the type of 
contradictions just mentioned. The second position not only implies, paradoxically, 
that we can have knowledge of this 'alien' ontology (in order that we may not 
understand it), but also that there exists, independently and unknowably behind the 
observable actions of the other-language user, a shadowy ontology. The significance 
of this last point is that Quine holds a behaviourist-type view of language and how it 
works. Thus, how can there be an ontology which is not reflected in the thought and 
(potential) behaviour of the other-language user? Surely, if this presented any 
significant problem for equivalence of terms, it would eventually be revealed in the 
interactions of the two sets of language users?
For these reasons, and in line with Davidson, I therefore hold the notion of competing 
conceptual schemes to be, at best, problematic. However, for my purposes, I believe 
that some version of Quine's notion of the inscrutability of reference is important to 
an understanding of the definition of death debate. Firstly, however, it is important to 
establish that the notion of the inscrutability of reference does not live and die with 
the notion of ontological relativity. We do not need to propose the existence of 
different ontologies, and consider translation between different 'languages', in order 
to show that there are times when people mean different things by certain terms. On 
occasions, this misunderstanding can be cleared up through further investigation and 
communication. However, on other occasions, the discrepancy does not become 
evident until very special circumstances reveal it.
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For instance, imagine that science were to develop the technology for brain 
transplants. Consequently, there would then arise controversies as to the identity of 
ndividuals who possessed the brain of one person and the body of another; more 
mtnguingly, imagine that transplantation of half of someone's brain were possible 
and that one half might live in one body, and the other half in another; or even that 
complete copies of individuals could be made so that the copy retained the original's 
memories In such situations, where once there was agreement as to the use of a 
term (m this case, 'her', 'yours', 'Mavis', 'person', etc.), now there is divergence 
Different parties will supply different arguments as to the defining criteria of 
personhood in order to evaluate the status of the different cases. Before the advent of 
the technology, however, the use of the terms had remained inscrutable and the 
divergence latent.
It is tempting here to assume that there is a pre-existing explicitness about these terms 
which certain situations bring out (e.g. as a conceptual realist might hold) Thus for 
instance, in the brain transplant scenario, one advocate always, in reality held that the 
body was the important thing in determining identity, whereas the other always 
secretly held that it was the brain. Thus, when circumstances allowed these two 
previously-conjoined things to exist separately, the respective 'secrets' were revealed 
(just as, in Wittgenstein's example of following a rule discussed in chapter 1, the two 
individuals would at a certain point diverge in their answers as the two divergent 
applications of the rule were revealed; or, in Quine's scenario, a situation arose in 
which 'gavagai' and 'rabbit' could be seen to mean different things).
Though this may, on occasion, be the case, it is not necessarily so. Sometimes - and 
this, I think, is the situation regarding the definition of death - situations arise which 
are new and unforeseen. Thus, the new development provokes a divergent 
interpretation in a term of reference (in this case, 'being dead') which, up until the 
advent of the new situation, did not in fact contain a 'secret' divergent application, but 
was in effect genuinely 'opaque'. Thus, in relation to the determination of death' the 
advent of new medical technology and advances in medical care have allowed such 
previously unthought-of scenarios as a 'brain dead' individual, some of whose 
spontaneous functioning is artificially maintained. It is such advances in technology, 
coupled with the inscrutability of the terms of reference used, which have allowed for 
a 'schism' to arise in what we mean by 'death'. Furthermore, such inscrutability is not 
even theoretically avoidable. Firstly, as Quine has argued, terms can only be cashed 
out relatively; so, whilst we may define terms in relation to other concepts (and so 
make them more explicit), we may not do this absolutely (that is, we will always 
reach a point where our definitions seem arbitrary, or otherwise rely on the irrational). 
Secondly, given that we do not know the future, we cannot know in what way our 
current understanding of terms may be lacking. The most obvious example of this is 
technology, where the possibilities it throws up are sometimes completely unforeseen 
(so, for example, it would have been difficult and extremely unlikely for us to have 
foreseen and incorporated into our use of the term 'being alive' the consequences of 
advancements in medical care).
The Redundancy of Categories and the Death of Natural Kinds
79 These examples are taken from Parfit (1984).
-70-
Before rounding off this chapter, I would like finally to consider one possible solution 
to the problem of categorization. Earlier, I outlined the way in which the development 
of robust scientific categories (theoretical kinds) stems ultimately from the refinement 
of intuitive natural kinds. However, the development of such scientific standards may 
lead ultimately, Quine points out, to the disappearance of the notion of kinds 
altogether. For instance,
One can define water-solubility by simply describing the structural 
conditions of that mechanism. [...] once we can legitimize a disposition 
term [such as "water-soluble"] by defining the relevant similarity 
standard, we are apt to know the mechanism of the disposition, and so 
by-pass the similarity. 80
In other words, knowing precisely in what way things are similar (are of a particular 
kind) leaves us in a position to dispense with the notion of a 'kind of thing with 
certain properties' (e.g. water-solubility) in favour of a reductive explanation of that 
similarity in terms of more fundamental composition and interaction (e.g. molecular 
structure and behaviour). On the other hand, taxonomies that still find the retention of 
kind terminology useful can employ such terms in a fully informed way by virtue of 
the mere existence of an underpinning reductive explanation. For instance, in 
utilization of the term 'species', zoologists or biologists
are in a position to define comparative similarity suitably for this science 
by consideration of family trees. For a theoretical measure of the degree 
of similarity of two individual animals we can devise some suitable 
function that depends on proximity and frequency of their common 
ancestors. Or a more significant concept of degree of similarity might be 
devised in terms of genes. When kind is construed in terms of any such 
similarity concept, fishes in the corrected, whale-free sense of the word 
qualify as a kind while fishes in the more inclusive sense do not.
This, then, is the goal of science - but is it one which is universally realisable? One 
caveat noted by Quine is that such a programme of reduction as makes the concept of 
kinds scientifically robust is only achievable in a relative sense (what he terms 
'ontological relativity'). In other words, the disposition of physical objects (e.g. water- 
solubility) is reducible to a mechanistic explanation only where the criteria of 
similarity can be explicitly stated in terms of the explanatory theory (e.g. the language 
of chemistry). However, for the purposes of a more fundamental reduction, the door is 
left open: chemistry may of course be explained in terms of more fundamental 
processes (e.g. the language of physics - hence the old quip that 'chemistry is just a 
branch of physics'), but that in turn begs another reduction, and so on.
I have already dealt with why I think it is impossible that anything but a relative 
reduction is possible. However, I would like now to consider whether a more modest 
form of reduction might not be of benefit in relation to the determination of death 
debate. Firstly, as I have already implied, such reductions may be of use in scientific
80 Quine (1969b),p.l35.
81 Ibid., p. 136.
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contexts where the sort of explanations they enable can in fact replace categorical 
explanations. So, for example, an evolutionary biologist seeking to understand a 
particular animal may find that it falls between two categories. However, in 
understanding it in terms of its genetic inheritance, it is possible to do away with the 
categorical problem altogether. So, instead of asking 'is or isn't it a mammal?' the 
biologist need only concern himself with its genetic family tree (some members of 
which were mammals, some not), whilst treating the category of 'mammal' merely as 
a term of convenience (useful, but ultimately theoretically inadequate). Thus, the 
categorical problem (In which category, by virtue of its traits, does that animal 
belong?) can be circumvented by an understanding of the more profound reasons why 
the animal comes to possess those traits in the first place.
When applying this method as a possible solution to the definition of death debate, it 
is important first of all to realise that it does not necessarily enable us to resolve 
category membership. It may enable us to refine certain categories (such as affiliating 
an animal previously thought dissimilar with another category based on common 
ancestry), but this only applies when we already know what enables membership of 
that category (i.e. the possession of significant features). However, since this is the 
issue in question, the reductionist method is of little help here. Secondly, all this 
method could do, essentially, is to describe certain states (the possession of certain 
characteristics), in terms of more fundamental processes (e.g. the interaction of 
biological systems). But whether these processes represent life or death would in turn 
be an open question that a reductive explanation could not resolve, in as much as we 
would have to have already decided what death was in order to understand that that 
was what certain processes represented. Ultimately, then, the reductive method is, at 
best, of value only in clarifying how already classified processes work (i.e. how 
putrefaction takes place), and at worst, indifferent to the whole categorization process. 
As such, the method cannot help us understand why one state should be called 'dead' 
and another 'alive' independently of previously-taken categorical decisions.
If the above is true, then what we are witnessing, in effect, is the death of the notion of 
natural kinds. However, this is not a demise accepted by everyone. For instance, 
David Wiggins has argued that there are 'lawlike principles' 82 which govern the 
identity of certain kinds. This, Frederick Doepke has pointed out in his defence of 
Wiggins, would ensure that
no such thing could become a member of a different kind. No body of 
water or bit of Gold, for example, could change its atomic structure, 
and no human person could become a member of another species.
Wiggins's position may therefore be seen as a combination of a realist belief in the 
mind-independence of certain entities (i.e. that such things as trees, water, gold, etc., 
actually exist as natural kinds of thing), combined with the more conceptualist 
admission that the form of our concepts is determined by human perceptual limits. 84 
This view, therefore, represents
82 Wiggins (1980), pp.77-86
83 Doepke (1992), p.89.
84 Ibid., p.91. For my purposes here, since they both defend similar views, I shall consider Doepke and 
Wiggins together.
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a common-sense metaphysics in which continuants [between different 
candidates for examples of the same kind] are known directly. Stones 
and trees and dogs are things that we know in the first instance simply 
by perceiving them. We do not, in this metaphysics, first perceive 
stages of them, and then go on to string these together, as we first 
perceive people and then go on to form concepts of groups of them, 
such as tribes, committees and nations. 85
The approach of Wiggins and Doepke, therefore, is to resist the temptation to consider 
any 'continuants' from the natural kind as first perceived as being significant. So, it is 
not just that persons A and B have red hair, freckles, are called Smith, etc., that make 
them the same person, but the fact that the survival of such features ('continuants') are 
linked in a lawlike way (nomologically). Thus, if we may identify those continuants 
which are governed by lawlike principles, then we have also succeeded in identifying 
those features which are significant to the identity of the natural kind in question.
In other words, imagine that we wanted to establish whether person A was the same 
as person B, where A had gone into a teletransporter and B had come out (to use 
Parfit's example). 86 According to Wiggins and Doepke, what would be sufficient for 
identity would be the presence of features in B which were 'continuants' of features in 
A. However, these could not just be any features, but specifically those features which 
were essentially A in the first place. But what are these features? Wiggins's answer is 
that
the determination of a natural kind stands or falls with the existence of 
lawlike principles, known or unknown, that will collect together the 
extension of the kind around two or three good representatives of the 
kind. In order for the name to stand for a natural kind, everything 
depends on whether there is some nomological grounding for the 
application of the name. If there is, and if the predicate is worthy to 
survive as a natural kind term, then the holding of the relevant 
principles is constitutive of its exemplification by its instances. To be 
something of that kind is to exemplify the distinctive mode of activity
87that they determine.
Wiggins's notion of natural kind therefore employs a 'pre-empiricist notion of 
substance', whereby we can simply
pick out (say) a tadpole and identify its kind by saying 'the members 
of the kind are anything relevantly like this', while leaving the actual 
standards of relevance to be scientifically determined at macrolevel
00
and microlevel
We are back, then with the notion of intuitive kinds considered earlier. We begin with 
an intuitive notion of a thing, which is then refined through 'standards of relevance to 
be scientifically determined'. In our teletransporter scenario, therefore, what defines
85 Ibid.,p.91.
86 Parfit (1984), p. 199-200, and subsequent sections.
87 Wiggins (1980), p.80.
88 Ibid., p.83.
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person A are these scientific standards of relevance. For instance, we might argue that 
the atoms of A were exactly reconstituted in B in the same configuration, and that 
because of the lawlike connection which governs the movements of the atoms 
between A and B, there is also identity.
In relation to the concept of death, we may apply Wiggins's views as follows: person 
X is alive because he possesses features which are relevantly similar to other living 
people; conversely, he is dead because he lacks those features. But what, here, are 
relevant features? It may be all very well to argue that our intuitive notion a natural 
kind can be scientifically determined at a later date when what we are talking about is 
a tadpole (though even here it may be problematic, as already noted in the above 
discussion of species); however, where we are speaking of a human being, then the 
role of science in 'filling in the details' of what makes a natural kind distinct is highly 
problematic. Firstly, as argued above, such a move would seem to privilege scientific 
discourse above others; secondly, as also noted, it would imply that we can in fact 
clearly distinguish between those features of a living human being which are 
amenable to scientific analysis, and those which have some cultural basis (such as 
personal identity, the notion of self, and so on). So, rather than reviving natural kinds, 
such views as those of Wiggins and Doepke merely seem to rely on the hope that our 
intuitive notions of kind can be cashed out in purely scientific terms. In the next 
chapter, however, I will consider important reasons why I think scientific analysis 
cannot ultimately help us with the notion of natural kinds - at least, not in a way that 
is divorced from the general marketplace of cultural concepts. Furthermore, I will 
later argue that it is this kinship with non-scientific and cultural concepts that must 
eventually allow for a much wider conception of death than has previously been 
admitted. 89
Conclusion
Throughout this chapter, I have attempted to view the problem of the definition of 
death from the perspective of conflicts involving category membership. Consequently, 
I have tried to show that, in relation to death, this search can be seen as the attempt to 
identify those essential features which determine death as a natural kind. However, I 
suggest, our concepts have not been built up from rational first principles, but have 
rather evolved from intuitive kinds. A consequence of this is that there would appear 
to be no essentialist fact of the matter as to what 'death' is: the criticisms of 
essentialism (and revised essentialism) are quite conclusive, and - I argue - we must 
reject both conceptual realism and the conservative variety of conceptualism which 
attempts to maintain the 'ghost' of essentialism.
The failure of essentialism (I argue) also in turn necessarily leads to the failure of the 
concept of natural kinds: if we cannot identify essential features, then we cannot 
identify natural kinds. We may, of course, argue that this failure arises as a 
consequence of our inability to directly perceive the true nature of death (which is 
nonetheless an intrinsic feature of a mind-independent reality) - the possibility that
89 Of course, neither Wiggins nor Doepke is explicitly proposing a definition of death here, and - to be 
fair - their views might also be used in conjunction with a personal-identity theory of death, and are 
therefore not necessarily tied to a strictly-biological definition. However, as I will later show in chapter 
6, such a view is no less problematic.
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this is true of death is something that I consider in the next chapter. However, in terms 
of our notion of death, it would seem that there are no conclusive ways in which we 
can fix the form of the concept - or, in fact, maintain its binary opposition with 'being 
alive' (hence allowing for the possibility of the existence of genuine intermediate 
states, or other possible conceptions). But does this leave us with nominalism? Not 
necessarily so, and in later chapters I will explore what I take to be the consequences 
of a non-essentialist conceptualism for the definition and application of the concept of 
death.
It is as a direct result of this defeat of essentialism - whether or not the doctrine of 
ontological relativity is true - that something like Quine's 'opacity of reference' may 
help us to understand how problems such as we face in the definition of death can 
come about: previously 'opaque' terms (as all terms must be at some level) are made 
'explicit' in unforeseen ways, and which set their previously interwoven features in 
potential opposition to one another. Furthermore, this referential opacity may also be 
seen to spring from the nature of concepts themselves. Concepts arise as 'intuitive 
kinds', and it is because they evolve from the ultimately non-rational grounds of 
human culture (as Nietzsche, Quine, and Wittgenstein would agree) that they are 
opaque: therefore there can be no ultimate, rational 'fact of the matter', no completely 
successful reduction, and ultimately - in a conceptual realist's sense - no such thing 
as a natural kind.
In the next chapter, I will attempt to conclusively show that - even if we adopt a 
metaphysical realist's ontology, and even if the above problems were ignored - the 
concept of death must be considered as relative to human culture.
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4. The Status of Death
Introduction
In the previous chapter, I outlined the problem concerning the definition of death in 
terms of a category conflict resulting from an essentialist position concerning the 
problem of universals. I also argued that whilst this sort of conflict is not confined to 
the definition of death problem, there are aspects of it which are peculiar to it (or, 
perhaps, peculiar to the type of concept that death represents). For instance, I have 
tried so far to show that there are traditional (or at least logically possible) ways of 
resolving such category conflicts which have been largely ignored by philosophers in 
relation to this context due to underlying and unexplored metaphysical assumptions 
(i.e. conceptual realism or - more likely - an essentialist conceptualising For this 
reason, the problem in determining death is still commonly presented as a search for 
significant criteria which are sufficient to disambiguate the status of problem cases in 
favour of either one category or another ('alive' or 'dead').
In saying this, however, it should be noted that I am not necessarily proposing that 
other, intermediate categories should be introduced into the scenario; nor am I 
essentially interested in identifying the set of significant criteria that render the status 
of such cases unambiguous; rather, I am concerned to show that, if we are to 
understand the nature of this debate, we need to analyse why it is that the majority of 
approaches to the subject still treat it as one which has to be solved in terms of binary, 
mutually exclusive categories. And yet, as I hope I have shown, the essentialist 
assumptions upon which it is based are at best problematic, and that a more fruitful 
understanding of the issues may be arrived at if we abandon the search for essential 
features, step back, and attempt to understand the nature of the problem. I therefore 
argue that this suggests that the desire to maintain a binary opposition between life 
and death is not based on any logical constriction, but rather on a non-rational (e.g. 
cultural or moral) need.
I have supported this approach by pointing out that the main method that has been 
suggested might resolve this problem (the strictly-biological definition) is itself 
problematic. For instance, in seeking to identify criteria which are sufficient for 
determining that someone is dead, we already seem to assume that not only is death a 
strictly-biological fact, but also that it is possible to define it in terms which are 
independent of any value-based concerns that we may have.' In this current chapter, I 
wish therefore to settle the question of what sort of concept death is. I will do this by 
attempting to show that, even if we adopt a realist ontology (such as that proposed by 
John Searle), death must still be considered as a human-dependent, 'observer-relative' 
aspect of reality.
In doing this, I will therefore consider various ways in which death might be 
considered to be an 'intrinsic' feature of the world, and attempt to show that - no 
matter what features of the definition of death are proposed as being intrinsic - there
1 I dealt with this latter point somewhat in the last chapter where I argued, in line with Quine, that any 
principle which could be utilized for the purposes of clearly distinguishing between fact and value must 
in turn be either itself partly value-based, arbitrary, or irreducible (i.e. the idea of ontological relativity).
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is a necessary sense in which the significance of such features is always supplied by a 
human agent.
Incidentally, some might wonder why I have taken this route: might it not be simpler 
to argue for an antirealist position, and show that therefore there are no intrinsic 
features at all? Whilst I take this point, there are good reasons for also rejecting it: 
firstly, presenting a case for rejecting realism outright would be a more major 
undertaking than merely showing that death is not an independent feature of the 
world; secondly, the proposition that all features of everything are socially 
constructed (or 'observer-relative') is too strong a case for the consideration of the 
status of death - and one that I might not necessarily wish to hold. My point, rather, is 
that, even if we adopt a realist position such as Searle's, Death cannot be considered 
an intrinsic feature of it; needless to say, therefore, that neither would it be an intrinsic 
feature of an antirealist point of view (since it does not contain any). So, whilst I do 
not necessarily hold to Searle's position, it is a useful way of answering the question 
of the status of death regardless of the position held in the realist/antirealist debate.
Finally, it should be noted that in this chapter I deal with the notions of metaphysical 
realism and the question of the existence of death as a mind-independent property of 
the real world. Therefore, these questions should not be confused with the debate 
concerning conceptual realism and antirealist approaches to concept formation 
considered in the previous chapter. There, I dealt with the concept of death; here, with 
the idea that there might exist something independent of our concepts, and to which 
our concepts refer.
Some Useful Distinctions
I think the first question that we need to answer in investigating these issues is what 
status we think death has. To aid in doing this, I am now going to introduce some 
distinctions used by John Searle in his book, The Construction of Social Reality^ 
Searle is what may be termed a realist in respect of certain issues, in that he believes 
that there is a clear sense in which the world exists as a human-independent reality. A 
consequence of this view is that Searle believes that the features of the world can be 
grouped into two classes: those which are intrinsic, and those which are observer 
relative. Intrinsic features include many of the things that science considers to be 
truths, such as the mass of a physical object, its chemical composition, etc. On the 
other hand, the observer-relative features of a physical object would include such 
things as its function, its aesthetic appeal, its monetary value, etc. Intrinsic features 
can therefore be termed ontologically objective in that they exist independent of 
individuals or human society. Observer-relative features, however, could not exist 
without a potential observer (or society of language users) within which such features 
are acknowledged. In this sense, such features are ontologically subjective in that they 
exist only as a consequence of the subjective ascription of meaning or function.
To illustrate this simply, in a world that did not contain humans, there would be no 
goals, tax returns, beauty, or freedom; however, there may still be nuclear radiation, 
carbon dioxide, trees, and thunder storms. The distinction, therefore, is between 
features which are inherent in physical objects, and those which are ascribed to it
2 Searle (1995), pp.7-13.
-77-
solely in the course of human interaction with them. It may be objected at this point 
that our knowledge of physical objects is observer relative in that 'inches', 'miles', 
seconds', 'kilograms', etc., would not exist without human culture. However, whilst 
this is true, Searle is careful to differentiate between a physical phenomenon's 
ontologically-objective features, and the ontologically-subjective terms used to 
describe them. So, whilst there have not always been humans around to measure the 
distance from the earth to the moon (in miles or kilometres), it does not follow that 
there has not always been some distance that existed between here and there. This is 
an important point for the definition of death: for death to be considered to be an 
intrinsic feature of the world (and ontologically objective), there must be a sense in 
which our ontologically-subjective conceptions correspond to it. However, if death is 
not an ontologically-objective (intrinsic) feature, then there is nothing for our terms to 
correspond to. In this sense, 'death' would be a social construction, or contingently 
relative to some other factor which influences concept formation.
A further distinction which Searle draws is between epistemically-subjective and 
epistemically-objective statements. An epistemic statement concerns knowledge and is 
subjective or objective according to whether it involves opinion or fact (put crudely). 
So, 'Mount Snowdon is beautiful' is an epistemically-subjective statement (it involves 
opinion), whilst 'Mount Snowdon is the tallest mountain in Wales' is epistemically 
objective (it involves fact). 3
Utilizing these terms, we may neatly categorize everything from quasars to cricket 
matches. For instance, consider in football the concept of a 'goal'. Since football 
would not exist without human beings and their social and linguistic practices, then I 
think it is safe to say that the definition of a 'goal' falls into the category of observer- 
relative things. Furthermore, since a goal is something which may be decided 
conclusively by empirical evidence, then we may also consider it to be epistemically 
objective. This is not to say, however, that people do not disagree about whether or 
not a goal has been scored - of course they do. However, in this case, their 
disagreement revolves around the determination of matters of fact, and not about 
subjective preference or ascriptions of value. To conclude, then, the decision that 
something is a goal is an epistemically objective statement about an observer-relative 
and ontologically-subjective event.
But where then does death stand? In terms of a medical/scientific model of death, it is 
tempting to argue that that it is an intrinsic feature of the world which would exist 
whether there were human beings or not (so, animals, plants, or perhaps even stars, 
may be said to die without there having to be a human concept of death to apply to 
them). In this light, the present confusion over the definition of death under certain 
conditions would be on a par with certain problems within quantum physics or 
genetics; in other words, we may not be certain how to resolve them at the moment, 
but their ultimate resolution is a scientific concern - i.e. a matter of ascertainable fact.
3 I realise that there are other accounts of the notion of fact than the one that Searle assumes here (for 
instance, which question the very notion of independent states of affairs). However, my purpose here - 
as already stated - is not to defend Searle, but to use him as a framework for discussing the potentially 
intrinsic status of death within a realist's framework (i.e. it may turn out that, even if such a realist 
perspective were true, death may still not be considered an objectively existing, intrinsic feature of the 
world). However, I will return to this question in relation to Searle's views in chapter 8.
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But may death, in Searle's sense, be considered an intrinsic feature of the world? 
Death as an Intrinsic Feature of the World
Death has long been defined according to the cessation of certain vital functions - 
heartbeat, respiration, and now (somewhat controversially, admittedly) brain function. 
In this sense, it has involved what may be termed the functional definition. 
Furthermore, in as much as a strictly-biological definition of death is reliant upon 
cessation of function, then we may equate these two definitions. If we are to assess 
this functional definition, or some variant thereof, then we therefore need to establish 
whether the notion of function itself can be considered an intrinsic feature of the 
world. When we talk about the function of the heart, for instance, are we describing 
intrinsic features of a physical object, or are we simply attributing an observer-relative 
function to it?
An example of an observer-relative function would be where we term a particular 
arrangement of bits of wood (or other material) a 'table'. There is nothing intrinsic 
about the standard function of this object, and we may in fact use any suitable surface 
as a table. Other things, however, seem already to possess function - such as, for 
instance, the human heart. In a sense, then, the functions of such things as the heart 
appear to be 'discovered' rather than attributed. In Searle's terminology, such a 
discovery is an example of 'non-agentive' function. In other words, its function has 
not been ascribed to it by a particular agent (as when I use any flat surface as a table), 
but is suggested by the interrelation of its parts in a causal way. Searle, by the way, 
argues that even though such functions are 'discovered', they are not ultimately 
intrinsic features of the world, because we ascribe value to what are simply causal 
systems. That the heart pumps blood is a fact; that its function is to pump blood, is a 
value-based ascription of a teleological purpose or role. This is an important and 
subtle distinction: Searle is not arguing that there is no difference between biological 
objects, other naturally occurring things, and manufactured items - between, for 
example, an eye, a stone, and a desk - but merely that we attribute function to each of 
them in different ways. A desk is intentionally designed to serve a particular purpose; 
a stone may, by chance, possess qualities which make it useful for some purpose (e.g. 
a large, flat stone may make a good writing surface); however, an eye, by virtue of the 
causal interrelation of its parts, is said to fulfil the function of seeing. However, whilst 
differences for the reason for the ascription of function exist, it is nonetheless true in 
all cases that the function is ascribed, and not inherent in the object. In other words, 
without human society to attribute function and purpose to these objects (or to 
'discover' function or purpose), they would have no inherent function (whereas, they 
would still possess mass, structure, a causal interrelationship of parts, and other 
physical qualities).
Searle's assertion here is at odds with a number of approaches which seek to account 
for the sort of teleology we find in non-agentive function; approaches which, in Mark 
Bedau's phrase, attempt to 'sanitize' what he and Searle see as the value-based 
ascription of function (i.e. the observer-relative aspect). 4 This generally amounts to 
seeking to replace the appearance of value (or teleological explanation) in the function
4 Bedau (1992). For the purposes of this discussion, I will utilise Bedau's threefold characterisation of 
the approaches he identifies and also some of his criticisms of them.
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with some 'purely descriptive form of causal analysis'. 5 We may identify, here, three 
main approaches to this problem: the mentalist approach, the systems approach, and 
the etiological approach. 6 All three approaches attempt a reduction of the notion of 
function into terms which avoid the ascription of teleological purpose, either by a 
human agent, or in a religious sense (i.e. divine design); function, then, it is argued, is 
a natural feature of the world. I will now evaluate these three approaches with a view 
to assessing the general plausibility of the idea that function can be in some way 
intrinsic.
Thrgg_Arguments for Intrinsic Function
Firstly, the mentalist approach attempts to account for teleology in terms of the 
rational purposes of a designer. So, a teleological explanation of the function of a 
kettle would account for it in terms of the intentions of its designer. However, when 
we come to non-agentive functions (i.e. ones which are merely 'discovered'), we find 
the mentalist having to say something like, 'Something has function if it appears that 
it has been designed by a rational agent for a certain purpose.' 7 This may be called an 
'as if type of argument, in that non-agentive functions are looked upon as //"they 
were designed. So, whilst there is not necessarily any suggestion of the existence of a 
designer (e.g. God), the idea of function is analysed as the as-//existence of features 
which, if someone had designed them, could be said to represent intelligent 
craftsmanship. This proposition is problematic enough in itself, I feel (how can we 
separate agentive actions (design) from an agent?), but the more central problem with 
this approach, of course, is that (as Bedau observes) it assumes the notion of good 
design, or of something's being more or less fit for purpose; in this way, the approach 
admits observer-relative values into the discussion. After all, design is not, by its 
nature, automatically 'good' or life serving; we could equally justifiably picture an
o
inept designer, or one whose purposes were eccentric or bizarre. 'Good design' is 
therefore not something which we would find 'in the world', independently of human 
opinion as to what good design is. Thus, ultimately, the mentalist approach would 
seem to rely upon observer-relative values (or else, the existence of an actual deity).
Secondly, the systems approach attempts to explain apparent teleology in terms of 
goals and goal-directed systems. 9 For instance, the function of the heart may be 
accounted for purely in terms of the constraints of a physical system; in other words, 
it circulates blood because that is how the system maintains its functional equilibrium. 
In this sense, the systems approach attempts to account for teleology in terms only of
5 Ibid.,p.781.
6 In his rejection of the notion of intrinsic function, Searle only considers and rejects the etiological 
approach of R.G. Millikan and Larry Wright. In the following, therefore, I will seek to outline all three 
approaches with a view to showing how they are all inescapably value-laden (and hence observer- 
relative), or else inadequate as definitions of function (e.g. because they are too broad).
7 Another alternative, of course, is to argue that non-agentive functions (from a human perspective) 
have purpose through the fact that they were created by God to fulfil a certain goal (i.e. religious 
teleology). So, whilst it may be argued that mentalism cannot account for non-agentive function, 
'divine mentalism' can. However, this begs not only the question of whether God exists, but also how 
we may know His purposes. This latter problem leaves even the religious believer in a position where 





'intrinsic causal dynamics'. 10 The problem with this approach, however, is that such 
notions as 'equilibrium', 'the goal of a system', etc., seem to be no more than a 
restatement of the teleological function that such talk was meant to replace (and be 
equally value-laden). We can illustrate this by showing that any state which a system 
passes through may be said to be the goal of that system - a goal which is, 
furthermore, at odds with the traditionally assumed purpose of the system (an example, 
of course, would be the disease of an organism). Furthermore, the idea of a system 
itself seems problematic (at least in relation to function), for we can imagine 
'systems' that have the necessary causal interrelation, but which appear merely by 
some accident of nature (such as - to quote Bedau's example - the formation of a 
bridge over a river by the random effects of natural forces - such as erosion, 
earthquake, etc.). 1 The systems approach, then, would seem not only to require some 
normative judgement as to what the 'proper' goal of a system is, but also to provide 
too broad a definition of a system so as to include events whose goal is incidental or a 
random act of chance (e.g. the fashioning of a useable bridge by natural forces).
Finally, the third approach to be considered is the etiological account, as proposed by 
Larry Wright. In this version, something can be said to possess a certain function if 
(and only if) the thing's performance of certain actions leads to that function being 
fulfilled. This is a fairly straightforward definition, for it is basically saying that to ask 
for the function of a thing is to ask for an explanation of why it is there, does the thing 
it does, etc. To ask, 'What is the function of the heart?' is therefore to ask for an 
explanation of how the heart works, what the effects of its actions are, how it came 
into being and continues to exist, etc. As Wright notes, this is very different from 
asking, 'What is the heart good for?' for
if "Why do animals have livers?" is a request for a function, it cannot be 
rendered "What is the liver good for?" Livers are good for many things 
which are not their functions, just like anything else. Noses are good for 
supporting eyeglasses, fountain pens are good for cleaning your 
fingernails, and livers are good for dinner with onions. No, the function 
of the liver is that particular thing it is good for which explains why 
animals have them.
Wright's etiological account therefore seeks not only to avoid the difficulty involved 
in distinguishing between accident and true function, but also attempts to sidestep a 
number of other pitfalls that previous accounts have fallen into: the tendency to 
confuse function and goal, the failure to distinguish between 'a function' and 'the 
function', and the inability to provide an analysis which can account equally for 
natural and conscious functions. 14 The reason it is possible to do the latter, Wright 
argues, is that 'in virtually all of the usual contexts, A'was designed to do Z simply 
entails that X is there because it results in Z.' 15 Thus, both types of function ultimately
10 Ibid.,p.785.
11 Ibid., p.785.
12 Wright (1973). For Searle's discussion of this, see Searle (1995), pp.16-23
13 Wright (1973), pp. 155-6, italics in the original.
14 Ibid pp.140-3. Incidentally, where Wright talks about 'natural' and 'conscious' functions, Searle
talks about 'non-agentive' and 'agentive' functions respectively.
15 Ibid.,p.l65.
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admit of an etiological account (i.e. one that explains function in terms of how it came 
about).
However, one objection to this approach - provided by Bedau 16 - argues that such 
etiological descriptions may account for a thing's function where in fact that thing had 
no teleology at all. For instance, a stick which is floating down a stream comes to be 
pinned against a rock and is kept there by the backwash it creates. From Wright's 
point of view,
all of the accident counterexamples can be avoided if we include as part 
of the analysis something about how X came to be there (wherever): 
namely, that it is there because it does Z - with an etiological 
"because". 17
Furthermore, the etiological 'because' is exemplified by such sentences as, 'It 
exploded because it got too hot', 18 a usage which seems to fit the stick and backwash 
example. It therefore seems that Bedau's example meets Wright's conditions for 
identifying a teleological-type purpose in the system, and thus distinguishing between 
accident and function, and yet provides us with something that we would not wish to 
call teleological. Wright's analysis, therefore, would seem to fall foul of one of the 
very pitfalls he was determined to avoid: the inability to distinguish between accident 
and genuine function. This is fatal for the whole account, for, as Bedau points out,
Given that the heart example and the stick example involve a similar sort 
of etiology, why is only the heart teleological? 19
Millikan and Proper Functions
The baton of etiological explanation of function is, however, taken up by Ruth 
Millikan.20 Like Wright, Millikan is concerned with accounting for function in terms 
of its causal history. However, Millikan's focus is primarily dependent on a 
Darwinian account of the evolution of biological function. So, for Millikan, what she 
terms 'proper functions' (what Searle would think of as 'non-agentive functions', and 
Wright as 'natural functions') exist by virtue of fulfilling either one of two conditions:
1. An item, A, originated 'as a "reproduction" (to give one example, as a copy, or 
a copy of a copy) of some prior item or items that, due in part to possession of 
the properties reproduced, have actually performed [function] F in the past, 
and A exists because (causally or historically because) of this or these
r >21performances.
2. Or, '/4 originated as the product of some prior device that, given its 
circumstances, had performance of F as a proper function and that, under
16 Bedau (1992), p.786.
17 Wright (1973), p.156.
18 Ibid.
19 Bedau (1992), p.787.
20 See Millikan (1984) and (1989).
21 Millikan (1989), p.288.
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those circumstances, normally causes F to be performed by means of 
producing an item like A'. 22
An item fulfilling the first of these conditions is termed by Millikan a 'direct proper 
function' in that it inherits its purpose directly by virtue of being a copy of something 
that had the same causal properties, and performed the same apparent function. 23 So, a 
heart's function is to circulate the blood, because not only does it actually do that, but 
it also possesses the same properties, and is a direct copy of, hearts that did the same 
job in direct ancestors. However, 'derived proper functions' work in a different way; 
we may say, for instance, that when a chameleon changes its skin colour to blend in 
with it's environment, it is utilizing a device whose proper function (blending in with 
the background) is, in a sense, 'indirect', in that such skin-pigment-changing 
functions as the chameleon possesses 'have not proliferated as a result of producing, 
specifically, brown and green skin patterns' and, unlike the function of the heart, is 'a 
proper function only as adapted to a given context.' 24 Hence, since the proper function 
in this case exists in relation to something else, it cannot be direct; the function is 
therefore provided by the context (it is accidental, and not purposive), whereas direct 
functions exist (in an evolutionary sense) because of the performance of this function 
in the past (and the part that the performance of this function has played in the 
evolution and survival of the organism). However, for Millikan, both derived and 
direct proper functions may be contrasted with accidental function (such as the 
function of the nose in holding up eyeglasses).
Fascinating as it is, however, Millikan's account of function is open to a number of 
criticisms. Most importantly, as is pointed out by Searle, it fails to account for the 
normative aspect of our idea of function. So, when we say, for instance, that a heart is 
malfunctioning, it is implied that there is a state of functioning that it worse or better 
than another. However, in Millikan's account, she can only attempt to account for the 
existence of hearts, or the existence of a chameleon's capacity to alter the 
pigmentation in its skin. However, in doing this, the notion of something being good 
at something, of optimum performance, of disease, etc., is left unaccounted for. This, 
it may be argued, is a necessary consequence of any attempt to account for teleology 
in terms of 'brute facts' (i.e. intrinsic features of the world), and - by extension - any 
attempt to apply this type of reductive explanation to what would seem to be, at least 
in part, value-laden and observer-relative terms. 26
Another problem for Millikan, however, is how she can adequately distinguish 
between derived and direct proper functions, or indeed between proper and accidental 
functions. For instance, imagine the following situation: in my son's bedroom there is 
a toy figure of a soldier which has a motion detector (what is sometimes called a 
'room guard'). Therefore, whenever something comes near it, it activates a recorded 
sound, and says 'Who goes there?' So, one day, my son leaves for school, leaving the 
toy switched on. As a result, the house cat - which usually sleeps on my son's bed - is 
afraid to go in the room. Now, I come home from work early - before my son - and
22 ibid.
23 See Millikan (1984), chapter 1, pp. 19-38.
24 Ibid., p.40. For more on derived proper functions, see chapter 2, pp.39-49.
25 Searle (1995), p.18.
26 1 will come back to this point later when I will look at the consequences of this position (which,
incidentally, is one favoured by Mark Bedau) for death.
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discover the situation. How do I know whether my son has done this deliberately? I 
can surmise, of course, but the only way I can be sure is to ask him. In effect, this is 
the only way I can distinguish between the accidental and conscious action of leaving 
the toy turned on.27
Now, in relation to Millikan, we can see that she faces a similar question. How can 
she distinguish between the accidental and deliberate nature of a function? In the 
above example, to establish that the toy was the direct or indirect cause of keeping the 
cat out of the room, we would need to know my son's intentions (perhaps he only 
intended to keep his sister out of the room). So, to return to the example of the 
chameleon, to distinguish between this type of indirect function and the direct 
function of the heart, Millikan needs to show that we can clearly distinguish between 
direct and indirect causation in this way. However, as an advocate of evolution, she 
has no designer whose intentions she can query. Therefore, she needs to show that the 
causal properties of a system are enough to make this distinction - but are they?
There would seem to be room for argument concerning what is and is not a direct 
function of something. So, in relation to the function of the heart, we can say that its 
function is to pump blood (a direct function). However, what if we said that its 
function is to provide oxygen to the brain? Is this a direct or indirect function? 
Undoubtedly, human beings exist because of this function of hearts, which may in 
turn be causally related to the existence of human beings (and hearts). Does the heart 
oxygenate the blood or merely pump it? Or, in fact, merely pump! Where do we draw 
a line between what is its proper function and what isn't? The problem would seem to 
be one of causal scope. For example, human beings exist because of their superior 
intelligence (which allowed our ancestors to craft tools, manipulate our environment, 
etc.) - is this in turn therefore a direct function of the heart (through the oxygenation 
of the blood which passes to the brain)? To follow this through to its absurd 
conclusion: is the existence of power tools a direct function of the heart? To draw a 
limit to the consequences of function, however, would seem to require a decision - an 
arbitrary declaration of limit. Otherwise, the consequences of function can be 
stretched and broadened in ways which make the whole notion unworkable.
Another objection in relation to a thing's function would be regarding the question of 
what 'it' is, or how we circumscribe its identity. For instance, in relation to the 
function of the brain, do we consider it as a whole, or - given its many functions - as 
diverse parts? Furthermore, do we draw a distinction between the brain and the 
nervous system, or do we consider them to form a whole? As can be seen, where parts 
are connected, where do we draw the line between one thing and another? Isn't this 
fairly arbitrary - or, at most, for the purposes of our ease of understanding? So, as 
with drawing distinctions between physical components of the organism (heart, brain, 
nervous system, etc.), so too with function: both, I argue, are human conventions 
which serve certain observer-relative purposes.
Ultimately, then, as Searle argues, it would seem that we must accept that
27 However, even this may be problematic. Firstly, there is the question of unconscious motivation in a 
psychoanalytic sense (as to what someone really intends); secondly, there is the question of 'moral 
luck' (see Nagel, 1979, and Williams, 1981, where we regularly judge agents on the consequences of 
actions outside of their control - which suggests that the conscious intention behind an action is not 
necessarily the defining feature - e.g. as with negligence or neglect).
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Functions are never intrinsic; they are assigned relative to the interests of 
users and observers. 28
In conclusion, we are therefore faced with the following options:
(1) Non-agentive function is an intrinsic feature of the world, either
(a) because it is a naturally occurring feature, or put there by a divine 
designer; or,
(b) because its apparent purpose is an <zy-//"intrinsic feature of the world;
(2) Non-agentive function is an observer-relative feature of the world (and 
humans ascribe purpose and goals to processes according to their own 
interests).
Option (1) (a) would seem to suppose some inherent purpose in nature, and so is 
generally open to the sort of objections that the teleological argument for the existence 
of God is vulnerable to: 29 e.g. that we cannot know with any certainty what those 
purposes are (they are open to interpretation). Therefore, since we have difficulty in 
identifying when function is intended and when it is not - and are unable to identify 
necessary and sufficient criteria for intentional or intrinsic function - then function is, 
to all intents and purposes, imposed by human observers.
Option (1) (b) is, as I hope I have shown, incoherent. It would seem to assume that by 
terming such features as-if functions we can account for what appears to be either 
natural order or divine design without assuming either. However, as I have argued, it 
does not do this, but merely begs the question as to why such functions exist in the 
first place, and why we may not interpret them another way. If we can do the latter, 
then surely function is supplied by human purposes; if we can't, then on what grounds 
can we be sure that the identified purpose is the true purpose?
This therefore leaves us with option (2).
The significance of this conclusion for the debate concerning the definition of death is 
therefore that, if function cannot be considered to be an intrinsic property of 
biological organisms, then for someone holding a functional definition of death 
(whereby death is construed as the cessation of certain vital biological functions), 
death itself cannot be considered to be an intrinsic feature of the world. Therefore, 
without human beings to ascribe observer-relative function to things, there would be 
no such thing as death. Furthermore, it is hard to see any alternatives which could 
propose a strictly-biological definition of death which did not in some way rely on 
some notion of function. The alternative to this would be to utilize a definition of 
death which did not seek to be exclusively biological (i.e. a partly-biological approach,
28 Searle(1995),p.l9.
29 See, for instance, Hume (1966), Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, Part VIII, and Hunie 
(1975), An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, section XI; and for a more general critique, 
Hick (1990), pp.23-6. Obviously, the main argument against (l)(a) is the idea that there are more 
plausible explanations - i.e. the theory of evolution - e.g. Dawkins (1986).
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such as one reliant upon some notion of personal identity). However, if this latter 
course is adopted then, since it will necessarily involve social and cultural notions (at 
least in part), I can see no way in which death can be considered anything other than 
an observer-relative feature of reality. Therefore, whatever course is adopted, the 
possibility that death is an intrinsic feature of the world seems to be excluded.
Function and Technology
Whilst I agree with Bedau and Searle on this point, there may however be a further 
point which makes the whole issue of a functional, biological definition of death 
unworkable anyway. If anything may be considered a table which will serve as a table, 
then similarly, anything can be considered a heart (or lung, or brain-stem) which will 
serve as such. Therefore, since organ transplantation and artificial aids to respiration 
and heartbeat can replace or supplement the functioning of the original organs, then - 
theoretically at least - we can consider death as relative to our technological know- 
how. In other words, organs can be replaced and supplemented by technology, and 
you are only dead when there is nothing more (technologically speaking) that can be 
done for you. 30
It may be argued against this last point that not all functions of a human organism can 
be replaced or supplemented - for instance, the function of the brain-stem. However, 
as I have already argued in Chapter 2, since we are only dealing with the notion of our 
current state of medical technology I do not see how this possibility can be 
conclusively ruled out. It may be argued, as David Lamb has done, 31 that 'if that were 
possible then anything could happen', suggesting that such science-fiction-type 
notions of theoretical possibility should not play a part in the definition of death. 
However, even if this is accepted as a reasonable point, it does not affect the logical 
point that the objection here is based upon empirical improbability, rather than logical 
impossibility.
It may be objected here that in highlighting the significance of technological issues for 
this debate I am not in fact invalidating the idea that death consists in the cessation of 
certain functions, but merely expanding the functional definition to include both 
biological and technological components. For, whether the heart that stops beating (or 
the brain-stem that stops functioning) is biological or mechanical, death still consists 
in the cessation of its function. 32 I would reply to this objection that whilst I would 
agree that the notion of function may still play a part in certain conceptions of death, I 
would also argue that the significant difference between a biological functional 
definition and a biological/technological functional definition is that in the former 
case, death is seen in terms of the irreversible cessation of function, whereas in the 
latter, the very idea of irreversibility is at odds with the notions of repair and 
maintenance that accompany the utilization of technology. In other words, if a heart
30 There is a growing amount of interest in the question of exactly what causes natural death, and 
whether we can in fact do something about it. In some cases, this is serious science (such as in the 
search for the genetic triggers that cause aging, or limit cell division); however, there is also a growing 
'crank' fringe - see Sanders (2002).
31 Lamb (1985), p.62.
32 1 include heart transplants as a form of technology here since they would not be possible without 
certain technological developments, but also because they are an example of the notion of 
replaceability which is central to the idea of technology.
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irreversibly ceases to function, we may possibly replace it with another one, the heart 
of an animal, or even a mechanical substitute. Therefore, whilst the notion of function 
is still relevant to such a definition, the accompanying notion of irreversibility is 
replaced by questions of current medical knowledge, technological advancement, etc., 
in relation to which the definition of death is constantly shifting. So, even if death 
could still be thought of as a functional matter, the conditions which cause the 
complete cessation of function are always on the move.
It would seem, then, that we do not have to equate cessation of biological function 
with death, because the cessation of those functions may in theory be reversible. 
Death occurs, therefore, when, according to our current medical technology, nothing 
more can be done. Far from being an intrinsic feature of the world, therefore, death - 
according to the functional definition - becomes contingent.
Conclusion
As can be seen from the above, not only is the functional definition of death a 
necessarily observer-relative view, but it also allows - via consideration of the role of 
technology in relation to function - for a definition which is contingent upon medical 
knowledge and technological advances. In fact, the very idea of cryogenic suspension 
is testament to this idea, for what is this if not an embodiment of the very idea that 
'science will one day find a cure for what we currently think of as death'?
However, these are not the only problems with the functional definition of death. One 
further problem (considered earlier in chapter 2) is that we may envisage a situation 
where an organism functions but it would be controversial to consider such a being as 
alive. 33 For instance, if we could replace the functioning of the brain-stem where a 
human being had no head, then the organism would still function, and - according to 
the functional definition - be technically alive. If a headless body can therefore be 
made to function, then to say that the organism is dead because it lacks the function 
for conscious awareness is to introduce consciousness as an intrinsic feature of being 
a living organism. In one sense, of course, consciousness is not an essential feature of 
being a living organism; there are organisms aplenty which lack it, and which we 
would not consider for that reason 'dead' (mainly - as with plants, insects, etc. - 
because we never considered them to have it - though this does depend, of course, on 
how consciousness is defined). 34 However, for human beings, the case is somewhat 
different, for we generally presume at least the capacity of consciousness as central to 
our notion of what a human being is. 35 One interesting question which arises from 
such concerns, therefore, is whether the idea that death is an intrinsic feature of the 
world can be rescued (at least with regard to human beings) by considering 
consciousness an intrinsic feature of the human being, the permanent incapacity for 
which constitutes death. I will deal with this possibility shortly, but in doing so I think 
we must leave behind the possibility that the functional definition (and therefore the 
strictly-biological approach) can treat death as an intrinsic feature. Failure in function 
of one aspect of one organ in an organism need not entail death so long as the overall
33 Gervais (1986, p.57), raises this objection.
34 Which I deal with in the next chapter.
35 1 realise, of course, that the notion of 'human being' employed here is a vague one, but 1 am content 
to leave it unexplored for the moment because it exemplifies the sort of 'institutional fact' (to use 
Searle's term) the status of which I shall be exploring in more detail in subsequent chapters.
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organism can continue to function as a whole. In terms of the permanent incapacity 
for consciousness, therefore, we are faced with the removal of a function which - 
whilst we might consider it significant - need not entail the death of the organism.
We may perhaps alleviate this problem by distinguishing between 'human organism' 
and 'person'. So, whilst the notion of a person that can actively fulfil certain social 
roles is observer-relative and therefore not intrinsic, the role played by the capacity 
for conscious thought in enabling such activities means that the failure of this capacity 
is sufficient for that of being a person also. Therefore, whilst the notion of the person 
is observer-relative, incapacity for consciousness (it may be argued) is a purely 
physiological concern, and thus may be considered an intrinsic feature. Thus, in a 
roundabout way, human death becomes an intrinsic feature of the world. 37 In this way 
is avoided the much thornier problem of what consciousness is, for whilst this 
question is hotly disputed and undecided, there is pretty much unanimous agreement 
that the capacity for consciousness resides in certain causal interactions within the 
brain.
I will turn to this question in the next chapter.
36 As proposed by Green and Wikler (1980).
37 This is, essentially, the position proposed by Agich and Jones (1986).
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5. Death and Consciousness
Introduction
In the previous chapter, I concluded that the functional definition of death cannot lead 
to considering death itself as an intrinsic feature of the world. However, given the 
prominent place held by the capacity for conscious awareness in our common concept 
of a human being, it is tempting to consider whether the permanent cessation for the 
capacity for consciousness might not, in some way, provide a basis for considering 
human death as an intrinsic feature.
Answering this question requires a number of preliminary issues to be addressed:
(1) In terms of being an intrinsic feature of reality, is 'capacity for 
consciousness' open to the same objections as the notion of biological 
function?
(2) If consciousness is a contingent feature of human beings (and human 
beings are a contingent feature of the world), then what consequences does 
this have for considering a definition of death based upon the capacity for 
consciousness?
(3) What consequences do the competing notions of consciousness have for 
any purported definition of death?
I will now turn to these questions. 
Capacity for Consciousness
In terms of considering the capacity for consciousness as a criterion for being alive or 
dead, the first question we must deal with is whether the notion of capacity for 
consciousness fares any better than that of function in terms of its being considered an 
intrinsic feature.
On a purely verbal level, there would seem to be little difference between 'capacity' 
and 'function' (for our purposes). It would seem to be a fairly straightforward matter 
to account for capacity in terms of function. So, instead of saying, 'this object has the 
capacity to act as a table', we can similarly say, 'the function of this object is to act as 
a table'. So, we can say that 'the function of the heart is to pump blood', or 'the heart 
has the capacity to pump blood'. Therefore, regarding consciousness, we can say, 'the 
brain has the capacity for consciousness', or 'a function of (a certain part of) the brain 
is to produce consciousness'. The only difference in the use of 'capacity' and 
'function' would seem to be that 'function' has more of suggestion of intrinsic 
capacity, but this is only a vagary of usage (we might equally talk of something 'being 
able to function as' something else - i.e. agentive function). The point therefore is that, 
whether we are talking of a particular function of the brain or the capacity to produce 
that thing (consciousness), we are in the same boat. We can therefore assess capacity
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for consciousness in the same way as we assessed the possibility of intrinsic function 
in the last chapter.
However, having said this, with capacity for consciousness/conscious function we 
have a slightly different problem. In considering the heart, we may distinguish 
between a description of the causal interrelation of its parts, and ascribing function 
and purpose to it. The former concerns ontologically-objective features, whilst the 
latter involves the ascription of human values. However, in considering the brain, 
when we attempt the same sort of distinction (between causal description and value 
ascription), the outcome seems less convincing. This is mainly, I think, because of our 
own subjective experience of being conscious: when we attribute function to the heart, 
we are still essentially describing objective, third-person, physical properties (though, 
of course, subjectively we also feel our own heartbeat); however, when we are 
attributing function to the brain, we have in mind - in part, at least - a qualitative 
outcome (that of phenomenal consciousness). ' Any reluctance to accept the 
distinction in this context therefore stems from a feeling that one's own consciousness 
is not dependent upon agentive ascription. In other words, that my heart has a 
teleological function is something which is dependent upon human value, but that I 
am conscious - in as much as it concerns my subjective, phenomenal experience - is 
not.
For now, we may initially conclude that - in as much as the brain is a functioning 
organ - the capacity for consciousness may be thought of as a non-agentive ascription 
(and, therefore, observer relative). However, in as much as consciousness has another, 
subjective aspect (that of phenomenal consciousness), then the comparison with the 
heart (and other things to which we ascribe non-agentive function) is asymmetrical: 
the physical aspects are parallel, but (whilst we may be aware of our heartbeat) the 
primary function of the heart is adequately described by an account of its physical 
causal properties; however, with the brain, this is not the case.
I will return to this last point shortly, when I consider competing interpretations of the 
nature of consciousness and their significance for the status of human consciousness 
itself. However, before doing so, there is a further issue which first needs addressing. 
I argued earlier - in line with Searle and Bedau - that function is an observer-relative 
feature of the world. However, in considering here whether capacity for consciousness 
should also be considered an observer-relative feature, we are left with a question: can 
contingent features also be intrinsic?
Contingent and Observer-Relative Features
In utilising Searle's distinction between intrinsic and observer-relative features of the 
world, we come to the question of what status human consciousness has.' If we hold 
consciousness to be an intrinsic feature, and that the permanent cessation of the 
capacity for it may be viewed as a sufficient condition for death, then accordingly
1 I am here following the distinction made by David Chalmers between those aspects of our mental 
functioning which may be described in purely causal terms (a 'psychological' description), and those 
which represent subjective experience ('phenomenal'), and hence (arguably) cannot be wholly captured 
by merely causal description. The latter, of course, are also covered by the term 'qualia'. See Chalmers 
(1996), pp.11-16. 
2 Hereafter, simply 'consciousness'.
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human death might also be considered to possess intrinsic status. In answering this 
question, however, a number of points need first to be clarified.
To begin with we need to distinguish between those features which are observer 
relative, and those whose existence is merely contingent. The existence of human 
beings, for instance, is contingent upon such factors as biological evolution, historical 
accident, and the very existence of life itself on this particular planet. Yet this does not 
mean, seeing as human beings do in fact exist, that they do not possess intrinsic 
features. We may distinguish, therefore, between those things which exist 
contingently, because they are observer relative, and those which, although their 
existence is contingent, nonetheless possess intrinsic features.
Observer-relative features exist because of the human ability to conceptualise. For 
instance, without language and the ability to create and utilise 'institutional facts' (as 
Searle calls them), 3 there would not exist such things as 'money', 'ownership', 
'property', etc. These notions all require social, linguistic interaction, and could not 
form part of the 'brute facts' of a universe in which humans - or language-capable 
beings - did not exist.4 In this sense, observer-relative features are contingent merely 
in the sense that their existence is dependent on the existence of this type of language 
user. More importantly, however, these features are, in Searle's phrase, 'ontologically 
subjective', in that they exist only for those language users. So, whilst 'money' only 
exists because language users exist (a contingent fact), there is a further sense in 
which only such language users can really use 'money' (as part of the linguistic, 
social institution of property and ownership). In other words, a dog may fetch your 
newspaper, but it cannot buy one.
The other sense in which the existence of certain features is contingent is, as has 
already been noted, when we consider that certain things simply may never have 
come into being. For example, the human brain may not have evolved at all, and there 
might have been a situation in which the planet that we now call home did not in fact 
host the type of language user that such neurological capacity makes possible. 
However, the point to be realised here is that contingency in this simpler sense does 
not in itself entail observer relativity; the fact that human brains may never have 
existed does not mean that their contingent existence debars them from the possession 
of intrinsic features. A tree at the end of my street possesses mass, has a certain 
organic structure, chemical consistency, etc; all these features are not the less to be 
considered intrinsic simply because that tree may never have existed. The distinction
3 See, for example, Searle (1995), pp.27-9. The main point here is that we can talk about certain things 
factually only because there are human beings who can create the conceptual frameworks 
('institutions') wherein this is possible.
4 Humans may not be necessary for the existence of observer-relative features, but some sort of 
conscious, concept-utilizing, socially-interacting, linguistically-sophisticated creature would be. So, the 
fact that animals have a certain sort of behavioural language would not in itself guarantee the existence 
of observer-relative features. In other words, chimps may communicate, socially interact, problem- 
solve, and so on, but it is unlikely that they have the concept of - for instance - 'money' (or some 
primitive precursor of it). I don't think that the possibility can be ruled out a priori, however, but 
merely in terms of what it appears chimps are capable of (it may turn out, for instance, that chimp 
language is more sophisticated than has been supposed).
5 There are, of course, incidents where animals seem to partake in these institutional practices: cats and 
dogs become sole beneficiaries of eccentric will bequests, someone marries a horse or a goat, and so on. 
However, in all such cases, the animal is a passive participant, whose role is ascribed and maintained 
by human agency.
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between observer-relative and intrinsic features is therefore not to be confused with 
contingent and necessary existence; contingency is not coextensive with observer 
relativity, and a thing may possess intrinsic features whose existence is not necessary.
Of course, this latter category includes almost every individual thing; the computer on 
which I am typing exists contingently (it might not have existed at all - either as a 
particular instance - this particular computer - or as a general type of thing), and yet it 
possesses the intrinsic features of mass, dimension, etc. 6 In a similar way, the 
existence of each individual physical object in the universe may be said to be 
contingent, whilst the existence of the class of physical objects itself may not be. 7 
However, the main point here is that, simply because a thing's existence is contingent, 
this does not in itself make it observer relative. For Searle then, an intrinsic feature is 
something whose existence is independent of our conceptualisation of it. Therefore, 
independent of the existence of human values and language, intrinsic features still 
exist.
The Status of Consciousness
So, what status does consciousness have? Is it an intrinsic feature of a human being 
(such as their weight or height)? As I have already argued, whether a feature exists 
contingently or even intermittently does not affect its intrinsic status. Therefore, if 
consciousness can be considered to be an intrinsic (although intermittent and 
contingently-existing) feature of human beings, it would seem to suggest that it 
represents a unique class of feature.
To begin with, we may imagine a world without consciousness, whereas to imagine a 
world without physicality would be - arguably - not to imagine a world at all. 8 If we 
therefore take it to be intrinsic, consciousness would seem to be a feature which it is 
possible that no particular thing embodies at any one time, in as much as we can 
imagine a world without any conscious beings in it.
This is different from the case with other intrinsic features - such as dimension - in 
that, as I have already suggested, there cannot exist a world in which dimension did 
not exist (for it would not be a world). 9 If we accept this view, therefore,
6 Another way of thinking about this, of course, is in terms of the age-old distinction between 
universals and particulars. The 'particular' object possesses the 'universal' features of mass and 
dimension.
7 Is it a contingent matter that the physical universe exists? Until we know more about how the universe 
began - and we may never know enough - then this would seem to be an unanswerable question.
8 Unless, of course, we were to hold to some form of idealism, but this in itself does not entail 
antirealism (see the discussion of this point in 'Conflict and Resolution in the Development of 
Categories', in chapter 3 above).
9 I feel that I am at the limit of my metaphysics here, and I am prepared to admit that these points may 
be debateable or defeasible in a more radical direction. For instance, someone more versed in modem 
physics might like to argue for the possible non-existence of one intrinsic feature or other (such as mass 
or dimension) at different stages of the development (or demise) of the physical universe, but my 
ignorance in this field forbids me to do so. For example: 'up until the universe was about 1 millionth of 
1 second old, the constituents of the primordial soup still did not yet directly resemble any object we 
commonly see around us, or have yet isolated in our laboratories. At that time, free quarks were 
everywhere, and matter had no mass.' Krauss (2001), p.52 (my emphasis). See also the observation 
made by Ladyman (2002), p. 144, discussed in chapter 3 above, regarding quantum physics and the 
fast-disappearing list of primary qualities. However, my main purpose here is simply to explore the
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consciousness would seem to be an anomaly among intrinsic features, for whilst it is 
possible for any one thing not to exist, whatever does exist commonly possesses all 
the intrinsic properties that there are (mass, dimension, etc.). However, as I have 
shown, it is possible to conceive of a world in which consciousness did not exist (or, 
even, for us to believe that this was once the case - i.e. before it developed). 
Therefore, consciousness - to use traditional technical terms - would seem to 
represent a universal predicate which did not require instantiation in any particular in 
order to be considered intrinsic; or, in plainer terms, consciousness may be an 
example of an independent feature of reality which there may, at certain times, be no 
instance of.
Let us entertain a possible objection to this argument. If we consider that sometime 
shortly after the Big Bang - as scientific wisdom has it - the universe consisted only 
of gases, then there would have been no 'solid' objects. In terms of the traditional 
tripartite division of solid, liquid, and gaseous states of things, only the latter would 
have existed. In such a world, 'solidity' would not have been a feature possessed by 
anything. In this sense, so we might argue, 'solidity' is an intrinsic feature which - 
like consciousness - need not exist in any particular.
The problem with this objection, however, is that the case of solidity is not an exact 
parallel. Certain physical features of the world - such as solidity, liquidity, etc. - can 
be reductively explained. The structure and interrelation of the atoms which make up 
the gas can also be called upon to explain how they might be structured in order to 
form a solid or a liquid. Therefore, instead of talking about the contingent existence of 
the feature of 'solidity', we may simply talk of the contingent interrelation of atomic 
particles in a certain pattern. In other words, we would say that 'solidity' is a high- 
level feature which supervenes on the low-level brute facts of the universe. Such 
supervenience is not, in itself, anything mystical, and furthermore allows of a 
physically reductive explanation (i.e. 'high-level' features are reducible to 'low-level' 
features - which are in turn brute, physical, and irreducible givens). However, the 
next objection is an obvious one: but can't we similarly explain consciousness 
reductively, and so avoid attributing to it this special status? Answering this question, 
however, requires a clear definition of what is meant by 'consciousness'.
Limits of the Enquiry
Before beginning my discussion of the nature of consciousness, and its relevance to 
the death debate, I must first make some general observations as to the approach I will 
take.
So far, I have dealt with the notion of consciousness in a very vague way. Mainly, this 
was to facilitate the preliminary discussion surrounding the potential problem 
involved in considering consciousness to be an intrinsic and yet contingent feature. 
However, having considered that point, it now becomes important to decide to what 
extent distinct and competing conceptions of consciousness have a bearing on its 
potentially intrinsic status. For instance, if it is possible - as some philosophers 
believe - to account for consciousness in purely quantitative and causal terms - then
status of consciousness in the light of Searle's distinctions. Moreover, whether Searle's distinction 
actually holds will be a question I will return to later.
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there may be no barrier to considering consciousness as an intrinsic feature. However, 
if - as it is also sometimes argued - consciousness cannot solely be accounted for 
quantitatively, then perhaps this represents a problem for any arguments which hold 
that consciousness is an intrinsic feature.
Secondly, whilst I have been vague as to the nature of consciousness, I have also been 
somewhat anthropocentric. In other words, where I have used the term 
'consciousness', I have generally had in mind 'human consciousness', and have 
excluded any notion of possible animal consciousness or degrees of conscious activity 
I have also assumed, for the purposes of this debate, that animals are not capable of 
the sort of thought formation that would enable them to partake in the kind of 
utilization of institutional facts (e.g. money) that distinguishes human interaction. This 
issue will become relevant now, however, when we consider the distinction between 
'phenomenal' and 'psychological' consciousness; if, for instance, it turns out that 
animals possess the same capacity for a particular type of consciousness, and that this 
particular type of consciousness is significant to the determination of death, then we 
may be able to establish a unified definition of death at least between humans and 
other creatures capable of this type of consciousness (thus avoiding a twofold, or even 
threefold definition of death). I shall therefore return to this issue once my 
conclusions have been established.
Thirdly, in the following sections, whilst I will set about clarifying my position on the 
two above issues, I should however point out that I will not be seeking to provide 
original contributions to the nature-of-consciousness debate. Rather, it will be my 
central concern to indicate, with regard to the various possibilities discussed, what 
consequences it would have for the status of death if capacity for consciousness is 
adopted as a criterion. Furthermore, I will be seeking to identify whether or not there 
are more central considerations which might allow us to clarify the relation of 
consciousness to the status of death in a way that does not necessarily entail the 
advocacy of one theory of consciousness over another.
The Nature of Consciousness
The debate as to the true nature of consciousness is a heated one. However, the camps 
divide roughly according to whether it is possible to explain the phenomenon of 
consciousness reductively. In turn, this issue gives rise to the question of whether 
there is a 'real' aspect to consciousness which reductive, third-person accounts 
necessarily exclude. In The Conscious Mind, David Chalmers sums up the position 
nicely. According to his division, consciousness has (arguably) two aspects 10 :
1. The psychological aspect. This involves the ability to calculate, judge, will, 
seek and achieve goals, etc. Such a view of mind admits of a reductive 
explanation, in that these types of action can be accounted for (again, 
arguably) in physiological terms (by presenting such things as 'purpose', 
'belief, etc., as potentially measurable neurological activity, biological 
structures within the brain, potential behaviour, etc.). For example, Daniel 
Dennett argues that intentionality can be explained in purely causal terms, and 
that what we do in ascribing intention is to adopt an intentional interpretation
1 Chalmers (1996), 'Chapter 1: Two Concepts of Mind', pp.3-31.
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(what he calls the 'intentional stance') of such causal interaction." Another 
advocate of a reductive explanation of consciousness, Francis Crick, puts the 
general materialist position quite succinctly:
"You," your joys and your sorrows, your memories and your 
ambitions, your sense of personal identity and free will, are in 
fact no more than the behaviour of a vast assembly of nerve cells 
and their associated molecules. 12
Hence, the main problems here are logistical ones, such as, 'How does the 
physical brain function as a biological information-processing system?' 
Obviously, the philosophers who think that this question can be conclusively 
answered also think that consciousness can be modelled or functionally 
understood, and that therefore 'strong Artificial Intelligence' is possible. 13 
Chalmers calls theories which propose that consciousness can be explained 
purely in these terms (and that a complete reduction is therefore possible) 
Type-A theories.
2. The phenomenal aspect. This refers to the experience of being aware, having 
so-called 'qualia' (the subjective experiences of having ideas, sensations, etc.), 
and generally, the idea that there is something it is like to be conscious. 14 Some 
(i.e. Type-A) theories reject the coherence of this idea because it can so easily 
lend itself to what they consider to be unacceptable forms of mysticism or 
dualism - i.e. to belief in the existence of 'something other', or something 
'over and above' the physical. However, this need not be the case, and 
advocates of these (Type-B) theories hold that phenomenal experience is real 
and irreducible, whilst at the same time holding to a materialist view of the 
universe. 15 A third approach (Type-C) would be to argue that materialism 
itself is false, and adopt some sort of dualism or even idealism, which holds 
that, not only is consciousness irreducible, but that it is a fundamental and 
distinct property to that of matter. 16
Setting aside, for the moment, the arguments concerning the nature and existence of 
the phenomenal aspect (and whether it can be ultimately explained in terms of a
11 See Dennett (1971) and (1991); for a general explanation of Dennett's position, see for example, Heil 
(1998), pp. 154-66.
12 Crick (1994), p.3
13 To use Searle's distinction (see Searle 1992, p.44 ff), advocates of'strong AI' believe that a machine 
which had the same functional organization as a human brain would be conscious in the same sense 
that a human is. On the other hand, 'weak AI' describes the position that, whilst machines may be 
considered to 'think' (in Chalmers's sense of performing the functions associated with the 
psychological aspect of consciousness), they are not actually conscious (i.e. their consciousness lacks 
the phenomenal, qualitative aspect).
14 The idea that there is a qualitative experience which is distinct from a description of psychological or 
causal interactions was famously discussed by Nagel (1974), where he points out the many problems 
we face in accounting, not only for the qualitative experiences of other species, but also of other human 
beings.
15 E.g. Searle (1992, 1997), Papineau (1993), and Tye (1986).
16 Chalmers himself advocates some blend of dualism and panpsychism. Examples of other Type-C 
theories would include Jackson (1982), Honderich (1981), and Sprigge (1994).
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psychological/physical reduction) 17 , I would like to relate these two aspects to the 
distinctions which I have already introduced. Firstly, in parallel to the point I made in 
relation to the notion of intrinsic function in chapter 4, the psychological aspect would 
seem to represent an observer-relative feature, for whether or not some form of 
behaviour is thought to constitute judging, willing, goal-seeking, etc., would seem to 
be a matter of interpretation based upon other observer-relative concepts that we hold 
(such as the notions of agency, identity, etc.). As Dennett rightly holds, 18 we may 
adopt an 'intentional stance' or interpretation of such actions, and in the 'ascriptions 
to the system of beliefs and desires (and hopes, fears, intentions, hunches,...)', explain, 
predict, and generally account for its behaviour. So, whether we consider 
consciousness in terms of brain function (e.g. functionalism), 19 as capable of being 
cashed out behaviourally (e.g. behaviourism), 20 or from some other materialist 
perspective (e.g. eliminativism),21 the ascription of function or purpose (just as it was 
in our discussion of the function of the heart) would seem to be observer relative.
However, the case of phenomenal consciousness would seem to be different. Is it an 
observer-relative fact that I have conscious, subjective experiences? In relation to my 
own experience of myself, this seems ridiculous, for I do not rely on interpretation or 
analysis in order to arrive at the conclusion that I myself am conscious (i.e. it is not a 
process of deduction) - in fact, the very possibility of my being able to interpret and 
analyse would seem to presuppose that. We might demur at this point, however - in 
line with a point made by Nietzsche - that, in supposing that there is some baseline 
subjective experience called 'consciousness', we are behaving 'as though knowledge 
here got hold of its object pure and naked'. 22 Nietzsche's point, of course, is that what 
appears to be 'self-evident' is often no more than a construction or assertion on the 
part of the perceiver. Wilfrid Sellars makes a similar point in arguing that knowledge 
is a 'conceptual state',23 and that mental experiences cannot therefore represent some 
sort of non-inferential form of knowledge as to the nature of the mind (targets here 
would include such concepts as 'immediate certainty', and Descartes's Cogito - 
which, incidentally, Nietzsche also criticises for similar reasons). 24 Sellars termed this 
idea that we can somehow infer epistemological or ontological truths about things 
from the very fact of certain experiences, the 'myth of the given'. In this case, this 
would mean that our judgment that phenomenal consciousness is a non-reductive 
reality is no more than a dogmatic assertion that serves certain metaphysical purposes.
However, as David Chalmers points out, subjective experience itself seems to be 
'more primitive' than knowledge, because it is a 'nonconceptual state'. For, even if
17 We may distinguish here between whether, for instance, such a reduction is possible (and 
physicalism is true), and whether we currently (or will ever) possess the necessary conceptual 
apparatus to facilitate such a reduction. This is pointed out by Nagel (1970), who argues that we simply 
do not currently posses the requisite concepts to explain consciousness (and that current physicalist 
attempts are therefore misguided - or at least over ambitious).
18 Dennett (1971), p.87.
19 For instance, as David Armstrong does - see, e.g., Armstrong (1973).
20 See, e.g., Ryle (1949). 
2l E.g.,Churchland(1981).
22 Nietzsche (1990a), Part One, s.16, p.46.
23 Sellars (1956).
24 For Nietzsche's criticisms of Descartes on this point, see for instance Nietzsche (1990a), sections 16 
and 17, pp.45-7; for Descartes's Cogito argument, see Descartes (1986), Second Meditation, p. 102 ff.
25 Chalmers (1996), p.380, n.6.
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we admit that the knowledge of our being conscious is constructed step by step (and 
therefore reliant upon language and conceptualization), the very notion of 
construction assumes the existence of something out of which we construct 
(something 'more primitive'). Therefore, even where it is admitted that 
sophistications to do with T and 'self, and concomitant arguments to do with 
existence and certainty, are later, observer-relative constructions, there would seem to 
need to be - in order to take phenomenal consciousness seriously - some sort of pre- 
existing base-level of 'non-conceptual' subjectivity. Margaret Archer, in Being 
Human: The Problem of Agency, puts this same point a slightly different way. For 
Archer, 'our sense of self, as part of our humanity, is prior and primitive to our 
sociality.' 26
Since this sensing will be seen to be wordless, and necessarily so 
because it is both prelinguistic and alinguistic, then it cannot rest upon 
any concept appropriated from society. This does not make it 
unconceptual: the sense of self, like all other knowledge, is 
conceptually formed. What is does mean, is that the theoretical work 
involved is performed and recorded in ways which are non-linguistic. 27
Obviously, this raises further issues: for Archer, this primitive, pre-linguistic sense of 
self provides a link with the animal kingdom, many of whom may be said to share it. 
Also, some may take issue with the idea of non-linguistic 'theoretical work'. 28 
However, these issues aside, this notion of the existence of a pre-linguistic, 
phenomenological baseline to experience and consciousness would seem to many to 
be a natural and coherent one.
Treating both the psychological and phenomenal aspects of consciousness seriously, 
therefore, we may consider consciousness to have a dual status. Firstly, from an 
objective point of view, it may be said to consist of certain intrinsic features (the 
interaction of neurons, synaptic structures, etc.). However, whilst the existence of 
physical parts is, in Searle's phrase, 'ontologically objective', our perception of 
function and purpose is 'ontologically subjective' (i.e. they are observer-relative 
features, and such things exist only for humans). Secondly, from a first-person point 
of view, conscious experience may be considered 'ontologically subjective', in that it 
only exists for the subject or conscious perceiver; for instance, my qualitative 
experience of feeling angry, or enjoying a piece of music, is something that only 
exists for me. However, that humans have such experiences (that they are angry, 
enjoy music, etc.) is an intrinsic feature of their neurology; in other words, my 
experience of a pain (to use a well-worn example) is subjective (it has a 'hidden' 
qualitative aspect); however, that I have pain experiences, is an objective fact. Searle 
puts the point like this:
Although the feature of being a screwdriver is observer relative, the 
feature of thinking that something is a screwdriver (treating it as a 
screwdriver, using it as a screwdriver, etc.) is intrinsic to the thinkers
26 Archer (2000), p. 121.
27 Ibid.,p.l24.
28 Though, incidentally, this position need not be problematic, for we need only consider the
significance of split-brain experiments for the presence of non-linguistic conceptualisation and
reasoning - see, e.g., Gazzaniga, et al, (1962).
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(treaters, users, etc.). Being a screwdriver is observer relative, but the 
features of the observers that enable them to create such observer-relative 
features of the world are intrinsic features of the observers. 29
In other words, even though 'mental phenomena are [...] ontologically subjective',30 
having such phenomena is an intrinsic feature of human brains, and the phenomena's 
existence are not dependent upon the existence of language users, social practices, etc. 
Phenomenal consciousness would therefore seem to be an intrinsic feature of human 
beings.
This is a subtle point, and is perhaps worth illustrating further: the experiences I have 
when I watch a film, feel pain, eat an apple, and so on, are qualitatively private; other 
people can do these things, but they cannot do them as me. So, in this sense, such 
experiences are subjective (and in Searle's sense, ontologically so, because those 
particular experiences that / have exist only for me). However, the fact that I have 
such experiences, that I feel qualitative states at all, reflects an ontologically-objective 
aspect of human beings; we are capable of such things (just as physical objects have a 
certain mass). In this sense, therefore, phenomenal consciousness is an intrinsic 
feature of human beings (unless, of course, you deny the existence of phenomenal 
consciousness, as certain (Type-A) reductivists do). 31
Epistemic Objectivity
Having dealt above with the ontology of consciousness, there remains the 
epistemological question of what status our judgements concerning it have. Here we 
may utilize Searle's other distinction involving epistemically-objective and 
epistemically-subjective judgements. Put crudely, epistemically-objective statements 
(such as, 'The Mountain is 1,000 feet high') involve facts, whilst epistemically- 
subjective statements (such as, 'Hamlet is a wonderful play') are attitudinal or value- 
based. However, it is not the case that we can only be epistemically objective about 
intrinsic (ontologically-objective) features, and epistemically subjective about 
observer-relative (ontologically-subjective) features. We may also be epistemically 
subjective about ontologically-objective features ('The mountain is awe-inspiring'), 









The Mountain is 1,000 feet high
The mountain is awe-inspiring'
Epistemically-Subjective
Hamlet is Shakespeare's 
longest play
Hamlet is a wonderful play
29 Searle (1995), pp. 10-11.
30 Ibid., p. 12.
31 A good example of this attitude and its arguments can be found in Dennett (1991), chapter 12, 
'Qualia Disqualified'.
-98-
In relation to consciousness, therefore, we must deal with the phenomenal and 
psychological aspects separately. Firstly, it must be noted that the psychological 
aspect of consciousness, whilst it can arguably be reduced to talk of intrinsic features 
(structures possessed by the brain, causal interaction of parts, and so on), cannot itself 
be considered ontologically objective. As I noted in my discussion of function and 
capacity, accounts which ascribe goals and intentions to systems - in fact, involve the 
very idea of 'system' at all - are observer relative. Furthermore, it would seem to be 
impossible for any psychological account to survive without attributing such function 
and goal-orientation, or else we would be merely left with the description of intrinsic 
physical properties - which, as far as consciousness is concerned, would not be an 
account at all. In other words, the enlightening concepts for understanding of the 
brain's role in consciousness are mostly observer-relative, and descriptions merely in 
terms of atoms and molecules would not be very informative without observer- 
relative concepts to relate them to. 32
In summary, I have already argued (in line with Searle), that the phenomenal account 
of consciousness (the qualitative experience of having mental phenomena) is observer 
relative. Therefore, in different ways, both the psychological and phenomenal aspects 
of consciousness are (in a sense) observer-relative, ontologically-subjective features 
of the brain: the former, because, as with a functional account, a psychological 
explanation must involve non-agentive ascription; and the latter because, in terms of 
the mental phenomena themselves (the qualia), they arise because of our position as 
subjective observers (we experience them qualitatively). However, there is one 
important exception to this categorization: whilst the qualitative experience of mental 
phenomena is ontologically subjective, the fact that we have qualitative experiences is 
not. In other words, that human beings have such experiences is a biological fact (i.e. 
brains allow such qualitative phenomenal experiences). Holding this view is, of 
course, to subscribe to the 'consciousness has a real phenomenal aspect' camp of the 
debate (which, at least for the purposes of this argument, I hold to be a possibility).
Epistemically speaking, therefore, we may hold objective judgements about 
consciousness in both its psychological and phenomenal aspects: the former, based on 
the observer-relative ascription of function to the interaction of intrinsic features of 
the brain (i.e. goal-oriented systems of neurons, etc.); the latter, based on both our 
own first-person, subjective experience, and factual assertions concerning the 
existence of phenomenal consciousness in other human beings, animals, etc. Thus, 
whilst my own mental experience is ontologically subjective, I may still make 
epistemically-objective judgements concerning it, in as much as others may seek to 
verify its nature (such as whether I am really happy) in much the same way as they 
might seek to verify more overtly objective phenomena - such as the existence of 
objects in the world. 34 This, ultimately, will have an important consequence for any
32 Of course, this ultimately suggests that the study of biology is much more reliant upon observer- 
relative concepts than physics is. Furthermore, the extent to which the concepts involved in the hard 
sciences concern intrinsic/observer-relative features is the basis of the debate between realists and 
social-constructivists regarding science.
33 Of course, this is not to say that such assertions are necessarily correct, but merely that the solipsist, 
the non-sceptic (using the 'argument from analogy'), the advocate of animal rights (perhaps), etc., are 
in effect in dispute concerning a factual matter (the existence of phenomenal consciousness in others). 
Though, just who the solipsist is arguing against is a puzzling matter...
34 It should be noted here that I am not using these observations as proofs for the non-reducibility of 
such qualitative experiences; for the sake of my wider argument, however, I take such a non-reducible
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attempt to present an account of death based on the absence of the capacity for 
phenomenal consciousness - to which I will now turn.
Cessation of Consciousness as a Criterion for Determining Death
I have so far argued that death cannot be considered an intrinsic feature of the world 
whilst its definition rests on observer-relative features (e.g. the functional definition). 
Therefore, without another suitable candidate, the definition of death may join other 
normative debates which concern conflicting values as to whether one thing or 
another should happen (for instance, whether or not to be vegetarian, or to impose 
trade embargoes on a certain country). This is not to say, of course, that ethical and 
scientific judgements are on a par, but merely to point out that, in the final analysis, in 
determining death we would leave the realm of 'brute facts' and move - at least 
significantly - into the realm of observer-relative and (ultimately) culturally- 
dependent 'institutional facts' (and from the strictly-biological view to the partly- 
biological view).
In the last section, I argued that holding that (a) phenomenal consciousness exists, and 
is real and irreducible, leads to the conclusion that (b) the capacity to experience 
conscious mental phenomena is an intrinsic (yet contingent, and not always present) 
feature of the human brain. Therefore, since the functional definition of death must 
involve observer-relative, non-agentive ascription, could phenomenal consciousness, 
as an intrinsic feature, provide a basis for resolving the death debate?
In response to this proposal, we may identify two main questions:
(1) In what way does adopting this criterion help resolve the practical difficulties 
faced in determining death?
(2) Even if doing so would resolve these difficulties, why should we equate death 
with cessation of consciousness at all?
The first of these problems is an epistemic one. That is, given the debate surrounding 
the phenomenal aspect of consciousness, can it really be used in practical situations in 
order to determine the moment of death? If death may be said to occur when there is a 
permanent cessation in the capacity for phenomenal consciousness, those individuals 
may be said to be dead who, in terms of their behaviour, display no evidence of the 
type of behaviour associated with the presence of that capacity.
However, there are a number of difficulties here. Firstly, the situation is an instance of 
the so-called 'problem of other minds'; in other words, how do we know that, behind 
the apparently intelligent, purposeful, conscious actions of other individuals, there 
exist the same qualitative, phenomenal, mental experience as accompanies our own 
actions? In brief, we cannot know that is the case, and may only apply an 'argument 
by analogy' with our own experience (i.e. others behave as I do, I have 'something 
going on inside', therefore so do they). Obviously, materialist attempts to dissolve this 
problem reductively (e.g. certain brands of behaviourism, eliminativism, and other
state to be fact. The reasons for this approach will become clear when I consider the possibility that a 
definition of death can be based upon the permanent cessation of the capacity for such experience 
(which I will come to shortly).
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types of reductive materialism), do away with the very thing that would be explained. 
However, those who would treat phenomenal consciousness seriously (and non- 
reductively) - as I have argued we should, for the moment - are faced with what 
would seem to be this insurmountable epistemic difficulty.
We might, of course, reject this problem as a sceptical paradox, and simply adopt the 
common-sense approach that the argument from analogy is ultimately based on. 
However, even if we do this, we may still be faced with cases where even the 
argument from analogy does not work: for instance, how would we know whether (a) 
phenomenal consciousness is or is not present, at some level, in (for instance) a 
comatose patient, and (b) whether the capacity for phenomenal consciousness has 
permanently ceased? These might be said to be scientific and technological concerns; 
if we can determine which areas of the brain are responsible for phenomenal 
consciousness, then we might be able to answer both (a) and (b) via brain scans (for 
instance, fMRI scanning). Even if such technology is not currently sophisticated 
enough, and our knowledge of the brain is not advanced enough, to answer such 
questions conclusively, we might nonetheless argue that herein lies the ultimate 
answer to our problems. 35
Secondly, an implicit assumption in attempting to adopt the presence of phenomenal 
consciousness as a sign of the presence also of some sort of intelligent, rational, 
volitional entity, is that consciousness does not seem to be necessary (or at least, need 
not accompany) many of these would-be defining criteria. As psychologist Julian 
Jaynes argues:
[Consciousness] is not to be confused with reactivity. It is not involved in 
a host of perceptual phenomena. It is not involved in the performance of 
skills and often hinders their execution. It need not be involved in 
speaking, writing, listening, or reading. It does not copy down experience, 
as most people think. Consciousness is not at all involved in signal 
learning, and need not be involved in the learning of skills or solutions, 
which can go on without any consciousness whatever. It is not necessary
35 However, this may not be the case. Furthermore, if we are to detect consciousness via brain-scan 
technology, then we would do so based on brain function. Such a method would rely on the idea that 
certain parts of the brain have certain roles, and the presence of electrical activity, blood flow, etc. 
(such as an fMRI scan would pick up) would indicate the corresponding mental activity. However, this 
relies on two assumptions: (1) the functional roles played by certain parts of the brain are the same in 
all brains, and (2) such activity is always accompanied by phenomenal consciousness. However, 
medical research currently indicates that - whilst there is some standardization - 'brain-maps' can 
differ between individuals (according to handedness, gender, and cases of abnormal development), as 
can the morphology of the brain itself, and that there would currently seem to be insufficient 
understanding of the precise relationship between function and brain areas to determine conclusively in 
all cases what are the nature of actual or potential mental states in the comatose. For instance, see Brett, 
et al. (2002), which details some of the current technological, methodological, and epistemological 
problems in this type of research). Furthermore, Blackmore (2003), points out that the problem of 
mapping states of consciousness is the difficulty in clearly defining which areas of the brain are 
essential to the state in question (pp.326-7); she also observes that - for instance - unconsciousness and 
consciousness are not accompanied by activation of different areas of the brain, but are rather 
accompanied by differing degrees of activity in the whole brain (pp.228-9). Therefore, the functional 
approach to brain studies, whilst undoubtedly useful, is far from an 'easy way-in' to understanding the 
nature of consciousness, and may ultimately be undermined by the non-standard nature of brain 
organization, and the difficulty in relating subjective states to corresponding physical events.
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for making judgements or in simple thinking. It is not the seat of reason, 
and indeed some of the most difficult instances of creative reasoning go 
on without any attending consciousness. 36
Therefore, since these things may occur without conscious awareness (phenomenally 
defined), it would seem to be a futile effort to cite them as evidence of the presence of 
phenomenal consciousness itself. 37 For, as Jaynes goes on to say:
If our reasonings have been correct, it is perfectly possible that there 
could have existed a race of men who spoke, judged, reasoned, solved 
problems, indeed did most of the things that we do, but who were not 
conscious at all. 38
Therefore, even if we could confidently identify those areas of the brain that 
performed certain tasks, and furthermore, could ascertain when they were active (or 
potentially so), then there is no guarantee that we are not witnessing some sort of 
reflex brain activity which is ultimately empty of phenomenal content. So, even if the 
technological difficulties can be overcome, there does seem to remain an 
epistemological one.
This is not to say, of course, that phenomenal consciousness may not play some part 
at some stage in the development of these psychological processes,39 but for all that, 
the objection seems an arresting one in the current context. Of course, reductivists 
concerning consciousness would wish to use such observations to point out that this 
only proves that what Chalmers calls the 'psychological aspect of consciousness' is 
consciousness tout court. However, this need not be the case, for, as I have already 
pointed out in response to Sellars, there is nothing self-contradictory in treating
36 Jaynes (1976), p.47. These quoted observations represent a summary of Jaynes's argument in the 
whole first chapter of the book - see pp.21-47, 'Chapter 1: The Consciousness of Consciousness'.
37 Apart from those detractors who consider phenomenal consciousness not to exist at all (e.g. Dennett), 
there are those who, like Jaynes, believe that it exists, whilst pointing out that phenomenal 
consciousness is not 'consciousness simpliciter\ and that there must therefore exist a sort of non- 
phenomenal consciousness (which is what Jaynes is arguing for). For instance, see Lormand (1996), 
pp.242-61, who argues that such things as moods and attitudes constitute nonphenomenal conscious 
states (i.e. they are conscious, in as much as they display an awareness of things, and nonphenomenal 
in as much as there is not necessarily 'something it is like' to have them). Lormand thus distinguishes 
between moods and attitudes, and the phenomenal conscious states that moods and attitudes can (but 
need not always) give rise to (just as depression can give rise to dark thoughts, but need not itself 
become phenomenally conscious).
38 Jaynes (1976), p.47. Jaynes's wider thesis - that, indeed, there was a time in history when this was 
the case - is a broad-ranging and fascinating one, covering religion, mythology, anthropology, ancient 
literature, the development of language, and much more. However, in utilising his initial argument here, 
I am not necessarily committing myself to his ultimate conclusions. However, the idea that phenomenal 
conscious - even when it is treated non-reductively - need not be involved in any of these activities is 
an important one. Of course, at bottom, Jaynes's argument is historical and would seem to be 
ultimately unverifiable (a sort of 'problem of other minds' at a remove of two thousand years). The 
presence in contemporary philosophy of mind debates of the subject of 'zombies' however, and the 
persistent attempt to show that so-called phenomenal consciousness can be 'explained away', shows 
that there is at the basis of Jaynes's theory an important observation.
39 In fact, I think this is the case - as does Lormand (1996), pp.254-7, who argues that phenomenal 
consciousness is necessary in order for nonphenomenal consciousness to exist, and that the possibility 
of making sense of nonphenomenal states (e.g. arriving at conclusions concerning dispositional beliefs) 
is dependent upon it.
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phenomenal experience as a more primitive and non-conceptual aspect of 
consciousness.
Given the above difficulties, therefore, there are currently serious practical and 
epistemological difficulties involved in adopting the cessation of the capacity for 
phenomenal consciousness as a sufficient criterion for determining death. However, in 
a sense, they are only that, and there remains the logical possibility that phenomenal 
consciousness is in fact the criteriological candidate that we seek (at least, for a 
definition of death involving intrinsic features). However, this brings us to the second 
and more difficult problem of why we should equate death with permanent cessation 
of the capacity for phenomenal consciousness at all.
Why Choose Consciousness?
Why should we hold that the cessation of the capacity for phenomenal consciousness 
should be equated with death? In other words, diagnostic and epistemological 
difficulties already noted aside, why should consciousness be considered as 
significant or essential?
So far, I have argued that no 'strictly-biological' definition of death is in fact possible 
which does not, in turn, require some degree of value ascription. Therefore, if we now 
apply this conclusion to the consciousness criterion, then on what grounds can we 
assume that consciousness is an 'essential' or 'significant' feature of a living human 
being? Is consciousness more vital than the other signs of life? What about cases 
where it is permanently absent, but other signs (e.g. heartbeat, respiration, etc.) are 
present? One advocate (such as Puccetti) may agree with the consciousness criterion, 
whilst another (such as Jonas), may find it inconclusive or dubious. As already noted 
in the range of views discussed in chapters 2 and 3, there would seem to be no purely 
logical means of determining exactly what the concept of a living human being 
consists of- and why, therefore, consciousness should be a defining feature of it.
Furthermore, with an attempt which seeks to identify specific physiological criteria 
for death, we once again face the problem of 'reversibility': if the functional state of 
certain areas of the brain determines the capacity for phenomenal consciousness, then 
there is the possibility of technological progress shifting that boundary (e.g. through 
the potential for repair of brain-cell damage). Are we therefore to abandon one 
criterion (reversibility) in favour of another (consciousness)? Therefore, even if we 
might argue that consciousness is an intrinsic feature of the world, and that thereby we 
might arrive at a definition of death based on intrinsic features, we are still presented 
with a value-driven definitional problem. Such competing criteria must therefore take 
their place alongside extra-biological features (such as - soon to be considered - 
personal identity and self-hood) in relation to an increasingly variable and shifting 
concept of death. Therefore, this conclusion not only suggests that the definition of 
death cannot be resolved in a strictly-biological (or strictly-logical) way, but 
furthermore that because of this, there may be a number of possible definitions (or 
redefinitions} of death which reflect value-based variance between individuals and
• f 40
cultures as to which criteria are significant.
40 1 shall explore what I have termed the 'potential variance' of the concept of death in chapter 8.
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Conclusion
In this chapter I have explored the question of whether the permanent cessation of the 
capacity for consciousness can be considered a sufficient criterion for the 
determination of death. In doing so, I have argued that it is only the phenomenal 
aspect of consciousness (as defined by Chalmers) that can be considered in anyway to 
be an intrinsic feature of a human being.
However, whilst this initially seemed hopeful as a line of enquiry, the application of 
the criterion gave rise not only to epistemological and practical problems in 
determining death, but was also subject to many of the same problems that beset 
previously considered attempts. As argued in chapter 2, advocates of the strictly- 
biological definition, such as Lamb, Becker, and Russell, ultimately fail in their 
respective approaches because they do not recognise the role of extra-biological 
attributions of value, which in turn reveal the definitional dilemma itself as a conflict 
beftveen such values. Furthermore, in chapter 3, possible resolutions of the problem 
according to a broader conceptual analysis were also shown to be problematic in that 
human concepts can be seen to be ultimately grounded in the non-rational, and such 
resolutions are therefore problematic for the reason that our rational concepts and 
categories are open to their variable influence. Lastly, the conclusions in chapter 4 
have shown that any type of functional definition of death (upon which strictly- 
biological approaches would seem to depend) can be said to be an intrinsic feature of 
the world. Therefore, regarding the earlier concern respecting a possible twofold 
definition of death (i.e. human death and general organismic death), I think it is by 
now becoming apparent that this must at least be the case: in rejecting the strictly 
biological definition (and the contention that function is intrinsic), we are faced not 
only with the fact that human death cannot be the same as that shared by other 
creatures and natural entities, but by the possibility that death in any sense is itself 
merely observer relative. Ironically, then, some form of consciousness or personal 
identity approach (if successful) may be the only candidate for an account of death as 
an intrinsic feature; in this case, only human death could possess this status.
So, as we have seen in the course of this chapter, we have at least, in identifying a 
significant and - some might argue - essential feature of human beings (i.e. the 
capacity for phenomenal consciousness), isolated what is perhaps the only intrinsic 
feature which may play a part in defining death. However, as we have also seen, this 
does not in fact provide a resolution to the problem, for whilst some form of 
phenomenal consciousness may be considered an intrinsic feature of human beings, 
there would seem to be no logically compelling reason for us to identify this feature as 
essential - compelling in some other sense, possibly (which I shall return to later), but 
in terms of providing us with an essential feature which is independent of value-based 
choices, then no. A human being without the potential for consciousness may still be 
considered a human being, and a living one at that. Furthermore, in more practical 
terms, it may also be seen that a definition of death based on the absence of 
phenomenal consciousness would be extremely difficult to implement (though this in 
itself is no argument against the sufficiency of the criterion on a theoretical level).
However, that the use of phenomenal consciousness as a criterion for defining death 
subsequently proves problematic, or else cannot be linked to the concept of death in a 
way that makes death itself an intrinsic phenomenon (and thus resolve the debate),
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does not in fact mean that phenomenal consciousness could not play an important role 
in the definition of death as an observer-relative phenomenon. I shall argue shortly 
that a number of the criteria discussed so far can play a part in defining death as a 
non-intrinsic (observer-relative) feature. However, before turning to these issues, it is 
first necessary to consider one last candidate for a non-observer-relative definition of 
human death: that of personal identity.
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6. Death and Personal Identity
Introduction
Given the difficulties involved in defining death in what I have been calling a 
'strictly-biological sense', it has occurred to some that these problems may be 
circumvented if we view death as a failure to fulfil those criteria necessary for 
personal identity (thereby adopting a 'partly-biological approach', as I term it). The 
best example of this sort of approach is that presented by Karen Gervais in her book 
Redefining Death, where she argues for a personal-identity based, neocortical 
definition of death. 1 In line with Green and Wilder, 2 Gervais argues that death in 
human terms (i.e. the death of humans) involves death of the person (as opposed to 
the mere death of the organism - which, however, she argues is sufficient for animals 
and other 'non-persons'). So, when the biological capacity which enables such 
personhood permanently ceases, the person is 'dead'. Since what is meant by 'person' 
here is the nexus of social relationships formed around the conscious entity that thinks 
of himself (for instance) as 'John Jones', a sufficient condition for the death of 'Jones' 
is the permanent cessation of the capacity to maintain those very roles, personal 
history, etc., that together make up 'Jones'. So, since these capacities generally reside 
in the neocortex or 'higher brain', neocortical death thus becomes - for humans (or at 
least, human persons) - death per se.
In this chapter I will therefore examine a range of personal-identity-based approaches 
to the definition of death, and conclude by underlining what I think are the general 
problems with such views.
Green and Wikler's Ontological Argument
Since Gervais is essentially adapting Green and Wikler's position in response to the 
criticisms of Agich and Jones, 3 it is perhaps best, before considering the merits of 
such an approach in itself, to set out the genesis and development of this theory via 
the debate between its respective proponents and critics. Firstly, Green and Wikler 
characterise previous philosophical attempts to resolve the problems concerning the 
definition of death as taking either a moral or a biological slant. 4 However, rejecting 
both these perspectives, they put forward what they term an 'ontological argument', 
based on the concept of 'being the same individual'. In these terms
Jones' death occurs either at the time that the patient dies, if the patient 
has remained Jones; or at the time the patient ceased to be Jones, 
whichever comes first. If, as we contend, the patient ceased to be Jones at
1 Gervais (1986). Gervais's analysis of Green and Wikler, her response to the criticisms of Agich and 
Jones (1986), and presentation of her own version of the personal identity/neocortical definition of 
death, can be found in Chapter 5 of Redefining Death, pp. 111 -58.
2 Green and Wikler (1980).
3 Agich and Jones (1986).
4 1 will not consider Green and Wikler's criticisms of these respective approaches here as I have already 
extensively criticised the biological approach in previous chapters; the idea that death can be defined 
by reference to moral concerns, since it involves adopting an observer-relative definition of death, is a 
subject I will consider in subsequent chapters.
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the time of brain death, then Jones' brain death is Jones' death. Thus, if 
the loss of capacity for mental activity which occurs at brain death 
constitutes death, it is not for moral reasons, nor for biological reasons, 
but for ontological reasons. 5
Thus, for Green and Wikler, since 'brain death strips the body of its psychological 
traits', the person's identity cannot 'survive the kinds of changes which brain death 
involves.' In simple terms, death is seen as the death of the person, and brain death is 
therefore just a simple biological criterion for no longer being that same person.
However, whilst acknowledging many of the problems associated with providing 
necessary and sufficient criteria for personhood, Green and Wikler instead concentrate 
on the issue of whether a particular entity is the same individual. In doing so, the 
authors claim to circumvent these difficulties and provide a basis for establishing the 
continued existence - or not - of the individual concerned.
Thus, we can afford to remain uncommitted on whether persons are 
essentially beings with psychological properties and on whether Jones is 
essentially a person. We demonstrate instead that Jones, whatever kind of 
entity he is, is essentially an entity with psychological properties. Thus, 
when brain death strips the patient's body of all its psychological traits, 
Jones ceases to exist. 8
Regarding the establishment of the identity of the individual 'Jones', Green and 
Wikler favour an account based on psychological continuity. However, since such 
continuity necessarily involves a functioning neocortex, Jones lives and dies - not 
with the fate of the body or organism as a whole - but with the capacity of the brain to 
sustain those psychological traits which constitute 'Jones'. Thus, 'Jones' may live on 
in a comatose body (which yet retains the neocortex intact), as a disembodied brain, a 
transplanted brain in another body, or - supposedly (though Green and Wikler do not 
use this example) - in another brain onto which the neurological organisation of 
Jones's 'old' brain has been 'mapped'. The point therefore is that 'Jones' lives whilst 
that which enables psychological continuity between one 'Jones-stage' and another 
also persists. 9
Objections to Green and Wikler
There are various problems with this view. Firstly, one of the more controversial 
consequences of the approach is that the incapacity to sustain individual identity can 
frequently be found in an otherwise 'living' body - not only in cases of persistent 
vegetative state, but also where brain-damaged infants are born with functioning 
brainstems (in which latter case - arguably - no personality develops at all). However, 
Green and Wikler anticipate this objection, and are prompt to distinguish between the
5 Green and Wikler (1980), p.l 18.
6 Ibid.
7 Ibid., p. 119.
8 Ibid.,p.l21.
9 That some of the science-fiction-type thought experiments considered by Parfitt (1984) may in f
act
cause problems for this view, I will consider below.
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use of their criteria in order to determine death, and its utilisation as a 'moral divide' 
(to use Laurence Becker's term). 10 For the
argument, requiring no moral premises, is not sufficient to yield moral 
conclusions. We show that the brain dead are dead, but it does not follow 
that brain death is the appropriate moment to turn off ventilators or to 
remove organs."
Thus, Green and Wikler's ontological argument is at most a foundation for further 
moral discussion concerning what we should do with those who are 'dead' in this way.
However, whilst they may have headed off this particular concern, others remain. One 
important difficulty is that, as Agich and Jones point out, simply ceasing to meet 
criteria necessary to maintain a certain model of personal identity is not always in 
itself sufficient for death. For example, it may be that only a persona - such as 'Jones' 
- is disrupted or irrevocably lost so that, whilst 'Jones' is 'dead', some 'other' being is 
decidedly alive. So,
The brain death issue is not whether that person is that person, Jones, or 
that person, Smith, as Green and Wikler insist; the issue is whether the 
patient is dead when his or her brain is dead whoever he or she is. 12
A further criticism made by Agich and Jones is that Green and Wikler's personal 
identity criteria for determining death would seem to represent 'a rather onerous test', 
for, as they somewhat humorously point out: 'Given this requirement, it is surprising 
that anyone is ever declared dead.' For
when we want to know whether an individual is dead, we do not have to 
inquire into the identity of the individual. We only have to inquire 
whether the individual is dead. Green and Wikler's excursus into the 
theory of personal identity confuses the central point at issue. 14
Indeed, the absurd consequences of Green and Wikler's view can be further illustrated 
if we consider that it is a test for death that can be readily performed on any living, 
conscious being - and prove positive! Successful candidates may include amnesiacs, 
stroke victims, those suffering from certain types of mental illness, and those 
suffering from senility. Green and Wikler's motivation for the adoption of this type of 
personal identity criterion is to avoid both the problems that beset the moral and 
biological arguments for death, but also to sidestep the more problematic search for 
sufficient criteria for establishing the existence of personhood. Thus, they reject 'kind- 
essentialism' (what essentially constitutes a human being) in favour of an 'individual- 
essentialist account', and replace the question of whether a person is still alive, with 
the more specific question of whether 'Jones' is alive. 15 However, as already argued, 
the fact that 'Jones' may die does not necessarily entail the death of the individual
10 Becker(1975),pp.334-359.
" Green and Wikler (1980), p. 128.





(who, whilst he may not be 'Jones', may yet be a person), which would suggest 
ultimately that an individual-essentialist imposes, in a sense, too harsh a criterion in 
that it allows death to be pronounced when it would seem extremely controversial or 
even ridiculous to do so.
Green and Wikler may counter here that this type of criticism is unwarranted; after all, 
they are not (as they point out) setting a 'moral divide', but merely an ontological one 
(i.e. under certain circumstances, 'Jones' is dead). But, then, what force do their 
arguments have? 'Jones' is dead, but his body lives, and one may even conduct a 
conversation with him (albeit it as some nameless person, or 'Neo-Jones'). If they 
were to argue, for instance, that pronouncement of Jones's death allows us to treat 
Jones's social obligations, legal status, etc., as null and void, in some cases this would 
surely be a situation better handled by existing attitudes and legislation relevant to 
individuals who are mentally ill, senile, or otherwise incapable of making rational 
decisions (and would certainly represent a less 'jarring' option ontologically 
speaking). In other words, it is more common (and, perhaps, more in keeping with 
prevalent notions of personhood) to think of the man Jones as suffering in some way 
(e.g. from senility, or brain trauma), rather than considering the person 'Jones' to be 
dead.
On the other hand, a failure of the test as to whether an individual is 'Jones' which 
leaves a never-again-to-be-conscious - yet living - individual, would seem to create a 
new category of individual (or organism) devoid of personhood. 16 Yet, surely, in 
making this distinction, Green and Wikler have already prejudiced any decision of 
what is to be done with this being by the mere fact of considering it 'not Jones 
anymore'; for indeed, the moment my grandfather ceases to be my grandfather, and 
becomes a semi-self-regulating organism (or whatever), is the moment many of my 
decisions are made for me. In this sense, therefore, Green and Wikler's divide is not, 
ultimately, a morally neutral one. 17 On the other hand, however, if capacity for 
consciousness is maintained, then surely I would be reluctant to consider the 
individual as not really my grandfather anymore, even if he did not meet the criteria 
for individual personal identity. In such a situation, I would probably rather think 
merely that, 'My grandfather does not know who he is', or some such thing. In this 
sense, Green and Wikler's criteria serve to dehumanise the individual, and disrupt 
many of the common, natural responses we might have to them, merely for the 
purpose of solving our definitional dilemmas.
One last criticism of the Green and Wikler position is that, although they argue that 
'Jones' is essentially an entity possessing certain psychological properties, they 
provide no real argument or justification of this viewpoint. For, as Karen Gervais 
points out, 18 'People may disagree on what Jones essentially is', and just assuming - 
as Green and Wikler do - that it is possible to make a clear 'patient/Jones' distinction, 
is not sufficient to prove that they are ultimately separable in this way. Of course, 
people can and do adopt such a view in relation to death, but this does not alter the 
fact that the adoption of such a view is a value-based decision in relation to what is 
important to the people adopting such a view. In other words, it is possible to have a 
wider concept of what 'Jones' is, and therefore when he ceases to be, and so even if it
16 Which, as Gervais (1986, p.l 14) argues, is an unnecessary and confusing dualism.
17 In fact, I argue that no such divide can be value-free in this sense.
18 Gervais (1986), pp. 115-6.
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can be demonstrated to me that, according to Green and Wikler's strict personal 
identity criteria, 'Jones' no longer exists, there is no reason to adopt this particular 
model of personal identity. I may, for instance, hold that the mental aspect of 'Jones' 
is only a facet of the person, and that, in an important sense (as with the example of 
my grandfather), 'Jones' still exists for me. 19
Finally, it remains to be seen whether the account of personal identity involved here is 
itself a coherent one for Green and Wikler's purposes. It may prove, for example, that 
such an approach has its own inherent problems which may undermine its use as a 
criterion for the definition of death. That is, even if the death of 'Jones' is sufficient 
for death, the approach to personal identity employed here (i.e. psychological 
continuity) may give rise to other unforeseen problems - though this is a more general 
point, and one which I shall consider near the end of this chapter.
Karen Gervais and Redefining Death
Like Green and Wikler, Karen Gervais defends a neocortically based view of human 
death as death of the person.
Since human death is the death of the person, and the death of the person 
occurs with permanent loss of consciousness, neocortical death is an 
adequate criterion for declaring death. 20
However, unlike Green and Wikler, Gervais retreats from their individual- 
essentialism and proposes a 'more modest mentalist view'.21 This, she argues, avoids 
the type of problems that face a more restrictive view, allowing us simply to argue 
that the permanent absence of the capacity for consciousness should be a sufficient 
criterion for declaring an individual 'dead' (whether 'Jones' or not), and that the 
'individual's essence consists in the possession of a conscious, yet not necessarily 
continuous, mental life'. 22
In doing this, Gervais argues that what is centrally involved in any definition of 
human death is what she terms a 'decision of significance'. 23 In other words, she 
argues,
Our concept of death is not a fact awaiting our discovery; rather, it must 
be chosen on the basis of ethical reflection.
19 Gervais provides a more detailed critique of Green and Wikler than I have supplied here, and I have 
also supplemented her position with points and criticisms of my own. She also identifies certain 
inconsistencies in their argument (such as treating anencephalic infants and 'neocortically dead' adults 
differently - thus requiring an additional, biological definition of death for the former). However, it is 
not my purpose here to revisit Gervais's every point and observation with a view to agreeing or 
dissenting, but merely to show that there are good reasons for rejecting the individual-essentialism of 
Green and Wikler. Ultimately, though, I will argue that there are also good reasons for rejecting any 
sort of personal-identity based definition of death.
20 Gervais (1986), pp.150-1.
21 Ibid., p. x.
22 Ibid., pp. 157-8. 
23 Ibid.,p.l56. 
24 Ibid., p. 155.
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This conclusion - a consideration which seems unrecognised among most other 
commentators 25 - is one that 1 have great sympathy with, and in many respects 
represents a key note of what I have been arguing to date: 'death' is not something 
which exists in the world (intrinsically), independently of human value systems and 
conceptualisations (though I would not say necessarily that the value-based aspect is 
purely ethical in nature, nor that the decision which 'resolves' the situation purely a 
moral one, but I shall return to this point in following chapters).
Death is not simply "a matter of scientific fact," as Lamb would have it. 
We must make an ethical decision about how best to regard the human 
for the purpose of declaring death. 26
Gervais, however, does not go into the reasons as to why death has this status (such as 
I have attempted in chapter 3, and will return to later), nor does she attempt to provide 
a theoretical framework within which she can distinguish between concepts which 
may be said to represent intrinsic features, and those which carry non-agentive 
ascription of value and purpose (such as I have also attempted to do in utilising 
Searle). As a result, Gervais seems to be left with a twofold concept of death: on the 
one hand, what we might call 'organismic' or 'natural' death (which human 
organisms might share with animal organisms, and other natural entities); and on the 
other hand, human, 'person-centred' death.
The death of a person is different from that of a dog or a cat; every death 
of a person unravels and reconstitutes a complex net of rights and 
obligations that usually involve many people. Death is not simply an 
event in the life of the deceased. We must think of human death not in 
terms of what it has in common with canine death or feline death, but in 
terms of what it represents for human relationships: abandonment of all 
roles, the end of all interactions, and the reconstituting of rights and 
obligations. Permanent unconsciousness, whatever its basis, represents 
these changes. 27
This discussion is similar in nature to the one at the other end of the life continuum 
(i.e. that concerning abortion). Michael Tooley, 28 for instance, argues that we may 
distinguish between the concept of a person and the concept of a human organism (a 
representative of the species Homo sapiens). This distinction, Tooley argues (parallel 
to Gervais), allows us to treat a non-person (in this case, the foetus), differently to a 
person (a conscious entity): the latter, by virtue of its consciousness, is a rights-bearer, 
whereas the former, by virtue of its lack of this feature, is not. This distinction is also 
defended by others, such as Peter Singer29 and Judith Jarvis Thomson, but there are 
also those who disagree that such a distinction is possible - or, more precisely, that 
criticise this approach for misconstruing the nature of this distinction. For instance, 
Bernard Williams criticises Tooley for glibly ignoring the social consequences of his
25 With the possible exception of Jonas (1978) and Evans (1990, 1994), discussed in chapter 2.






arguments: what sort of world would this be if such arguments held? 31 Singer, 
Thomson, and Tooley therefore seem to assume that such a distinction is significant in 
itself, but surely, as I have argued, it is not that easy or simple: as Williams points out, 
it is the wider social significance of such questions which have a bearing on the 
meaning of the distinction, and not the other way around. How we treat a non-person 
is determined by our general views on life, the value of existence, and other non- or 
semi-rational attitudes, and not by the mere fact (if that is so) that they do not possess 
personhood.
A different criticism is presented by Eric Olson. 32 Tooley, Singer, and Thomson are 
all representatives of what Olson calls the 'Standard View' of personal identity, 
whereby organism and person are clearly distinguished. However, as Olson argues, 
this leaves us in the bizarre position that - according to the Standard View - T am 
not identical with the foetus that my body grew out of. This is because a foetus 
possesses no psychological properties, and the defining features of personhood are 
psychological (rationality and self-consciousness). Olson highlights the difficulties 
and absurdities inherent in this view well: the Standard View's inability to account for 
the relationship between the organism and the person results in a situation where we 
are almost led to talk of the existence of two entities.
This view entails that, although we are material beings, we are not 
human animals: we are not members of the species Homo sapiens. 
Apparently we are not organisms at all, in spite of appearances - even 
though we are alive and are composed entirely of living tissues 
arranged in just the way that the tissues of a living organism are 
arranged. 33
This, he points out, is the reason for many of the strange situations that crop up in the 
personal identity debate (such as, in fact, Parfit highlights - which I shall deal with 
shortly). 34
In relation to the definition of death, there is therefore the similar problem that human 
beings embody two aspects: they are both organisms and persons. Gervais presents 
the definition of death problem as a choice between these two at-times-divergent 
features of a human being, and it's resolution as the provision of justification as to the 
adoption of one or the other definition (in her case, death defined as death of the
31 Williams (1995).
32 Olson (1997). 
33 Ibid.,p.l01.
34 Olson's own solution is to consider that identity only entails between biological entities (i.e. between 
the foetus and the adult organism), what he calls the 'Biological View'. Thus, for instance, this would 
avoid the well-known problem of brain transplantation scenarios: if some other entity possesses all or 
part of your brain, then they simply possess part of you (the mental aspect), just as they might possess 
any other non-essential feature (such as a limb or an organ). I think, however, that whilst Olson's attack 
on the Standard View is well conceived, his solution may have its own flaws - not least, the 
observation (already considered) that deciding between the persistence of mental qualities and 
organismic functioning and integrity is arguably something that already implies metaphysical 
commitment and possession of certain values. Furthermore, it would seem odd to deny that the mental 
element is in some way inessential in the way that Olson thinks it is. My own position is therefore to 
reject both these views in favour of the possibility that many conceptions of self and death are in fact 
possible (multiple 'redefinitions').
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person). In her eyes, this justification must take the shape of a moral argument. In 
other words, we must investigate what moral consequences there are for adopting 
organismic or person-based definitions of death in certain problematic circumstances. 
Of course, given that most of these problematic situations involve the permanent 
absence of the patient's capacity for consciousness, the moral considerations tend to 
centre on the consequences for the patient's relatives, the strains put upon the health 
service, the needs of the organ transplant programme, etc., the needs of the patients 
themselves, whilst not ignored (we should respect living wills, religious beliefs, the 
dignity of the dying, etc.), are outweighed by these other considerations. Furthermore, 
since these external concerns are better acknowledged by adopting a person-centred 
concept of death (and merely hampered or ignored by an organismic concept), then 
these moral considerations persuade us that the person-centred definition is the one to 
adopt.
Human death should be regarded as a person-centred occurrence. Since 
permanent unconsciousness is the sign of personal death, the brain-death 
and neocortical-death criteria are consistent with this concept. Treating 
such individuals as living human beings must be disallowed on the 
grounds that there is no moral cost to them in our considering them dead, 
and high moral cost to others in our considering them alive. 36
The adoption of this definition of death therefore takes a contractual form, wherein 
parties of differing views must arrive at an 'outcome that each person realises in 
advance is optimal for both'. 37 This is then put forward as a template for public policy, 
arguing that we must avoid foisting a highly technical, perhaps counter-intuitive 
definition of death (which Gervais admits neocortical death might be, considering our 
emotional reactions to patients in a persistent vegetative state) upon a somewhat 
sceptical and under-informed public. Therefore, she argues, so that they can play their 
part in the contractual agreement as to what death is, a thorough educational 
programme must take place to inform the public of the relevant issues involved.
Responses to Gervais
Firstly, it should be noted that in some respects I agree with Gervais's approach. On 
the one hand, for instance, she identifies that the adoption of one or other definition of 
death implies what she calls a 'decision of significance' as to which features of the 
individual - spontaneous function, consciousness, personal identity - are to be 
considered significant or essential features of the human being, so that their absence 
might be a firm indication that an individual is 'dead'. However, as I have already 
argued, such 'decisions of significance' in turn represent value-motivated attempts to 
draw the borderline in a particular way. In other words, what is important to one 
person may not be so important to another; one person may be content to consider 
insignificant the fact that a patient may have unaided respiratory and cardiac function, 
because the potential for consciousness has permanently disappeared; another may
35 As should now be apparent, this is not the way I see the problem; for me, both the concepts of 
'functioning organism' and 'person' are non-intrinsic and observer-relative. Therefore, they both 
already represent value-based ascriptions. I shall unfold the consequences of this view in a later section 
in this chapter.
36 Gervais (1986), pp. 175-176. 
37 Ibid.,p.l67.
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point to the presence of these functions as indications that the being in question is still 
alive. Deciding between these two viewpoints is not something that can be done by 
strict appeal to 'objective facts', since many of these facts still leave the question open. 
So, even if we say, 'the patient will never again be conscious', the further questions 
which arise are, 'How do we value consciousness?' and 'Do we value it over and to 
the exclusion of spontaneous function of the organism?' Obviously, I am not saying 
that we think exclusively or even explicitly in terms of value, and furthermore it 
would be wrong to consider such questions simply as concerning value; more 
precisely, we might say that our ontological judgements (What is a person? When is 
he dead?) are informed, or motivated, or tied-in with value-based assertions (that 
consciousness matters, that spontaneous function is significant, etc.) which - as I have 
suggested in chapter 3 - it may turn out cannot be cashed out rationally, but which at 
the very least represent ineradicable and irreducible aspects of such concepts.
Given that our judgements at even a fundamental level (such as the non-agentive 
ascription of a certain purpose or function to a living organism) are 'double sided' in 
this way (containing fact and value), the genesis of the problem concerning the 
definition of death can be seen in a whole new light. As I have so far argued, the 
problem as it stands exists because the development of technology has allowed the 
possibility of situations where values and concepts which previously existed in 
harmony were put into conflict with one another. So, in creating the possibility of a 
'beating-heart cadaver', in invalidating the cardio-respiratory criteria for death, 
advancements in medical technology have created situations in which particular 
aspects of certain concepts - e.g. 'a living person' - have been set against one another.
I have also argued that the reason this very division of concepts is possible has 
something to do with the necessary opacity of concepts in general. As Quine and 
Wittgenstein were among the first to point out (in their different ways), there must 
come a point where a term is referentially opaque, and there can be no more analysis 
of the term in yet more fundamental ways. Of course, such limits are relative, and - as 
Quine further argues - it is always possible to more fundamentally explain one 
'conceptual scheme' within another (but which itself is only relatively analysable). 
Furthermore, the way a term is used and what it means may be influenced by 
empirical matters - such as, for our purposes, advancements in medical technology. 
Thus, I argue, what we are faced with in the problem of defining death stems from a 
previously opaque term (e.g. 'living person') being divided, and its parts exposed and 
seen - under these new conditions - to be potentially contradictory.
I will deal with what form possible resolutions to this problem may take in subsequent 
chapters, but I now wish to show how the picture of the problem as I have just set it 
out can help us evaluate Gervais's position - or, in fact, any personal identity 
argument.
The Twofold Definition of Death
As we have seen, Gervais's conclusions lead her to consider death in a twofold 
manner: human (personal-identity based) death and animal (organismic) death. Whilst, 
initially, she presents these two views as competing candidates for human death, she 
ultimately decides upon the former (personal identity) on moral grounds. However, 
whilst I agree with her that this problem cannot be resolved by a strictly-biological
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analysis of organismic functioning, and that any attempt to decide between 
organismic and personal-identity based definitions of death requires a 'decision of 
significance', to adopt two definitions of death (one for humans and another for other 
living entities) would seem to leave us with an awkward and somewhat arbitrary 
dualism. Furthermore, it would mean that a human could be 'alive' in organismic 
terms whilst 'dead' in terms of being a person. However, since this is the very 
problem that we started with, is it ultimately satisfactory to adopt a model that allows 
this?
Gervais's reasons for adopting this twofold definition can be summarised as follows:
1. Any strictly-biological, organismic definition of death is in itself insufficient 
(in that it requires a 'decision of significance' to work - e.g. that the 
continuing integrated functioning of the organism is more important than 
capacity for consciousness).
2. Considering human death as the death of the person (a partly-biological 
approach) also requires a decision of significance, but it is preferable on moral 
grounds.
3. The current dilemma (as to how death should be defined and when it should be 
declared) therefore requires a redefinition in terms of what physiological 
functions are 'essential to the existence of the person',38 so that the permanent 
cessation of these functions constitutes the person's death.
Firstly, therefore, Gervais would seem to assume that an organismic definition of 
death, whilst insufficient for human purposes, is nonetheless sufficient for the purpose 
of defining non-human organismic death (e.g. that of animals and other organisms). 
However, the organismic (or functional) definition is insufficient not only for humans, 
but in general. By 'insufficient' here, of course, I don't mean that it is completely, 
under all circumstances, unworkable, but merely that it cannot be cashed out via a 
'strictly-biological' analysis involving purely intrinsic features. If Gervais's twofold 
definition is based (as it seems to be) on being able to strictly distinguish between 
organism- and person-centred death in this way, then it is consequently flawed: the 
functional/organismic definition of death is as much reliant upon our own (human) 
ascription of value and purpose as any definition based on the incapacity for 
consciousness (as I have argued in chapter 4 in my rejection of the notion of intrinsic 
function). In an important sense, therefore, both definitions embody a concern with 
value: an organism has spontaneous, integrated function, therefore it is still alive; an 
individual retains the capacity for consciousness, therefore it is still a living person.
Gervais's rejection of the organismic definition stems from the fact that, for her, the 
capacity for consciousness (however minimal) is the sine qua non of personhood. A 
functioning organism without the capacity for consciousness is 'dead', whilst an even- 
minimally-conscious person, whose organismic function is artificially maintained - or 
even one whose brain waves have been 'downloaded' onto a computer - is still alive. 
However, given my above assertion that both these concepts ('organism' and 
'person') are value-based and normative, in what sense is a twofold definition of 
death warranted?
38 Gervais (1986), p. 177.
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Regarding her second point, Gervais argues that an analysis of what is meant by the 
term 'human being' does not provide us with a direct means of resolving the death 
debate. Fundamentally, this is because certain technologically-instigated situations 
allow for important aspects of the whole human being to be absent (e.g. the 
'organism' may be alive whilst the 'person' is 'dead'). I agree with this, and have so 
far been at pains to show how I think the nature of human concepts and necessary 
limitations in their analysis, in conjunction with advancements in medical technology, 
have given rise to this situation. However, having arrived at this point, Gervais 
concludes not only that we must redefine death, and that an ontological analysis alone 
cannot help us, but furthermore that this redefinition must have a moral basis. In other 
words, since we cannot by ontological analysis alone determine sufficient criteria for 
whether the human being as a whole has ceased to exist, we must decide (via its moral 
consequences) whether death should be thought of in terms of the 'organism' or the 
'person'.
The problem with this, of course, is that just because it can be shown that a problem is 
not ultimately solvable in definitional terms (by essentialist-type appeals to what 
something 'really' is), does not mean that our one necessary recourse is to a moral 
justification of one path or the other. Merely because we cannot decide whether a 
certain creature is a mammal or not, or whether a certain astral body should be classed 
as a planet, does not mean that such things are therefore to be decided by appeal to the 
moral consequences of adopting one definition or another.
The final step of Gervais's argument involves the identification of those physiological 
criteria whose continued functioning is essential to the continued existence of the 
person. Whilst at first this may seem to be a reasonable position - provided that the 
personal-identity basis for death is accepted, of course - it does seem to involve the 
same type of problem concerning 'kind essentialism' that Green and Wikler were 
seeking to avoid in employing their notion of'individual essentialism'. For Gervais's 
argument to succeed she must be able to clearly distinguish between those features 
which may persist in integrated function of the organism, and those which are 
essential for the persistence of personhood - and here we are again faced with the 
same type of classificatory dilemma which, as I have argued, constitutes the essence 
of the definition of death problem itself. Where does the person 39 stop and the 
organism begin? Can the two be exclusively defined? The answer to these two 
questions, I argue, is that, for reasons stemming from the way in which the concept of 
'person' has over time and through communal linguistic usage been formed, there is 
no compelling way in which this task may be accomplished (without, at least, being 
open to the charge of conceptual gerrymandering - which, actually, I think most 
attempts at resolving this conflict to date are). To illustrate this in more detail, I will 
now consider what I have termed the 'classificatory dilemma' in relation to the 
general problem of personal identity, and thereby show why it cannot be used as a 
means of resolving the problem of the definition of death.
39 Here, and in the following sections, I use 'person' in its widest sense - i.e. not merely in Green and 
Wikler's sense of a conscious and psychologically intact entity (i.e. 'Jones'); a 'person', in my sense, 
may include some of the very features that Green and Wikler wish to exclude (i.e. physical processes, 
physical and bodily continuity, and so on). I believe this wider concept is more reflective of common 
usage, and hence - where we consider the definitional problem of death to stem from the conflict of 
observer-relative values (as I believe it does) - more relevant to this discussion.
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The General Problem with Personal Identity Arguments
In the preface to the first volume of his autobiography, the writer Anthony Burgess 
considers the nature of producing such an account of one's life:
The delineation of oneself at such length must look like egocentricity, but 
an autobiography has to be egocentric. On the other hand, what do we 
mean by the ego? It is an existential concept, I believe, and the ego I 
examine is multiple and somewhat different from the ego that is doing 
the examining. Even the ego that began the book in September 1985 is 
not the one that has completed it in 1986. In other words, the book is 
about somebody else, connected by the ligature of a common track in 
time and space to the writer of this last segment of it, which cheats and 
looks like the first.40
This somewhat sceptical picture presents the problem of personal identity in a 
nutshell: how, without 'cheating', can we establish the 'ligature of a common track in 
time and space' between all the different physical stages and mental states of the same 
person's life? In terms of the philosophical history of the problem, the two main 
approaches attempt to establish continuity either via psychological or physiological 
criteria (or, perhaps, some combination of the two). Thus, an individual is the same 
(has the same identity) as a particular individual in the past if we can establish 
continuity between either the existence of the physical bodies of those individuals (or 
significant parts thereof), or continuity between some aspect of the mental functioning 
of these two individuals. In terms of physiological criteria, I might argue that I am the 
same person as a certain 10-year-old that I see in a photograph, because it can be 
demonstrated - through the resemblance of our physical features, identifying marks, 
etc. - that in a significant sense that body is connected to mine. Similarly, I might 
argue that I am that 10-year-old, because I can remember doing and experiencing 
certain things that happened to that child (and, perhaps, remember looking in the 
mirror and seeing the same facial features, hairstyle, etc., in the photograph).
There are many objections and consequent refinements relating to both these 
approaches. The standard objection to the physiological approach is called the 
example of 'Theseus' ship',41 whereby each plank in a wooden ship is replaced by a 
new one over a period of time, until eventually the ship consists of totally new planks; 
therefore, is it the 'same' ship? hi relation to the psychological argument, common 
objections include the difficulty of whether a memory-based criterion for 
psychological continuity can account for such things as the memory gaps caused by 
brain damage, etc. However, it is not my purpose here to revisit the whole sequence of 
arguments, objections, and counter-arguments which make up the vast personal 
identity debate, or to pass judgement upon the various candidates for one or another of 
the approaches to solving the problem. Rather, I am merely concerned to show in 
what way I think the problem of personal identity reflects a more fundamental 
problem; one that is inherent in the application of a number of types of concept, and 
stems from limitations to do with the nature of categorization and concept formation.
40 Burgess (1987), p.viii.
41 See, for example, Maslin (2001), pp.249-50.
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In Reasons and Persons,42 Derek Parfit argues - successfully, I think - that ther
e are 
(at least logically) plausible situations in which we are faced with a choice 
as to 
whether an individual can be said to possess personal identity or not. In a now fa
mous 
thought experiment, Parfit envisages that a 'Teletransporter' exists which can co
py a 
person's exact physical constitution, send the information as a radio signal to M
ars, 
and reproduce that individual there (whilst destroying the individual's bod
y on 
Earth). However, in the scenario, the Teletransporter malfunctions, and
 the 
original's body, instead of being destroyed, is merely fatally damaged. The ori
ginal 
person is then informed of the malfunction, told that they will die from cardiac fa
ilure 
over the next few days, and invited to come to terms with their temporary 
'dual 
existence' and imminent 'death'.
Parfit ultimately concludes that there is no personal identity criterion which ca
n be 
used to decide between such a case (or even similar, modified cases), and tha
t the 
choice which faces us is therefore a real one. Furthermore, he concludes that we 
must 
accept that in such cases we have what he terms 'survival without identity', in
 that 
there is a sense in which the other 'me' shows that T will survive, but not in s
uch a 
unique way as to ensure the integrity of personal identity. Thus, for Parfit, there 
is no 
possibility of a concept of personal identity which would not allow this so
rt of 
aberration to happen. Therefore, we would be better off in such a situation to wis
h our 
Martian counterpart well, and accept his continued existence in light of our 
own 
demise as the best of a bad lot.
If we now view this sort of problem in light of the already discussed classific
atory 
dilemma, we shall see that it is ultimately analysable in the same form. Whethe
r the 
scenario concerns a dual existence occasioned by a malfunctioning Teletranspo
rter, 
one where an individual's brain is split and put into two different bodies, or any 
other 
similarly problematic scenario, the central difficulty lies with maintaining the do
gma 
of binary opposition (that a person is either 'Jones' or 'not-Jones') whilst establi
shing 
criteria whereby the status of cases may be unambiguously pronounced u
pon. 
Similarly, therefore, Parfit's science-fiction type examples allow scenarios in w
hich 
the concept of 'person' can be split, and reveal conflicts between its consti
tuent 
elements - or, also, conflicts between our assumptions as to what a person is an
d our 
use of the term - much in the same way as technological advancements have all
owed 
the development of similar scenarios and quandaries in the definition of death deb
ate.
Gervais on Personal Identity
In terms of its specific application to Gervais's position, therefore, it can be s
hown 
that her position ignores the sorts of problem which Parfit highlights. Her noti
on of 
personal identity can therefore be shown to be vulnerable to two types of object
ion - 
both of which ultimately spring from the fundamental problems inhere
nt in 
categorization and concept formation which I have identified.
Firstly, as I have already noted, Gervais considers consciousness as the sine qua
 non 
of personhood. However, not only does she not define what she means by the v
ague 
term 'consciousness', but she is therefore unaware of the problems faced by an
yone
42 Parfit (1984). 
43 Ibid.,pp.l99-201.
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seeking to differentiate between conscious and non-conscious, volitional and 
instinctive/automatic functioning, etc. 44 Furthermore, Gervais seems to conflate 
'consciousness' with 'possessing psychological properties', yet there is by no means 
an automatic equivalence between these two things. For instance, it is common to 
consider behavioural traits and emotional proclivities as belonging to the personality, 
or even as an indication of someone being a particular person (e.g. 'That doesn't 
sound like something he would do'). Yet these are not exclusively the properties of 
consciousness, and most importantly there are a whole host of qualities which we may 
associate with a person which have a non-rational, non-conscious - even purely 
physical - basis. In this latter case, a person's physical appearance, some distinct 
physical quality that they possess, etc., may arguably be as much of the 'person' as 
any other 'conscious' quality. In this way, Gervais's position ignores the wider sense 
of 'person' that this picture suggests, and therefore the problem of decidedly 
divorcing and identifying aspects of it as essential.
The second form of objection considers the other side of the coin in pointing out that 
such science-fiction scenarios as Parfit and others have envisaged - and Gervais 
herself considers at one point - can be used to undermine the possibility of unique 
personal identity. In considering whether it might be possible to consider a person as 
still existing when their memory had been 'transferred to a computer tape with an 
input-output mechanism that would allow ongoing interaction between the tape and 
the rest oJ 
concludes:
f the world' 45 (a possibility first envisaged by Robert Veatch), 46 she
It is difficult in principle to deny that the tape is the same person. Any 
claim that the tape is not embodied in a human body begs the question. 
This suggests, contrary to the writings of Veatch, that personal identity is 
preserved as long as a personal history is preserved, and that 
embodiment in a human frame is not a necessary condition for the 
retention of personal identity. 47
Having accepted the possibility of such survival, however (or at least its cogency as 
an objection to be used against those who argue for the important role of the physical 
brain in view of its irreplaceability and uniqueness), it is surprising that she does not 
follow through the computer analogy to its logical conclusions. In other words, an 
obvious consequence of being able to reduce an individual to a finite set of data (by 
transferring their 'brain waves' to 'computer tape', or recording the state of the cells 
in their body for radio teletransportation to Mars), is that such information is 
duplicable - which, if we follow Parfit's reasoning, undermines the possibility of 
personal identity criteria which guarantee uniqueness, and allows for what Parfit 
terms 'branching' cases.
44 Discussed in the previous chapter.
45 Gervais (1986), p.129.
46
vjw o v L ' uv/ /•> r '
Veatch (1986), p.69. Veatch holds that the essential feature of human beings (that makes them alive) 
is the capacity for social interaction. However, whilst considerations of personal identity would seem to 
be relevant to this argument, Veatch does not go beyond this assertion; therefore, I have not considered 
his arguments here, but briefly later (see chapter 8).
47 Gervais (1986), p.131 (the italics are mine).
48 Parfit does appear in the bibliography to Gervais's book, but is not anywhere mentioned in the text.
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Furthermore, the brain-splitting experiments such as Parfit considers present a parallel 
case to the determination of death debate: if we can house the two halves of 
someone's brain in two separate bodies, which is the 'real' person? Making a decision 
itself requires a Gervaisian 'decision of significance' as to which half is more 
important, how much is 'enough' of someone's brain, etc.
However, we need not in fact resort to Parfit's science-fiction scenarios in order to 
consider examples which are problematic to the personal-identity-based approach. 
Thomas Nagel, for instance, considers the problems presented by cerebral 
commissurotomy (brain-bisection), whereby the corpus callosum (the bridge which 
connects the two cerebral hemispheres) is severed. 49 As a result, it has been found that 
the left and right hemispheres can both receive and process information independently, 
can work simultaneously, and even at cross purposes. Such findings, Nagel argues, 
naturally beg the question as to how best to explain this situation: how many minds do 
we have?
There is a powerful inclination to feel that there must be some whole 
number of minds in those heads, but the data prevent us from deciding 
how many. 50
This inconclusiveness, Nagel argues, must lead us to revise the assumptions we have 
about normal mental functioning, and that 'these very unusual cases should cause us 
to be skeptikal about the concept of a single subject of consciousness as it applies to 
ourselves.' Perhaps, he concludes, we may even one day come to think of the 
concept of a single person as 'quaint'. 52 Roland Puccetti similarly argues that we may 
credit different activities to these different 'selves':
I cannot believe my right-sided cerebral companion contributed much 
to the writing of this paper, for example, or understood it as he saw me 
writing it out. He leaves the philosophising to me. 53
Therefore, the brain-splitting experiments such as Parfit, Puccetti, and Nagel consider 
present parallel cases to the determination of death debate: if we can house the two 
halves of someone's brain in two separate bodies, or cause the two halves of the same 
brain to behave independently, then which is the 'real' person? How many 'persons' 
are there?
Some have sought to resist this sceptical approach. For instance, John Eccles has 
argued that we may think of the activities of the non-verbal right-hemisphere as 
unconscious and automaton-like. 54 However, as Puccetti points out, we have as much 
reason for attributing conscious willed action to the right, non-verbal brain as we do
49 Nagel (1979c). For an account of the original experiments, see Gazzaniga, Bogen, and Sperry (1962), 
and for a wider account and more general discussion, see Carter (1998), pp.42-3, and Blackmore 
(2003),pp.l03-8.
50 Nagel (1979c), p. 161.
51 Ibid., p. 163.
52 Ibid., p. 164.
53 Puccetti (1973a),p.354.
54 Eccles (1967, 1970).
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for the left, verbal brain (for, after all, speech may be unconscious). 55 Another 
objection considered by Puccetti is raised by Donald MacKay,56 who argues that we 
may consider the apparently separate actions of split brain patients as under the 
control of a 'metaorganising system', or unified self. However, Puccetti responds,57 
apart from the fact that there is too much evidence that the two hemispheres can often 
act at complete variance to each other in split-brain patients, there would seem to be 
no reason to postulate such an overarching entity at all. They seem to have no 
awareness of one another, and MacKay's attempt would seem to be simply a 
metaphysically-motivated attempt to retain the old-fashioned notion of self.
However, this said, could I make a decision as to which aspect of my mental 
functioning was in fact the real 'me'? As Puccetti implies, philosophers and writers 
(those favouring the verbal hemisphere) would choose the left hemisphere (in most 
people); however, this is not automatically the case, and artistic and creative types 
would perhaps make the opposite choice (again, in most cases). Making such a 
decision itself would therefore seem to require not only a Gervaisian 'decision of 
significance' as to which half is more important, how much is 'enough' of someone's 
brain, etc., but also a metaphysical commitment to the existence of a single 
(Cartesian?) self- or that, faced with competing options, we must choose one. 5 *
Conclusion
In this chapter, I have argued that personal identity approaches to redefining death 
fare no better than other approaches already considered - and for similar reasons. 
Gervais's notion of personal identity would therefore seem to be problematic in that it 
relies on assumptions which are themselves highly controversial and questionable. 
The notion of personal identity, therefore, rather than supply a means of resolving the 
definition of death, merely mirrors the same type of definitional problem (as I have 
outlined it) on another level. Personal identity approaches in general, therefore, in as 
much as they seek to provide sufficient criteria for the survival of a unified self, rely 
on a number of assumptions already criticised: that the essentialist assertion that a 
concept or entity must embody a specific set of criteria so as to represent a distinct 
'kind'; that such features can be reduced to non-observer-relative features of a human 
being (i.e. the capacity of the brain to produce consciousness, and thereby 
personhood).
Furthermore, however, Gervais's attempt to resolve the debate morally (via a 
contractual method), would seem to admit that the whole debate is actually a cultural 
one. In as much as morality may be seen as an aspect of our social discourse, and 
therefore not an intrinsic feature of the world (that is, of course, if we reject certain 
forms of moral realism), then moral values must take their place alongside other 
observer-relative features of the world. This overall view, I shall argue, in turn opens
55 Puccetti (1973a), pp.341-2. It is only a generalization that the right-brain is non-verbal, and 
experiments have shown that it may possess some basic linguistic ability. Furthermore, it is also a 
generalization that it is the right brain which is the non-verbal one - this may be reversed in left-handed 
people (to a certain extent), and brain dominance (in terms of verbal/non-verbal processing) can differ 
from individual to individual. See, for instance, Carter (1998), p.46-7.
56 MacKay (1969a, 1969b).
57 Puccetti (1973a), pp.342-3.
58 Of course, where verbalisation/spatial awareness is not lateralised to such an extreme, then the choice 
becomes more complicated.
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up the definition of death debate to the influence of a wide array of competing value- 
driven influences - to a world, in fact, where concepts such as death are more 
potentially variable than we would perhaps like to think, or that Gervais recognises.
What these values are, and what this means for the debate, I will now consider.
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7. An Observer-Relative Death
Introduction
So far I have considered the case for death as an intrinsic, ontologically-objective 
feature of the world. This has taken the form of the 'strictly-biological' views of such 
as Laurence C. Becker, 1 David Lamb, 2 Christopher Pallis, 3 and Tom Russell,4 who 
favoured a functional definition of death, and such 'partly-biological' views of Green 
and Wikler, 5 and Karen Gervais, 6 which attempted to show that the permanent 
incapacity of the neocortex was a sufficient condition for considering the 'person' 
dead. However, as I hope I have shown, both these approaches fail in resolving the 
death debate: firstly, they fail to show that (in Searle's sense) death is an intrinsic 
feature of the world; secondly, as a consequence, both approaches fail to account for 
the fact that, as death becomes an observer-relative feature of the world, so the 
putative solutions considered merely beg the question, 'What is it that we consider to 
be essential to the concept of a living person?' Heartbeat and spontaneous respiration 
are significant to some, 7 whilst the absence of the capacity for conscious thought is 
decisive for others; 8 that the individual ('Jones') is no longer with us may be 
sufficient for his death (some argue), whilst for others there is a wider concept of a 
person of whom the integrity of psychological personal identity is merely an aspect. 
Because there are competing answers to this question, and because the observer- 
relative concepts that it involves are (to an extent) changeable and culturally 
dependent, then the above approaches merely represent attempts to 'gerrymander' the 
constituency of death. Having reached this point, I therefore wish to argue that the 
concept of death cannot be determined by reference to brute facts or intrinsic features, 
and it thus has far more in common with other 'epistemically-thick' concepts in ethics, 
aesthetics, or other cultural phenomena (even sport). It is to comparisons with 
questions in such fields that I will therefore now turn.
A Note on Physicalism
However, before I do so, it is perhaps only fair to anticipate one last objection: it may 
be counter-argued here that, in dismissing the functional, consciousness-based, and 
ontological (personal-identity based) definitions of death, I have not thereby 
dismissed the possibility that death is an intrinsic feature of the world in some other 
sense. In reply to this I can only point out what I take to be a decisive point: in 
categorizing something or someone as dead, we do not merely describe causal 
properties of physical objects (i.e. their purely intrinsic features), but ascribe 
significance based on the value that we perceive those properties to have in our own 
application of related concepts (i.e. 'person', 'alive', 'quality of life', and so on). 
Descriptions of causal relationships are therefore in a sense neutral in a way that
'Becker (1975).
2 Lamb (1978, 1985).
3 Pallis (1983a, 1983b, 1985).
4 Tom Russell (2000).
5 Green and Wikler (1980).
6 Gervais (1986).
7 E.g. Jonas (1978) and Martyn Evans (1990, 1994).
8 E.g. Puccetti(1976).
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ascriptions of life are not. To illustrate this, consider the following scenario: a robot is 
built with the identical causal properties as those possessed by a human being. Setting 
aside the question of whether this would in fact make it 'conscious', can we consider 
it alive? On what basis do we ascribe life to it? I argue that those who would reject 
ascribing living status to this robot do so for reasons over and above an analysis of 
such a thing's causal properties, and that therefore, the ascription of life to it entails 
something more than that; furthermore, these ascriptions are observer-relative, and so 
cannot be said to be 'entailed' by the causal properties themselves; as for life, so for 
death.
But, it may be objected, wouldn't the causal properties of a purely physical universe 
necessarily entail certain social facts? Or, wouldn't it be necessary to posit the 
existence of non-physical facts, or non-determinism, or some other means of avoiding 
fixing the form of our social concepts? Therefore, is the notion of physicalism an 
objection to the possibility of potential variance within socially constructed concepts?
In her article, 'Conceivability, Possibility, and the Mind-Body Problem', Katalin 
Balog sums up the physicalist position as follows:
Any world which is a minimal physical duplicate of our world is a 
duplicate simpliciter of our world. 9
In other words, 'Two worlds are physical duplicates if and only if they agree on all the 
true statements expressed in the language of physics.' 10 However, as noted above in 
the discussion of Searle, the brute physical facts of the world do not determine its 
observer-relative features (i.e. social facts); more specifically, the laws of physics do 
not determine our notions of self and death (any more than they determine our notions 
of money or the rules of football). As a consequence, it may be said that physically 
identical worlds are not identical worlds in all senses, and that it may be possible for 
otherwise identical worlds to differ in terms of the makeup of their social facts.
A determinist might interject here that physical facts will necessarily determine how 
individuals behave, and therefore constrain the evolution of social facts along certain 
lines; so, it may be argued, our physically-determined brain states will eventually lead 
us to have particular, physically-determined social concepts. However, I would 
maintain that, even if this were so, it would be logically possible for the social facts to 
have evolved a different way; in other words, even if the world is determined, it is 
logically possible that it might have been determined another way (just as we might 
imagine a universe with different physical laws, or where different events unfolded). 
Therefore, in such a world, the social facts would be different. Furthermore, since I 
am proposing an increased possible scope of concept formation and change, we must 
assume that we are physically determined to appreciate choice! Perhaps this is crudely 
put, and perhaps if physicalism were true then some sort of compatibilist position 
would need to be adopted, but the main point is that we seem to be aware of choice, 
and also aware that the facts of the situation do not entail the form of the socially 
constructed concept. So, adopting a two-level, compatibilist position, we might yet 
say that on one level we appear to have choice (regardless of the actual state of affairs
' Balog (1999), p.503 (italics in the original).
10 Ibid.
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on another, more primary level). More simply, however, we might just point out that - 
given the findings of quantum physics and the possibility of indeterminism - 
physicalism is not necessarily the only option.
In arguing that there is an element of choice in our concepts, I would therefore argue 
that the formation and change of these concepts is independent of the truth of 
physicalism. This is not to say, therefore, that (for instance) notions of personal 
identity or death supervene on physical facts, for this would - it seems to me - 
suggest that the concepts involved were destined to take a certain definite shape. 
Rather, I would argue that these concepts spring from a sort of 'debate' between the 
significance of certain biological criteria, moral concerns, epistemic needs, social 
forces, and so on. In this sense, it can be seen that the latitude which I have attributed 
to the development and expansion of concepts of self and death in this chapter is 
untouched by the truth of the physicalist position.
The fact of death is therefore in a certain sense contingent: it is dependent on 
technological innovation, culturally-relative concepts of person and self, and even 
moral considerations. However, in adopting this view, I am saying more than that 
death is a changeable feature; rather, I am trying to point out that 'person X weighs 13 
stone' and 'person X is dead' are different types of statement. The former is a 
statement about an intrinsic feature of the world which is subject to change; the latter 
is a statement implying values and concepts which are socially derived, and therefore 
open to change in a different way. The former is subject to physical laws; the latter - 
at least in part - subject to social conventions and concepts. A more exact parallel of 
the type of statement that 'person x is dead' would therefore be something like 
'person x is guilty' (in a legal sense). In both situations, factual matters play a part 
(e.g. the intrinsic features of physical objects), and yet also in both instances there is 
the presence of what Searle calls 'institutional facts'. In other words, for the social 
facts of moral and legal culpability to exist, there must first be established the social 
institution of morality, theories of agency and identity, and other related concepts. 
Similarly, then, decisions of death rely, at least in part, on the existence of an 
institution of social values to do with the value of life, the nature of identity, etc. I 
would now like to follow the consequences of this proposition for the definition of 
death in more detail.
An Observer-Relative Definition of Death
It would seem then that, if the above arguments are accepted, the definition of death 
and (for instance) the definition of a 'goal' in football have at least this in common: 
they are (are least partly) epistemically-objective statements about observer-relative 
and ontologically-subjective events. However, as I have already pointed out, 
according to Searle's scheme, this does not mean that judgements about such things 
cannot be objective - in fact, he says, they can be either subjective or objective. This 
simply means that whilst the things we make judgements about may only have a 
subjective, observer-relative existence, the judgements we make can themselves be 
evaluative (subjective) or factual (objective).
For instance, Searle argues that the terms we use to describe objects have a factual 
character. If I call something a screwdriver, this assertion can be tested; it is a fact 
which can be ascertained as being true or false (either the object concerned is a
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screwdriver or it isn't). However, to say that a screwdriver has an aesthetically 
pleasing design is to introduce a subjective valuation of it.
Death, Fact, and Value - Problems with Searle's View?
Searle's view of the physical world, as is probably apparent by now, is based upon the 
established distinction involving the categorization of judgements into 'fact' and 
'value' in as much as he assumes the existence of features of a mind-independent 
reality which are non-evaluative (intrinsic) features. His utilisation of epistemically- 
subjective and -objective statements is therefore beholden to this established tradition 
of distinguishing between things which are objectively-true (and can be verified), and 
things which are merely expressions of value or preference. To be fair to Searle, 
however, he does admit that there is a continuum which exists between these two 
terms, and that they should merely be considered as representing two extremes of that 
continuum (and not a dichotomy)." Also, a further virtue of Searle's view is that - as 
I have just shown - objectivity does not begin and end with brute facts, and we may 
also make objective statements about things whose existence is contingent upon 
human value (i.e. are observer-relative). In this sense, he avoids the sort of primitive 
dichotomy that was prevalent with, for instance, the logical positivists. 12
However, I want to argue that, in relation to the definition of death, a lack of 
recognition of the problems involved in this type of fact/value distinction has itself 
clouded the overall problem of how death is to be defined. This is because of two 
main assumptions:
(1) It is possible to clearly distinguish between matters of fact and evaluative 
judgements.
(2) The determination and definition of death involves purely intrinsic and brute 
facts.
In my arguments so far, I have therefore attempted to show such 'facts' - or empirical 
evidence - are not, in and of themselves, always conclusive. Furthermore, what makes 
them conclusive is not necessarily the presence of further facts, but rather clear and 
unambiguous guidelines or rules. These rules help us determine not only which facts 
are relevant, but also, what the facts 'mean'. It is these rules which allow the grouping 
of facts to be more than simply arbitrary collections of observed truths (I shall return 
to this shortly when I look at Searle's notion of the roles of constitutive and regulative 
rules in social practice).
To illustrate this point, we can think of any situation where the total facts of the 
situation leave the conclusion unspecified or open. In moral philosophy, therefore, a 
parallel situation would obviously be Hume's 'is-ought' gap, 13 whereby no factual 
statements ('Jim robbed Bill') can entail a moral conclusion ('Jim ought not to have 
robbed Bill' or 'Stealing is wrong'). In a parallel way, therefore, the concept of
11 Searle's belief in intrinsic features of the world would seem to be distinct from his moral realism (e.g. 
Searle, 1964). For my purposes, therefore, I treat Searle as a realist who denies the notion of intrinsic 
value or purpose (teleology).
12 See, e.g., Ayer (1946).
13 See Hume (1967), Book III, Part I, Section i.
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'death' can be seen to apply to factual statements concerning the function of aspects 
of a human being in much the same way as the concepts of 'right' and 'wrong' apply 
to the actions of human agents. Therefore, just as some moral philosophers might 
argue that certain actions are inherently right or wrong, or at least imply some moral 
obligation (moral realism), 14 so certain philosophers in the definition of death debate 
have assumed that 'death' must be a feature of the world (metaphysical realism). 
However, as I hope I have shown, at least in relation to concepts such as 'death', this 
idea is flawed. Furthermore, the problem also extends to the more basic notions on 
which a concept of death might be built (namely, that of 'function'), and which it is 
therefore also difficult to consider intrinsic.
Some philosophers, such as Quine, have therefore argued that the separation of 
judgements into 'fact' and 'value' is an artificial exercise which ultimately ignores the 
necessarily entwined nature of the two concepts. To quote Quine's well-known 
illustration of this point:
The lore of our fathers is a fabric of sentences [...] It is a pale grey lore, 
black with fact and white with convention. But I have found no 
substantial reasons for concluding that there are any quite black threads 
in it, or any white ones. 15
The 'lore' that we inherit - the concepts and possibilities of our language with which 
we describe and interpret the world - has neither purely 'black' (factual) nor 'white' 
(evaluative/conventional) aspects, but is rather 'grey' (an intermingling of both). 
Rather than a dichotomy, therefore, a better picture would be a continuum: some 
concepts are mostly 'black' (factual), with some 'white' (evaluative), and vice versa.
Another way of talking about this situation is to say that there is, as Hilary Putnam 
puts it, 'an entanglement of fact and value'. 16 Putnam, in criticising the use of a 
metaphysical fact/value distinction made by some philosophers, argues that one key 
problem for this distinction is the existence of what are called 'thick ethical concepts'. 
Since one purpose of drawing any type of fact/value distinction is to distinguish 
between 'science' (factual statements) and 'ethics' (value judgements), the existence 
of terms which seem to span the divide would make any sharp distinction untenable. 
For instance, if I call someone 'generous', it may be argued that I am making both a 
statement of fact (the person's action is generous, having certain characteristics) and 
evaluating that person's behaviour (that action is 'good'). Therefore, the concept is 
'thick' in the sense that it is not 'thin' enough to be merely classified as either a 'fact' 
or a 'value'.
A moral philosopher wishing to preserve some version of the fact/value distinction 
might argue (as Hume and Ayer 17 have done) that such terms actually have no factual 
content (i.e. the non-cognitive position that they are merely conventional expressions 
of non-rational desires - e.g. emotivism and expressivism), or even that we may
14 Such as, in fact, Searle himself holds.
15 Quoted in Putnam (2002), p. 12. Incidentally, by considering no concepts to be purely factual in 
nature, Quine would seem to be in disagreement with Searle as to the existence of purely 'brute facts' 
(intrinsic features of the world).
16 Ibid., Chapter 2: "The Entanglement of Fact and Value", pp. 28-45.
17 Ayer (1946), chapter 6.
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distinguish between the different aspects of 'thick' concepts (between, for instance, 
evaluative aspects and descriptive aspects of a concept - for instance, G. E. Moore's 
mtuitionism, where 'good' is a non-natural property which we apply to factual 
situations). I do not have space to fully assess such positions here, but it should be 
clear that in proposing that death is an epistemically thick concept, I am ultimately 
criticising any strict application of the fact-value distinction. So, because, for the 
purposes of my argument, I have relied quite heavily on the coherence of Searle's 
distinctions, it might be natural to assume that any problem for Searle's position 
would also create a problem for me. However, for two reasons, I do not think this is
so.
Firstly, I am quite content that I have proven that, given Searle's definition of 
'intrinsic features', all attempts to consider such concepts as personal identity and 
function as intrinsic fail. Furthermore, any attempt to rescue these attempts would 
seem to rely upon a reintroduction of teleological or metaphysical features into a 
mind-independent reality, which would in turn represent a problematic and 
controversial move (and one which I have already rejected). 19 I therefore consider this 
aspect of the application of Searle's ideas to be unproblematic. So, even if Searle is 
wrong, he is not wrong by being insufficiently metaphysically conservative.
Secondly, if we consider Searle's assertion that there are at least some intrinsic 
features to be problematic (because no 'facts' are ever value-free), then the criticism 
begins to run the other way. In other words, this is a criticism that might be levelled at 
him by antirealists or social constructivists,20 and so any notion of death that would 
arise from such alternative perspectives would, by their very nature, already be 
'observer relative'. 21
Therefore, there is a sense in which - for my purposes - the antirealist attack on 
Searle's position is immaterial to the death debate: if Searle is right, then death is an 
observer-relative feature; if social constructivism is right, then death is still an 
observer-relative feature (or a socially-constructed equivalent thereof). The only 
problem for me would be a realist that wished to argue that some feature of mind- 
independent reality (such as biological function) provided a means to treat death as an 
intrinsic feature of that reality. However, since I have analysed these arguments (in 
chapter 4), and found them wanting, I consider my use of Searle to be justified and 
unproblematic (even if his position as a whole is not).
Death as an Epistemically-Thick Concept: the Partly-Biological View
In relation to the problem of the definition of death, I want to argue that 'epistemically 
thick' concepts do exist, and that death is one such example. Since this is not a term 
Searle uses, we might also translate this concept into his schema: certain observer-
18 Moore (1993).
19 See, for instance, the views of Wright (1973) and Milikan (1984, 1989) concerning the no
tion of 
intrinsic function, which I discussed in chapter 4, and also the notion of primitive natural ki
nds, as 
advocated by Wiggins (1980) and Doepke (1992) in chapter 3.
20 See, e.g., Page (2004), and Rorty (1997).
21 Searle devotes Chapter 7 of The Construction of Social Reality, 'Does the Real World E
xist? Part I: 
Attacks on Realism', to a discussion of the antirealist approach. For instance, a Ni
etzsche-type 
approach would focus on Searle's assumptions that cause and effect, mass, the notion 
of a distinct 
object, etc., were mind-independent.
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relative concepts (such as in ethics) can have epistemically-subjective and 
epistemically-objective aspects. For instance, it is a question of epistemically- 
objective fact as to whether an individual has stolen a car; however, it is a question of 
epistemically-subjective fact as to whether this is right or wrong. The notions of 
'right' and 'wrong' are therefore institutional facts which admit of a value-based 
application. However, in the following discussion, I will simply refer to 
'epistemically-thick' concepts in what I take to be a roughly equivalent way to 
Searle's position.22 Death, therefore, is an epistemically-thick concept. However, in 
terming it thus, I would not necessarily wish to call death an epistemically-thick 
ethical concept, because that may be to presume that the evaluative aspect of the 
concept had a prescriptive purpose (or however we interpret the character of ethical 
statements). However, whilst I would certainly not rule this out, neither would I wish 
to say that this is the only role played by the evaluative aspect of the concept. I will 
therefore argue more generally that death is a thick epistemic concept, spanning both 
objective and subjective statements in the epistemic sense. So, in this sense, instead of 
the 'is-ought' gap, we may refer to what might be termed the 'is-what' gap. In other 
words, there are relatively independent factual aspects of situations involving the 
definition of death, and there are evaluative aspects: certain relatively uncontroversial 
'facts' (is) and what they mean (what). Furthermore, we may say this, more subtly, 
about concepts much closer to the 'fact' end of the continuum than where I take death 
to be situated. For instance, it may be argued that science itself employs certain values 
in its search for 'objective truth'. I am thinking of such things as the coherence of a 
theory, its simplicity, its stability, etc. However, the concept of death has much 
stronger and more evident evaluative aspects than this.
It is in this sense, therefore, that we may conclude that any definition of death must 
adopt some version of a 'partly-biological' view. In effect, by calling death a 'thick 
epistemic concept', this is all we mean: there are facts to do with death (which are 
relevant to it) which take a primarily biological form;23 however, these facts are not 
themselves sufficient for a definition of death, and death must therefore be considered 
an observer-relative concept which is relative to human values and culture. In a way, 
then, all observer-relative concepts are epistemically thick: they involve some 
intrinsic features, but the ontologically-subjective features are linked to human value 
and are therefore supplied by conscious human agents.
This can be seen if we consider, once more, the occurrence of certain types of so- 
called irreversible coma. An individual may retain the capacity for independent and 
spontaneous respiration whilst the capacity for all cognitive function has gone. Now, 
certain facts in this situation (construed in a certain way) are not really in conflict; 
however, certain values are. For instance, in saying that a person is alive because they
22 At the end of the day, it does not really matter to my purpose if Searle would not agree with my 
equivalence of this interpretation of his concepts with Putnam's concept of epistemic thickness. My 
main use of Searle has been in criticising the possibility of considering death as an intrinsic feature; 
should the opposite be true, therefore, and lead to attacks upon the nature of the intrinsic itself, then - 
as I have already stated - this is fine for the purposes of my argument (which will consider death as an 
observer-relative feature).
23 Of course, if we were to consider a science-fiction scenario where there are no biological aspects to 
survival (e.g. survival of brain patterns on a computer hard drive), then we would have to alter 'partly- 
biological' to 'partly-physical'. However, the same principle would apply: there are observer-relative 
ascriptions which would mean that no 'strictly-physical' (and therefore possibly intrinsic) definition of 
death would be possible.
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can breathe unaided, one of the things we are valuing here is the notion of 
spontaneous function. Since this is one of the signs of life, we are reluctant therefore 
to consider an organism which possesses this feature 'dead'. However, as human 
beings, we also value consciousness, or the capacity for awareness and interaction. In 
certain instances of coma, the absence of one, together with the presence of the other, 
therefore causes a conflict (and subsequently the type of ambiguity which I outlined 
initially). As I have already suggested, the resolution of such conflicts does not 
necessarily come via the discovery of further facts, but rather through addressing the 
'rules' which give such facts their significance. Now, since these rules - as I shall 
shortly argue through the parallel with other social practices (i.e. football) - are not 
factually derived (or at least, not solely so), but stem instead from a complex of 
valuations and conventions, the similarity between the definition of a goal and the 
definition of death is therefore greater than many would first suppose. However, if 
this is admitted, this leaves us with a problem: sporting rules may be altered arbitrarily, 
but can we treat death in such a way?
Social Reality: Constitutive and Regulative Rules, and Conventions
I would like now to embark on a treatment of death as an observer-relative feature of 
the world. To do this, I will once again use Searle's form of realism as a basis for 
discussion.' In The Construction of Social Reality, Searle argues that social reality 
exists because, through collective human intentionality, we create the possibility of 
social (or institutional) facts. Therefore, for such a thing as money to exist, there must 
exist a collective intention that certain-shaped and -coloured bits of metal, pieces of 
paper, and so on, should have a certain social significance. Without this, none of these 
things in themselves would mean anything at all (they would have no intrinsic value).
The second main ingredient of Searle's social ontology is the identification of rules 
which govern these practices.
Firstly, a social practice must have constitutive rules; these consist of rules which 
make the practice the thing it is. So, in terms of football, for instance, the constitutive 
rules would be such things as: no outfield players can handle the ball during play; 
kicking another player to obtain the ball is a foul; if a ball crosses a team's goal-line, 
then a goal is scored to the other team; and numerous other rules. Without these rules, 
it would not be football: if players pick up and run with the ball (as they do in rugby), 
or assault other players to get the ball (as some might say they also do in rugby...), or 
score points if the ball flies over the crossbar of the goal, then it would not really be a 
game of football.
Secondly, practices are also accompanied by regulative rules; these consist of rules 
which 'regulate antecedently existing activities.'
24 See Searle (1995), pp.27-29 for a brief overview of his basic idea; also, Page (2004), pp.264-6, for a 
succinct account. Many have criticised Searle's distinction between constitutive and regulative rules - 
as he admits himself- Searle (1995), p.29, for instance: Giddens (1986), Ruben (1997). However, 
whilst I am not myself completely happy with the distinction, the criticism is not essentially significant 
for my purposes, because I am primarily interested - as previously - in having a realist framework to 
discuss these ideas. Whether such a view turns out to be problematic, therefore, is incidental, for if I 
can express my view that death is socially constructed and problematic within such a perspective, then 
it goes without saying that this will also be the case for certain antirealist/social constructivist positions.
- 130-
For example, the rule "drive on the right-hand side of the road" regulates 
driving; but driving can exist prior to the existence of that rule. 25
So, if we break a regulative rule, then we can still be said to be taking part in the 
practice which the rule regulates: to drive on the wrong side of the road is still to be 
driving, though it may be punishable by law; to occasionally handle the ball or foul 
another player is still to play football, though such things are punishable by specific 
disciplinary sanctions (such as a yellow or red card). Regulative rules, then, do not 
exist to create the practice, but regulate it according to other principles: in the case of 
driving, regulative rules exist for the sake of safety (to protect pedestrians and other 
drivers); in football, regulative rules exist to ensure fair play, or to safeguard against 
injury.
Finally, Searle distinguishes between constitutive and regulative rules, and 
conventions: it is a convention that drivers acknowledge the courteous actions of other 
drivers (such as letting another car join a line of traffic in front of you) with a wave of 
the hand, but it is not a constitutive or regulative rule. Similarly, in football, teams 
will conventionally put the ball out of play when a player of the opposing team is 
injured; however, there is no rule of either sort that commands them to do this.
The Game of Death
Given these distinctions, it is interesting to apply these concepts to the determination 
of death. Firstly, since death is an observer-relative feature, then it must be considered 
an institutional fact which exists because of the collective intentionality of human 
beings. So, death exists because human beings credit certain brute facts of the world 
with certain significance: so, those who do not possess a range of specific 
physiological features (respiration, heartbeat, capacity for conscious awareness, and 
so on), are considered dead, whilst those who do possess them, may be considered 
alive.
Translating talk of death into Searle's terminology for the explanation of how social 
facts come to exist, we find that - much like Wittgenstein's explanation of linguistic 
practices26 - we are tempted to talk of social practices as if they are a 'game'. So, 
what are the 'rules' in the game of determining death? It seems very strange to talk in 
this way, but as this is arguably a consequence of moving away from the traditional 
idea of death as an intrinsic feature of the world, and towards a more controversial 
observer-relative view of death, then perhaps it is inevitable that it should feel odd.
Firstly, what are the constitutive rules of death? Most important, it would seem, would 
be the idea that someone is either dead or alive - in other words, the notion of binary 
opposition. Another rule might be the notion of irreversibility: if someone is dead, and 
then comes back to life, then he or she was not really dead in the first place. Other 
constitutive rules might involve the possession or absence of certain significant 
features: a person who lacks all spontaneous function, but is conscious, should not be
25 Searle (1995), p.27.
26 See, for instance, Wittgenstein (1967), p.5: 'I shall also call the whole, consisting of language and the 
actions into which it is woven, the "language game".' This approach to language seems to form the 
main theme of sections 1-64.
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considered dead; on the other hand, the presence of spontaneous function in non- 
essential features (such as the continued nervous and muscular activity in a headless 
chicken or certain other animals), is not considered sufficient for the individual to be 
considered still alive.
In relation to the above, regulative rules would seek to refine and legislate activities 
within the 'game'; these mostly reflect the growth of medical knowledge through 
history, examples of which would be: a person is not dead merely because his heart 
stops, or his breathing has ceased (such cases may be revived); the failure of an organ 
is not necessarily fatal (it may be replaced or artificially maintained); certain states 
may imitate death (such as hypothermia, cataleptic narcolepsy, 'locked-in' syndrome, 
and so on), and carefully specific tests are required to differentiate between genuine 
and 'faux' death.
Therefore, in the problems concerning the definition of death, we can see that the 
conflicts concerned involve the application of problematic or ambiguous constitutive 
rules. For instance, prior to the advent of technology that would keep a comatose 
person alive, the criteria concerning spontaneous function and capacity for 
consciousness had not been brought into conflict. However, subsequently, these 
constitutive rules can be seen, in certain controversial cases, to provide alternative and 
conflicting outcomes. To use an analogy, it is as if, in a game of football, on trying to 
decide whether the ball had crossed the goal-line (i.e. a goal had been scored), it were 
suddenly realised that no one knew what that meant.
A Sporting Analogy: Football and Death
Sport is full of controversy. Frequently, this controversy surrounds matters of fact. In 
such cases, there may be debate - for instance - as to whether a ball has crossed a 
particular line. In football, where that line is the goal-line, there is no doubt when 
either the ball hits the back of the net, or is cleared before it gets anywhere near the 
goal (these are simple, binary cases of 'goal' and 'no goal', where the distance 
between the ball and the line is readily apparent). However, in the famous case of the 
1966 World Cup final, England's third goal was a disputed case: the ball hit the bar, 
bounced down near the goal line, and was cleared. Did it cross the line, and was it a 
goal? The rule states that, 'the whole of the ball must cross the whole of the line' for it 
to count as a goal. Since then, television replays and computer projections of the event 
suggest that it did not; however, this illustrates my point: any difficulty there is in 
deciding whether the ball crossed the line or not is purely an empirical one; in other 
words, there is no ambiguity in the definitions involved, and the only problem 
involves clarifying the actual issue of where the ball was in relation to the line.
However, whilst I do not know the exact details, there must have been a time in the 
development of the game of football where controversy regarding marginal cases had 
to be directly addressed. It is therefore easy to imagine that there was a time when the 
need for greater precision regarding goal-line decisions became apparent. Now, if we 
are to imagine the sort of controversy that took place in the 1966 World Cup final 
taking place at a time when such lack of precision had not yet been addressed, then it 
will be clearly seen what I mean by definitional ambiguity.
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So: Geoff Hurst's shot hits the bar and bounces down near the line, before being 
cleared away; the English team claims a goal, and the Germans protest. On one level, 
we are presented with the same empirical problems as there are after the rule change: 
did the ball cross the line? However, on closer inspection, because we are imagining 
the event taking place at a time when certain laws lacked a certain precision, we are 
also presented with a definitional ambiguity. Actually, the first official rules 
established in 1863 state that:
A goal shall be won when the ball passes between the goal posts or over 
the space between the goal-posts (at whatever height), not being thrown, 
knocked on, or carried. 7
Now, here the ambiguity consists in a number of factors: there is no specific reference 
to the goal line, but let us suppose that passing 'over the space between the goal posts' 
means 'crossing over the line'; but what would 'crossing the line' consist of here? For 
instance, is it (see associated diagram):
  Case A: For the front part of the ball to cross part of the line?
  Case B: For the front part of the ball to cross the whole of the line?
  Case C: For the whole of the ball to cross most of the line?




The important point here is that, since the law concerned is vague or ambiguous, any 
of the above interpretations may be valid (though Case D is obviously a clear goal). 
Furthermore, as a consequence, no empirical evidence will resolve the issue whilst 
such an ambiguity is present. What does it matter that we can conclusively obtain the 
exact position of the ball (i.e. through television footage or computer projections), 
when the law does not specify (unlike the modern one) how far the ball must be over
27 See Ken Aston's excellent history of football - Aston (2008).
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the line? Whilst there is a possible ambiguity in the definition of 'goal' involving the 
terms 'ball' and 'goal-line', the problem is not (or not only) an empirical one, but a 
definitional one. 29
The resolution of such definitional problems must therefore involve, fundamentally, a 
clarification of the definitions used. In the definition of a goal in football, this has now 
been achieved by the somewhat arbitrary amendment of the law (or, as Searle would 
say, the 'regulative rules' of the game). In other words, the definitions of 'in' and 
'out' of play, the interaction of players, the ball, lines, etc, could all have turned out 
differently - as they have in different sports (in rugby, for instance, if the ball touches 
a line, then the ball is considered 'over'; this is almost the opposite to the case in 
football). Furthermore, and most importantly, there is no sense in which such an 
arbitrary decision can be incorrect. If a goal is defined in a particular way, but the 
regulative rule is subsequently changed, the previous rule was not incorrect; rather, it 
was decided that the interests of the game would be better served under the new rule. 
However, in suggesting that the act of changing such sporting rules can be somewhat 
arbitrary, this is not to say that a number of different sorts of factor could not play a 
part in such a decision: for instance, in deciding how a goal should be defined, it may 
have been a deciding factor that it is easier to tell whether a ball has crossed the line 
completely than it is to tell if part of the ball has crossed part of the line. Consequently, 
in saying that occasionally certain rules in sport may involve definitional ambiguity, I 
am not saying that no empirical or other factors are relevant to its resolution, but 
merely that such factors do not, of themselves, necessarily provide a resolution.
Conclusion
These points, whilst relatively uncontroversial in relation to the definition of 
regulative rules within football, can be seen to be far from so in relation to the 
definition of death. Firstly, it should be noted that the analogy is not exactly parallel: 
the conflict in the laws of football can be seen as involving regulative rules; the 
conflict in the definition of death involves constitutive rules. So, the ambiguity 
concerning the definition of death is deeper, it concerns what death is. Ultimately, I 
will argue, on one level this makes no difference in as much as either set of rules can 
be changed; however, what this observation does explain is the greater difficulties that 
we face in the latter case. Constitutive rules are more fundamental to the practice 
concerned, because they define what that practice is; however, regulative rules are 
more changeable because they respond to surface-level problems, and therefore 
changes to these rules do not amend the nature of the practice, but merely refine its 
expression.
Furthermore, however, the key difference between the 'games' of death and football 
is that the former represents a more deeply embedded social practice than football, 
and thus its rules are more difficult to change (because of the greater importance
28 Actually, there may be some ambiguity even with the modern law. For instance, the rule does not 
specify from what perspective the ball should appear to have crossed the line - I am assuming a bird's 
eye view (i.e. directly above), but this is not explicit. In fact, this is the very sort of definitional 
ambiguity that sometimes results in the sort of divergent applications and controversy that I wish to
illustrate.
29 In fact, this ambiguity would be a direct parallel of my discussion of Quine in chapter 3 concerning 
the inscrutability of reference - for 'rabbit part' read 'ball part'!
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placed upon its outcomes). 30 However, I shall argue that the difference here - whilst 
great - is not one of kind, but one of degree. This is an important point, I think, 
because it underlines the central conclusion of my thesis: death is not an intrinsic 
feature of the world, and in abandoning that possibility, we also abandon the 
possibility of treating it as a privileged social practice. That it is more important than 
football, despite Bill Shankly's famous quip, 31 is therefore due to the greater 
existential consequences attached to it, and the more fundamental values that it 
concerns, and not to a difference in the nature of the practice itself: football and death 
are therefore points on a continuum, where the more embedded the practice in the 
social fabric, the more intransigent its constitutive rules seem. However, this 
intransigence is only relative to human ingenuity and desire, and there is no ultimate 
reason why very different notions of death and personal identity might not exist.
This topic will be the subject of my next chapter.
30 1 speak, of course, to those people who live outside of Liverpool.
31 The onetime manager of Liverpool FC is reported to have said: 'Some people think football is a
matter of life and death ... I can assure you it is much more serious than that.' Metcalf (1986), p.237.
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8. Death and Immortality
Introduction
In this chapter I will consider certain applications of my arguments concerning the 
concept of death. So far, I have been at pains to point out what I think are compelling 
reasons for rejecting the idea that death is in some way an intrinsic feature of the 
world. I have also tried to show that, whilst death is an observer-relative feature (and 
we must therefore adopt a 'partly-biological' view), certain criteria relating to the 
traditional concept of death have been brought into conflict with one another by 
advances in medical technology. Therefore, whilst different conceptions of death are 
possible (in the same way that we may adopt different constitutive rules in changing 
the nature of a game), there is a general, understandable reluctance to do so.
Therefore, in the following sections, I first consider the question of what limits there 
are to the adoption of new conceptions of death. After this, I set out a range of views 
on death from differing perspectives in science-fiction and religion - which I take to 
be the two areas which provide the most far-reaching and contentious alternatives to 
the traditional conception of death.
Before commencing, however, I should perhaps just point out that the various topics 
in this chapter are touched upon quite lightly - and, some might argue, too briefly. 
However, I don't have space to consider the many possible responses to the positions 
advanced, and I would not want it to be thought that I considered the arguments set 
down as conclusive treatments of the issues concerned; rather, I would ask that they 
be considered possible avenues down which the directions opened up by the 
conclusions of the previous chapters may be pursued.
Death and Choice: Morality
In the search for ontologically-objective criteria for the disambiguation of 
controversial cases in the determination of death, proponents of various positions have 
rejected the relevance of moral criteria to the debate (e.g. as Becker, Lamb, and 
Russell have argued, for instance). However, as this rejection was linked to an attempt 
to treat death as an intrinsic feature of the world (or as based on intrinsic features), it 
seems - now that I have concluded that death is observer-relative - that this issue 
must be revisited. What part, then, do moral concerns play in our adoption of an 
observer-relative definition of death?
There have already been attempts to resolve this problem from a moral perspective. 
Hans Jonas has argued that, whilst the brain-dead ' should not be declared dead, we 
have no duty to prolong the life of such individuals, because the inherent value of the 
patient's life to the patient himself is practically non-existent.' Howard Brody, on the
1 By 'brain-dead' and 'brain-death' here and in the following paragraphs, I mean whole-brain death, 
referring to the essential functions of the brain-stem in addition to other areas of the brain (including 
the neocortex).
2 In this sense, he argues, 'the Report [of the Ad Hoc Committee of the Harvard Medical School to 
Examine the Definition of Brain Death] has strictly speaking defined not death, the ultimate state, itself,
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other hand, whilst he rejects the neocortical definition of death, argues that brain- 
death is synonymous with death itself; this is because the person without capacity for 
consciousness is no longer a person (and therefore not capable of bearing moral 
rights), though they might nevertheless still retain spontaneous function (and are 
therefore, according to Brody, still alive). 3 Robert Veatch takes a minimalist approach, 
arguing that the essential feature of a human being is the embodied capacity for 
experience and social interaction; since consciousness is a prerequisite for this, 
neocortical death is synonymous with the death of the human being. 4 Paul Ramsey5 
and Robert Schwager both consider spontaneous respiration and heartbeat as a 
sufficient condition for life, and our moral obligations therefore spring from our 
inherent duty to the still-living human being. John C. Hoffman 7 defends Veatch, but 
argues that the question of what death is can only be answered by identifying which 
features hold an intrinsic moral value, and therefore entail moral obligations (deciding, 
along with Veatch, that the capacity for experience and social interaction is the 
defining feature). Finally, Karen Gervais8 argues that human death is the death of the 
person (which either neocortical or whole-brain death are sufficient to bring about), 
but that choosing to instate this definition is a public policy decision that requires a 
contractarian approach.
However, all of the above approaches rely to some extent on essentialist assertions: 
Gervais, Veatch, and Hoffman argue that consciousness is essential to personhood, 
which is in turn the essence of a human being; Jonas takes a rights-based approach, 
considering the essence of a human being as the capacity to be a moral agent; and 
Ramsey and Schwager view spontaneous function as a defining feature of being alive. 
However, to take Hoffman's point, each of the competing views of what essentially 
constitutes a human being entails an alternative assertion of 'intrinsic value'. 10 But 
can what has arguably been traditionally thought of as an ontological concern be 
resolved by purely evaluative considerations?
This is a tricky question, I feel, and one that threatens to blur the distinction between 
ontological and moral questions. For instance, returning to Searle's terminology, 
moral concerns may force change upon the constitutive and regulative rules of many 
social practices: this may range from the alteration of somewhat arbitrary customs, 
such as the tightening of sporting rules concerning physical contact in rugby union so 
as to protect players; to deeper changes, such as the outlawing of the Hindu practice 
of suttee, where widows followed their deceased husbands onto the funeral pyre. In 
both these instances, conflict between values leads to a revision of the practices in 
what we like to think of as 'moral progress' (rugby becomes more considerate of
but a criterion for permitting it to take place unopposed - e.g. by turning off the respirator.' Jonas 
(1978),pp.51-2.
3 Brody (1981). As Gervais points out (1986, p.88), this seems to commit Brody to the problematic 






9 Ibid., pp.!66-77.Gervais is not a moralist per se, but her conclusions suggest that, the ontological 
considerations once established, death should be defined in the process of a public policy debate (which, 
by definition, will take on a primarily moral character).
10 Hoffman (1979), p.436.
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safety; funeral practices become more 'enlightened' and humane); in such cases, the 
deeper, morally-driven constitutive rules can be seen to outweigh the dictates of 
tradition and social expectation.
However, if we consider the moral approach to be relevant to the definition of death, 
we must admit that it is only one possible influence in a range of other factors; many 
social practices are also shaped by aesthetic principles, evolutionary drives, epistemic 
concerns, religious and spiritual aspirations, and so on. As a result, we cannot 
privilege moral discourse over all these other concerns - unless, of course, we want to 
say that a concern for morality is the fundamental and defining feature of humanity 
(which, apart from being a highly debateable assumption, is difficult to see as 
anything other than a bald metaphysical assertion). Therefore whilst, in the above 
examples I considered moral considerations to be 'deeper' than other concerns (e.g. 
the desire for sporting spectacle in rugby), this is not to say that it is the deepest, or 
that it is somehow a reliable and independent arbiter of what should and should not be 
the case as regards the rules of social practice.
What we therefore now require is a picture of how social practices interrelate, before 
considering how they may change.
Wittgenstein's River
Various philosophical approaches argue that we cannot completely distinguish 
between ontology and epistemology; in other words, between what there is, and how 
we come to know it. So, as a consequence, we may argue that our ontological 
concepts are always 'tinged' in some way by limits that we, as humans, are forced to 
accept. The nature of these limits, of course, is open to debate: a Kantian explanation 
would see such limits as built into the possibilities of experience; a Nietzschean 
approach, on the other hand, would point out that our rational understanding of the 
world is motivated by irrational forces that we are seldom (and can never be wholly) 
aware of; Searle has argued that many features of our social practices are observer- 
relative and only make sense in relation to social institutions and collective 
intentionality. However, for whatever reason, it may be argued that the concepts that 
we utilize in our social practices (and even, some argue, in our fundamental 
epistemological and scientific ones) are ultimately without absolute rational 
grounding.''
However, this is not to say that, as a result, our practices and concepts become 
arbitrary. Searle has already given us one picture of how social practices may be 
embedded by human collective intentionality, and Wittgenstein has similarly argued 
that human practices reach down into a non-rational basis or 'form of life' within
11 I take this to be a relatively uncontroversial position (though obviously there will be some who 
oppose it). I have highlighted this aspect of the philosophies of Wittgenstein (1967, 1974), Quine 
(1969a), and Nietzsche (1990a), but there are many other examples I could choose. However, perhaps 
the seminal and definitive statement on this subject is Kurt Godel's 'incompleteness theorem', which 
denies (generally) that 'all truths or laws pertaining to their subjects are provable within them.' 
(Detlefsen, 2000, p.319). Obviously, this has wide-reaching consequences, but most significantly 
suggests the failure of attempts to prove the 'completeness' of first-order logic (which was the goal of 
A. N. Whitehead and Bertrand Russell's Principia Mathematica). In the current context, it simply 
means that such concepts as that of 'self and 'death' cannot (arguably) be defined without the 
assumption of some arbitrary, conventional, or non-rational element.
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which such practices make sense. For this reason, therefore, even though we may lack 
a fixed set of ontologically-independent facts which determine our social practices 
(atoms do not tell us how death should be determined, because both living and dead 
things are made up of them), we may nonetheless still picture a way in which such 
practices are not completely arbitrary; if there is logic and consistency within games, 
and some games are 'deeper' than others, then this interplay is perfectly capable of 
explaining social interaction - including the practices surrounding death. This 
therefore provides us with a conceptualist framework which - to an extent - 
constrains what is and is not conceivable (though to what extent this is mutable, I 
shall shortly explore).
I take this picture to be similar to the conclusion that Wittgenstein arrives at in his 
later philosophy: the meaning of certain propositions is relative to other, 'deeper' 
propositions; so, whilst we may not ultimately be able to find a rational ground for our 
practices, there are limits to the choices that we can make as to what exactly those 
'fundamental' propositions are.
95. The propositions describing this world-picture might be part of a 
kind of mythology. And their role is like that of rules of a game; and the 
game can be learned purely practically, without learning any explicit 
rules.
96. It might be imagined that some propositions, of the form of 
empirical propositions, were hardened and functioned as channels for 
such empirical propositions as were not hardened but fluid; and that this 
relation altered with time, in that fluid propositions hardened, and hard 
ones became fluid.
97. The mythology may change back into a state of flux, the river-bed 
of thoughts may shift. But I distinguish between the movement of the 
waters on the river-bed and the shift of the bed itself; though there is not 
a sharp division of the one from the other. 1
As can be seen, the metaphor of a river is a good one: the fast flowing current 
represents the quickly changing world of facts, and our knowledge of things within 
certain contexts; just as we might seek to ascertain the state of play in a game. 
However, as we move deeper, the propositions become more fundamental and less 
changeable - until, Wittgenstein argues, we reach a point where certain empirical 
propositions become 'hardened' and function as 'channels' for other, shallower, 'fluid 
propositions'.
Here, in fact, we have a parallel to Quine's notions of ontological relativity and 
relative conceptual schemes: 13 the 'hardened' propositions are not absolute, and their 
relation with more fluid propositions is 'altered with time'; however, there is always a 
sense in which the deeper propositions are necessary for the shallower ones to have a 
reference point or 'anchor'.
12 Wittgenstein (1974), p. 15. 
13 Quine(1969a).
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If we relate this picture to social practices, and especially to death practices, we can 
see that advances in medical technology have resulted in a 'shift of the [river] bed 
itself; assertions which were considered fundamental and unalterable (such as the 
binary definition of death, the co-incidence of cessation of spontaneous function with 
death itself) have loosened from the bed-rock and have begun to float more freely 
(although, to continue the metaphor, still at a deep, slow-moving level - that is, the 
features of what we consider essential or important to a human being are still deeply 
resistant to change).
However, if we accept this picture of deep and shallow structures in relation to social, 
linguistic, and epistemic practices, then we are left with the question: How much is it 
possible to revise our fundamental conceptions of life, death, and self? Obviously, this 
is not a question that can be easily answered, but a further problem lies in the 
assumption that we can set limits: if fundamental concepts are potentially open to 
change, then how can we possibly say what it is and is not possible for them to evolve 
into? This highlights the dynamic nature of this particular view of human discourse, 
and shows that the desire to set limits to it - to say (using Wittgenstein's metaphor) 
that this part of the river bed is fixed and unchanging - is to use concepts themselves 
which are part of this process, and therefore themselves potentially open to change. In 
other words, any metaphysical position is merely one among others, and therefore 
open to change. 14
I will now go on to consider how this type of perspective (where no elements of social 
discourse are ultimately fixed and unchangeable) may allow us to understand 
historical developments in the notions of life, death, and self. In doing so, I will look 
at various conceptions of the self- as body, as soul, as mind - and attempt to show 
how it is possible to find (or imagine) variations of these concepts which stretch our 
notion of what death is.
Death as the Departure of the Soul
Before going on to talk about the concept of the soul in relation to our notions of the 
self and death, I would like firstly to make some observations as to its possible 
significance for determining and defining death.
It might be thought that the debate concerning the definition of death would be 
immeasurably simplified - if not resolved - if we could assume the existence of the 
soul. Of course, there would still be the attendant problem of ascertaining exactly 
when the soul leaves the body (or whether it is still present), but we could at least 
entertain the following:
(1) that the soul is a human being's vehicle of consciousness;
(2) that it is separate from the body;
(3) that it survives and possibly pre-exists the body;
(4) that it is the essence of what we consider to be the human 
individual.
14 Which, of course, is precisely the point made by Godel.
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Obviously, even if we accepted these statements as true, we would still be faced with 
problems: does the fact that the body is still, to some extent, 'alive' mean that the soul 
has not yet left, or that those features which persist are non-essential to the soul? If the 
soul has left, can it be brought back (as in the Biblical case of Lazarus)? Does the 
ongoing presence of the soul entail a duty to maintain life, or might we argue that, 
under certain circumstances, it might be right to 'release' the soul from its earthly 
prison (where, perhaps, it can never again lead a full earthly life)?
As these questions show, the problem of determining death does not go away if we 
assume the existence of the soul, but (it may be argued) the problem of defining it 
does; the problem of when someone is dead can be seen to be an empirical one, but 
the fact of death would become (dare I say it) an intrinsic one. In this sense, problems 
of whether to 'release' souls or not could become a legitimate moral (or theological) 
concern. However, the above said, there are good reasons why this approach - even if 
we could prove the soul's existence - is no more fruitful than any other.
Gareth B. Matthews 15 argues for a revival of the idea that death takes place when the 
soul leaves the body. In association with this, he argues a return to the notion of 
'quickening' (as a sign of when the soul enters the body), and, in relation to death, its 
opposite (which Matthews does not give a term, but which we might call 'hastening'). 
For Matthews, the determining sign of when quickening takes place in the foetus 
relates to when it can be decided that it possesses psychological qualities; so, when it 
responds to stimuli with purposive action, or shows signs of expressing preference. 
However, the one example he gives - that of a foetus which responded to an injection 
of a sweetened substance (saccharine) into the amniotic fluid by 'swallowing larger 
than usual amounts' 16 of liquid - could also, arguably, be interpreted as a bodily 
reflex, and not entail consciousness at all. In fact, Matthews seems to have a very 
skeletal idea of what is entailed by the term 'psychological features', and the idea that 
there might be a problem in distinguishing between unconscious and conscious 
processes (or psychological and phenomenal consciousness) seems not to have 
occurred to him at all.
Another problem is why we should associate quickening with the arrival of the soul. 
Traditionally, as with Descartes, the soul has been considered a purely human entity 
not granted to animals (as Matthews himself points out). l7 However, the sort of 
psychological quickening that Matthews identifies is not, surely, that different from 
that which is displayed by animals - in fact, as Matthews argues, quickening can be 
thought of as the point at which the foetus first becomes 'a little animal'. 18 It is 
debateable, therefore, whether such 'psychological' qualities are in fact the defining 
features that Matthews takes them to be: if an animal foetus (e.g. a lamb) were to 
display such responses, it would seem strange to decide that we cannot abort the 
human foetus, but that we can later kill the lamb even when it displays signs of greater 
development. Furthermore, why should we therefore consider quickening to be an 
event that is specifically related to the arrival/genesis of a metaphysical entity (the 
soul)? It would seem that either Matthews must admit that animals have souls too 
(which I doubt he wants to), or that he has in mind some looser notion of 'soul' which
15 Matthews (1979).
16 Ibid., p. 156.
17 Ibid., p. 153, n.8. 
18 Ibid.,p.l55.
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is meant to serve for some essentialist notion of what defines the human being. Either 
way, there seems to be a lack of clarity and precision in his argument, and it is left 
ambiguous as to what exactly is intended by this notion of the soul.
Turning to the other extremity of the continuum, Matthews does not give much space 
to the notion of 'hastening'. However, the same problems as just outlined in relation 
to quickening also apply here: there is no distinction between psychological features 
and phenomenal consciousness, and Matthews seems to have no awareness of the 
difference between these aspects or how it might have a bearing on his definitions. 
Therefore, in both cases, we are left with a bald essentialist assertion that the human 
being consists in certain psychological features (which are also shared with animals), 
and that their presence or absence constitutes life or death respectively. However, in 
terms of determining death, this leaves us no closer to a clear procedure than previous 
essentialist attempts - and, what is more, with the added metaphysical baggage of a 
non-corporeal entity (that is, if this is the way that Matthews intends his concept of 
soul to be understood - which, as I say, is unclear). Lastly, we might also consider 
that, if it is possible that a soul may be returned or 'called back' to the body, then 
death may become 'reversible' - we might even call back souls to other bodies. 1 ''
As I suggested initially, therefore, the problems that we face in determining death are 
not avoided by the introduction of the idea of a soul. If we could ascertain the definite 
existence of the soul, and which functions it is responsible for maintaining, then 
perhaps a less problematic procedure for determining death could be arrived at. 
However, since medical science seems either to ignore or dismiss the relevance of the 
concept of the soul, and it has not been conclusively shown that such an entity does in 
fact exist, then its relevance for the determination of death (if it has one) seems to lie 
somewhere in the future of metaphysical/scientific research.
However, if the notion of the soul does not help us in determining death, what about 
the significance of the concept for the definition of death? We might point out that, 
even though it is difficult at the moment for us to decide the moment of death via 
reference to the departure of the soul, this does not rule out the possibility that, in the 
future, its existence and nature might be established. However, it might be argued, 
whilst it cannot currently help us resolve all problematic cases in the determination of 
death debate, its existence would at least provide us with a clear sense of what death is 
(i.e. the departure of the soul).
But would it? Having argued that the notion of the soul does not (as least, currently) 
help us in determining death, I would now like to set down what I think are good 
reasons why it cannot ultimately help us to establish what death is. I will also later 
discuss what I think are the reasons for this, and why, in my view, religion represents 
the sort of 'debate with death' that can also be found in science-fiction contexts.
The Deconstruction of the Soul20
19 There are many treatments of this theme in film and literature. My favourite is the film All of Me 
(Reiner, 1984), where Steve Martin portrays a lawyer who ends up sharing his body with the soul of a 
recently deceased female client (Lily Tomlin). The client had planned to transfer her soul to the body of 
a young woman (whose soul would then 'pass on'), but the transfer goes wrong.
20 Incidentally, it should not be thought that my use of'deconstruction' here or subsequently has any 
intended relation to the post-modernist position associated with Jaques Derrida, etc. As should now be
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Descartes and Plato both seemed to hold a similar conception of the soul. Plato, in The 
Republic 21 and The Phaedo, 22 argued that not only is the soul the seat of 
understanding and reason, but that it is also the essence of the individual. Similarly, 
Descartes argued that man's essential activity is thinking, and that the soul is the 
vehicle of this process; that T is the subject of the predicate 'think'. 23
This view has been extremely influential, and it may be debated whether in fact Plato 
and Descartes have merely given voice to a prevalent 'folk belief in the identity of 
the individual. For instance, even in Berger and Luckman's famous work on social 
construction, The Social Construction of Reality, where one might expect to find the 
notion of the individual socially 'deconstructed', the authors seem to retain an almost 
Cartesian concept of the individual. On the one hand, they argue that
Identity is formed by social processes. Once crystallized, it is maintained, 
modified, or even reshaped by social relations. The social processes 
involved in both the formation and the maintenance of identity are 
determined by the social structure. Conversely, the identities produced by 
the interplay of organism, individual consciousness and social structure 
react upon the given social structure, maintaining it, modifying it, or even 
reshaping it.24
Whilst I agree with the broad sweep of the above, it should be pointed out that Berger 
and Luckman already seem to utilize a 'ready-made' concept of the individual. As 
they state shortly after:
Identity is a phenomenon that emerges from the dialectic between 
individual and society. 25
And the concept of the individual itself? How does that emerge? There may be some 
sense in which the authors consider the notion of an individual self with set limits as 
being defined by biology: 'the organism posits limits to what is socially possible.'26 
However, as I hope I have already shown, biological criteria do not always provide 
incontrovertible criteria for identity or self. In the following sections, therefore, I will 
consider various different ways in which this Cartesian/Platonic notion of the 
individual can be broken down and replaced with other, broader concepts.
apparent, my approach stems mainly from the Anglo-American analytic tradition, though is not strictly 
confined to that.
21 Plato (1987), Part XI: The Immortality of the Soul and the Rewards of Goodness', pp.378-93.
22 Plato (1969), pp.99-183.
23 See, for instance, Descartes (1968), Second Meditation, pp. 102-12.
24 Berger and Luckman (1966), p. 194. This is not to say, of course, that social construction has not 
considered the notion of individuality to be socially constructed - it has become a standard approach. 
See, for instance, Anderson (1997). Obviously, what I am proposing here is a variation of this type of 
approach for the related concepts of'self and 'death'.
25 Ibid., p.195.
26 Ibid., p.201. However, they do then go on to talk about these biological factors limiting 'the range of 
social possibilities open to any individual' (pp.201-2), again suggesting a pre-formed notion of 
individual.
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Returning to the religious perspective, whilst it is easy to find traditional religious 
doctrine which backs up this Cartesian/Platonic view, it is also possible to find 
divergent ones. The most obvious example of a more radical concept of the self is to 
be found in Buddhism. In the doctrine of anatta ('no-self), Buddha argues that the 
idea of the self is a mistake, and that such a 'misconception was a symptom of that 
ignorance which kept us bound to the cycle of suffering.' 27 As Karen Armstrong 
explains:
Where the seventeenth-century French philosopher Rene Descartes 
would declare 'I think, therefore I am,' the Buddha came to the opposite 
conclusion. The more he thought, in the mindful, yogic way he had 
developed, the clearer it seemed that what we call the 'self is a delusion. 
In his view, the more closely we examine ourselves, the harder it 
becomes to find anything that we can pinpoint as a fixed entity. The 
human personality was not a static being to which things happened. Put 
under the microscope of yogic analysis, each person was a process. 28
So, in the metaphors Buddha used to illustrate this view, the self is compared to 'a 
blazing fire or a rushing stream';29 and, he argued, just as fire or water is different 
from moment to moment, so is the self. For Buddhism, therefore, personalism, 30 or 
the idea that Buddha's teaching may be interpreted as leaving room for the concept of 
a distinct self, is generally considered a misinterpretation of his doctrine, and a 
metaphysical mistake.
This brings to mind, in different ways, Gilbert Ryle's concept of the Cartesian self as 
a 'category mistake' 31 and David Hume's picture of self as a 'bundle or collection of 
different perceptions'. 32 However, it also suggests Nietzsche in the way that 'soul 
atomism',33 as he calls it, is seen as a doctrine which springs from a psychological 
need to attribute a centre to things - and specifically, to the self. However, for 
Nietzsche, this is simply another example of a philosophical prejudice, born of 
Platonist Christianity's need to guarantee the personal identity, moral culpability, etc., 
of individual agents. However, in an almost Buddhist-like passage, Nietzsche takes 
apart Descartes's famous cogito argument:
a thought comes when 'it' wants, not when T want; so that it is a 
falsification of the facts to say: the subject T is the condition of the 
predicate 'think'. // thinks: but that this 'it' is precisely that famous old 
T is, to put it mildly, only an assumption, an assertion, above all not an 
'immediate certainty'. For even with this 'it thinks' one has already gone 
too far: this 'it' already contains an interpretation of the event and does 
not belong to the event itself. 34
27 Armstrong (2000), p. 102. 
28 Ibid.,p.l01.
29 Ibid.
30 See Conze (1959), The Personalist Controversy', pp.192-7.
31 Ryle (1949). Similar approaches can also be found in other analytic literature - e.g. Geach (1972). 
32 Hume(1967),p.l80.
33 Nietzsche (1990a), Part One, section 12, p.43. See also sections 16-21, and 32.
34 Ibid., section 17, p.47. The italics are in the original.
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What we are faced with here, therefore, is the notion of the self (or soul) as a socially 
constructed entity (or, in this case, a deconstructed entity). Initially, this might seem 
like a negative view; Buddhism and Nietzsche have both been accused of nihilism. 
However, once we can see that it is possible for the self to be taken apart in this way, 
this leaves room for other concepts of self. But what might these possibilities involve?
The Expanded Self
Divergent notions of self are common in religious literature. In many cases, they take 
the form of what I will term an 'expanded' notion of self, which frequently has an 
experiential (as opposed to merely theoretical) basis.
So, for instance, the American poet Walt Whitman provides perhaps a typical 
expression of this view of self. One of the best examples of this is his long poem, 
'Song of Myself, where he undertakes a vast, sprawling celebration of the panorama 
of human existence. The 'self of the poem, however, is not simply that of the poet - 
or at least, not only that - but an embodiment of the whole range of human experience. 




And what I assume you shall assume,
For every atom belonging to me as good as belongs to you.
From then on, the poet sets out a vision of a cosmic self that both is and is not the 
poet's own:
I am the mate and companion of all people, all just as immortal and fathomless
as myself; 
They do not know how immortal, but I know. 36
In all people I see myself, none more and not one a barleycorn less, 
And the good or bad I say of myself I say of them. 37
-JQ
I am Walt Whitman, an American, one of the roughs, a kosmos
Furthermore, the self of the poem is therefore not one with a definite limit or moral 
perspective; it is one that includes the diverse range of all people, allowing the poet to 
identify with the totality of selves, their attitudes, desires, and perspectives.
Through me many long dumb voices,
Voices of the interminable generations of slaves,
Voices of prostitutes and of deformed persons,
Voices of the diseased and despairing, and of thieves and dwarfs,





Through me forbidden voices,
Voices of sexes and lusts.... voices veiled, and I remove the veil,
Voices indecent by me clarified and transfigured. 39
Anticipating that the reader will have difficulty in seeing unity in such diversity, 
Whitman concludes:
Do I contradict myself?
Very well then....1 contradict myself;
I am large....! contain multitudes.40
One of the interesting consequences of the presentation of this self is the consequent 
attitude to death that it entails:
Has any one supposed it lucky to be born?
I hasten to inform him or her it is just as lucky to die, and I know it.
I pass death with the dying, and birth with the new-washed babe....and am not 
contained between my hat and my boots41
Therefore, in his identification with all life, the poet becomes immortal:
And I know that I am deathless
[-]
I laugh at what you call dissolution ~
And since each of us is a part of the other, and of the overall process of life, death is 
simply a process of assimilation; therefore, he says,
Who need be afraid of the merge?43
We may of course view this as simply an extended poetic conceit: an 'as if 
identification for metaphorical purposes. However, whatever the particular case with 
Whitman's poem,44 it can be seen that the notions of self and death are inextricably 
intertwined: with a 'narrow' notion of self, one where the self is 'contained between 
my hat and my boots', then death is subject to the processes of natural dissolution; 
however, with the 'expanded' self, such dissolution is defeated - or at least postponed.
In viewing the self as socially constructed, therefore, we may make the link between a 
'narrow' self and the needs and dictates of society. It is tied in to the need for moral 
agency, education, economy, and the diverse natural and cultural influences that shape 






44 It has been argued, however, that there is some pivotal mystical experience underlying Whitman's 
early poetry - see Ando (1970), pp.111-12.
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the phrase of Ralph Waldo Emerson, Whitman's contemporary - frequently finds 
himself out of step, and socially surplus.
New, we confess, and by no means happy, is our condition: if you 
want the aid of our labor, we ourselves stand in great want of the 
labour. We are miserable with inaction. We perish of rest and rust: but 
we do not like your work.45
Emerson's point is therefore that society is aimed at social utility, and therefore, when 
embodiments of divergent notions of self occur, they find themselves to be 'useless'.
A more traditional expression of this view can be found in the Hindu scriptures, 
notably the Bhagavad Gita, where Krishna, the divine incarnation, consoles his 
disciple Arjuna:
The wise grieve not for those who live; and they grieve not for those who 
die - for life and death shall pass away.
Because we all have been for all time: I, thou, and those kings of men. 
And we all shall be for all time, we all for ever and ever. 46
In this whole universe there is nothing higher than I. All the worlds have 
their rest in me, as pearls upon a string.
I am the taste of living waters and the light of the sun and the moon. I am 
OM, the sacred word of the Vedas, sound in silence, heroism in men.
And I am from everlasting the seed of eternal life. I am the intelligence 
of the intelligent. I am the beauty of the beautiful. 48
The self outlined here is identified almost entirely with universals, and not particulars. 
In this sense, the individual is seen as a transitory and passing embodiment of a 
greater self (just as we saw in the Buddhist metaphors of fire and running water). The 
notion of the expanded self is therefore - if not common - then widespread enough to 
occur in different cultures. Buddha or Christ might also say, with Whitman, that the 
expanded self is 'not contained between my hat and my boots'. Furthermore, one of 
the central themes which link these depictions of self is the consequent attitude to 
death:
If any man thinks he slays, and if another thinks he is slain, neither 
knows the ways of truth. The Eternal in man cannot kill: the Eternal in
.. 49
man cannot die.
45 Emerson (1981), pp. 105-5. 
46 Mascaro(1962),p.lO.
47 Ibid., p.36.
48 Ibid., p.31. 
49 Ibid.,p.ll.
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Therefore, in identifying with the processes of life as a whole, the expanded self 
escapes death - as the Elizabethan poet John Donne put it, since death of the 
individual self is just a 'short sleepe':
One short sleepe past, wee wake eternally,
And death shall be no more, Death thou shalt die. 50
But is it possible to 'kill' death merely by consciously revising our concept of self? As 
I have argued, divergent notions of self - especially that of the expanded self - are 
common themes of religious (Buddhist and Hindu) and semi-religious literature 
(Whitman and Emerson) from various cultures and periods. I have also suggested that, 
since the form of the self is largely dictated by social and cultural factors, that it may 
be possible to legitimately (i.e. actually) alter our notions of self (e.g. by education, 
social change, etc.). I will now consider the question of this legitimacy directly.
Death and Immortality
In the above sections, I have tried to outline the prevalence of an alternative concept 
of death, and also to show that it is one where the notion of self is expanded to a point 
where death, as we know it, is transcended. However, in presenting this view, I am 
not arguing for a religious point of view (although this is an example of a religious 
point of view); rather, I am trying to show that such religious perspectives exist, are 
not necessarily irrational, and represent what I have earlier termed a 'debate with 
death'. However, having done this, I would like now to consider the deeper question 
of whether such positions are coherent. Atheists, among others, would argue that they 
are not, but - as I will show - the opposition here between accepting that such views 
are coherent and rejecting them as nonsense (literally) is not so straight forward as 
may be supposed (and, as many atheists suppose). Before returning to consideration 
of the significance of the notion of the expanded self, therefore, I must first consider 
some common objections (and possible solutions) to the problems faced by religious 
assertions concerning immortality and certain features of religious language in general.
In Death and Immortality,^ D.Z. Phillips defends a picture of religious language that 
seeks to avoid what he considers to be certain common misconceptions. Phillips 
argues that if we interpret religious language in a literal, prepositional way, then it 
becomes - quite rightly - open to a host of rational objections. 52 For instance, 
consider the statement that 'God loves us'. Critics of religion - such as A.G.N. Flew - 
would argue that, in order for such a belief to be meaningful, it must at least be 
possible to say what might potentially falsify it. 53 Since, Flew argues, nothing would
50 John Donne, 'Holy Sonnets: Divine Meditations', sonnet 6, in Gardner (1972), p.85.
51 Phillips (1970). For a concise statement of Phillips's views on religion and their relation to 
Wittgenstein's thought, see also Phillips (1971).
52 For example, see MacKinnon (1955), who - whilst having sympathy with some theological 
interpretation of immortality - rejects the common misconceptions which ignore 'the logic of our 
language' (p.262); and also, of course, Flew himself in the same collection (Flew, 1955), who further 
suggests that such positions as MacKinnon's (and Phillips's) are distortions of theological doctrine. 
Incidentally, Flew seems to have quite recently revised his atheistic position and now seems open to 
certain form's of theism. However, for my purposes, I use his 'old' views simply as representative of a 
certain common form of attack upon religious meaning (which many still hold).
53 See, for instance, Flew's famous Theology and Falsification', in Hick (1964), pp.225-8.
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seem to count against the idea that 'God loves us' (not even the existence of natural 
evil such as earthquakes and hurricanes), then such language is meaningless.
Phillips's objection to this is that it misconstrues the meaning of religious language. 
For instance, the belief that we shall be reunited with our loved ones beyond the grave 
is not to be interpreted as a proposition to be verified or falsified by actual events, but 
rather as an expression of the religious believer's attitude to his family.
For Flew, the belief is shown to be confused by treating it as a prediction 
and by demonstrating the logical contradictoriness of what is predicted. I 
am suggesting that this procedure ignores the religious and ethical 
significance of the belief. A man may actually visualise his family, most 
of whom are dead, embracing each other in a reunion after death. Of 
course, awkward questions can be asked about whether they are really 
embracing each other, and if so, what is one to make of the identity of the 
buried or cremated bodies. But these questions are not simply awkward, 
they are also trivial. The picture of the family reunion may have an 
ethical and religious role in the person's life [...] The man may look on 
his relationship to his family as going beyond death, and his obligations 
to them as something which death cannot erase. The picture of the family 
reunion after death is not a prediction for which he has evidence, but a 
vision in terms of which much of his own life is lived out. The picture is 
not assessed by appeal to the evidence. On the contrary, the picture, for 
this man, is the measure of assessment.
Phillips, then, rejects Flew's objections because - for Phillips - religious language is 
non-propositional. As such, the picture which forms a part of a person's religious 
beliefs is to be understood not as consisting of propositional statements concerning a 
metaphysical reality, but rather as expressing certain moral and spiritual attitudes. If 
we then apply this understanding to survival of death, and the notion of immortality, 
we can see that the common objections (concerning personal identity, dualism, the 
existence of God, and so on), do not have any force.
If we ask ourselves when we would consider whether a man has a soul or not, 
we see that this has nothing to do with any kind of empirical question. It is 
not like asking whether he has a larynx or not. 55
Therefore:
Talk about the soul, then, is not talk about some strange sort of 'thing'. On 
the contrary, it is a kind of talk bound up with certain moral or religious 
reflections a man may make on the life he is leading."
So, to lose one's soul, to sell it, or to swear upon it, does not involve - for Phillips - 
assertions about the existence of some metaphysical entity, but rather concerns ways
54 Phillips (1970), pp.68-9 (my italics).
55 Ibid., p.44.
56 Ibid. It is easy to see what such a position has in common with the general analytic critique of 
Cartesian dualism - e.g. Ryle (1949) and Geach (1972).
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of speaking about one's life, attitudes, morality, etc., which form part of the wider 
discourse of religious belief.
In fact, Phillips argues, the religious conception of immortality is based on the fact 
that one's own personal self will not survive. Quoting Simone Weil:
The principal claim which we think we have on the universe is that our 
personality should continue. This claim implies all the others. The instinct of 
self-preservation makes us feel this continuation to be a necessity, and we 
believe that a necessity is a right. 57
The frustration of this desire, therefore (both Phillips and Weil argue), is the basis of 
the religious attitude of 'dying to the self:
Belief in [personality-based] immortality is harmful because it is not in our 
power to conceive of the soul as really incorporeal. So this belief is in fact a 
belief in the prolongation of life, and it robs death of its purpose. 58
This is, I think, a point worthy of any existentialist: 59 To imagine a divine reward, or 
to act out of the belief that there will be an extension of our earthly life in a post- 
mortem state, is to live in 'bad faith' (as Sartre would say). For Weil and Phillips, 
therefore, immortality consists in the attitude to life embodied by the individual in 
their religious practices. As Phillips concludes:
I am suggesting then, that eternal life for the believer is participation in the 
life of God, and that this life has to do with dying to the self, seeing that all 
things are a gift from God, that nothing is ours by right of necessity. 60
My purpose in presenting Phillips's views here is primarily to show that it is possible 
to entertain a picture of religious language which is not at odds with conventional 
scientific views of the nature of the human being. In other words, we need not 
presuppose the existence of a metaphysical soul, or even of God (conceived in a way 
which Phillips objects to), in order for religious language to make sense. Of course, 
Phillips has his critics - from both sides of the religious debate - but the strength of 
his position is that it allows religious language to be meaningful without either 
completely distorting its nature, or challenging accepted scientific dogma.
However, in light of my conclusions concerning the nature and status of the concept 
of death, I would now like to propose that, whilst Phillips's approach goes some way 
towards establishing how we can legitimately possess an alternative view of death, it 
does not actually go far enough. This is, I shall shortly argue, because there is an 
underlying conservatism to the position. Therefore, since Phillips's position is itself 
based on that of Wittgenstein, I shall argue that such conservatism is an aspect of 
Wittgenstein's own philosophy. Perceiving this, and taking account of the greater 
conceptual freedom which this reveals will, I shall argue, help us to understand a 
wider spectrum of social and religious discourse.
51 Weil (1959), p. 174.
58 Weil (1951), p.33.
59 See, for instance, Cox (1999).
60 Phillips (1970), pp.54-5.
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Wittggnstein's Conservatism
As a number of commentators have noted, there is a discernible conservatism to 
Wittgensteinian thought which is at odds with other trends in philosophy. As J. C. 
Nyiri notes, some of Wittgenstein's traits are typical of the figure of the conservative, 
who is
devoted to the familiar and mistrustful of all novelties; [...] affirms 
instinctively the durable, the constant, the traditional; he is sceptical of 
every radicalism, of Utopias, and of promises in regard to the future 61
Russell B. Goodman (in his study of the influence of William James upon 
Wittgenstein) observes that:
In the Investigations, Wittgenstein wants to return, to bring words home 
from their metaphysical to their everyday use. As Wittgenstein put it late 
in his life, "[where] others go on ahead, I stay in one place.' ",,62
Thus, when faced with philosophical problems, Wittgenstein's recourse to a 
consideration of how we use language in everyday life is seen by some to represent a 
conservative (as opposed to a radical) move; it considers the problems as aberrations 
caused by 'language going on holiday', and seeks to re-ground the debate by returning 
it to a consideration of the practices that gave birth to the concepts. As Ernest Gellner 
notes, however, there is a circularity involved here:
To 'observe how we use words' is to make statements, in ordinary 
language, about the role, function, effects and context of expressions. But 
in doing this, the concepts and presuppositions of that ordinary language 
are taken for granted and insinuated as the only possible view. We smile 
at scholasticism which had to prove what Revelation supplied anyway. 
But Linguistic Philosophy has to prove, 'make acceptable', what 
common sense or linguistic custom provides anyway. (Linguistic 
Philosophy is scholastic in this sense as well as in its pedantry.)
So, in relation to Phillips's view of religious immortality already considered, the 
proposition that religious language is true because of as-yet-undiscovered 
metaphysical truths is rejected, because it would involve a radical revision of science 
(and also 'common sense' linguistic practices). However, the reinterpretation of 
religious language so as to conform to scientific knowledge is seen as a return to the 
'original' meaning of the practice. In some cases, this can involve an almost 
counterintuitive interpretation of the material under consideration. For instance, in
61 Nyiri (1982), p.46, quoting Gerd-Klaus Kaltenbrunner.
62 Goodman (2002), p. 167. The quote is from Wittgenstein (1980), p.66. For other interpretations of 
Wittgenstein as a conservative (or 'neo-conservative'), see for instance, Janik (1985), Norris (2003), 
and Wheeler (1988). It should not be thought, incidentally, that Goodman sees James as providing a 
conservative influence; rather, he sees it as a general point of contrast between Wittgenstein and the 
American pragmatists.
63 Gellner (1959), p.217. Gellner's attack in this books is directed at linguistic philosophy as a general 
movement, but since this springs mainly from Wittgenstein - who is also one of Gellner's main targets 
- then his criticisms are pertinent here.
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'Remarks on Frazer's Golden Bough',64 Wittgenstein criticizes the anthropologist Sir 
James Frazer for what he considers to be a misinterpretation of the religious practices 
of primitives peoples. Instead of attributing to them a false scientific world view 
(where rain dances affect the weather) as Frazer does, we should rather - Wittgenstein 
argues - observe that such practices can be made sense of in other ways (such as a 
celebration of the anticipated coming of the rains). 65 However, such an interpretation 
is arguably at odds with much of our understanding of how such practices are 
understood by the practitioners themselves; and, furthermore, may be said to be 
applicable only to a limited range of those practices. For instance, consider a shaman 
who enters the spirit world to find a familiar spirit, or performs a ritual which is 
intended to injure an enemy at a distance, or to heal someone: should we consider the 
shaman as 'mistaken' in considering these practices to have the purpose he intends 
them to have? Interpreting such practices in this 'expressivist' way would therefore 
seem to argue for a privileged account of what is true about religion, identifying only 
certain practices and attitudes as 'genuine'. Of course, if the objective is simply to 
rescue a certain type of religious practice from the criticisms of science and 
rationalism, then this is less problematic; however, as an interpretation of religious 
and magical practice as a whole, it is less successful.
Needless to say, the interpretation of Wittgenstein's philosophy as fundamentally 
conservative has been strongly resisted by many modern-day Wittgensteinians. 66 As 
Denis McManus points out, we have to be careful how we interpret Wittgenstein; 
since, like Nietzsche, his later philosophy is non-systematic, and occasionally cryptic, 
our criticisms may provide no more than a form of straw man argument. Furthermore, 
however - if he is not conservative - we should also not assume the opposite - i.e. 
that Wittgenstein is actually always proposing a radical position:
The fact remains that when thinking about criticism of established 
practices, it IS easy to slip into ways of speaking which suggest that such 
criticism does indeed rest on our exposing 'the true meaning of 
democracy' or such like. Thus to defend Wittgenstein here one must 
examine these philosophical temptations with the same sensitivity that 
Wittgenstein himself displays, rather than simply saying that he never 
defends conservative theses.
The apology for Wittgenstein's apparent conservatism (if it is there at all) is therefore 
that 'it IS easy to slip into ways of speaking' which suggest a conservative approach.
64 Wittgenstein (1979), pp.61-81.
65 This might be termed the expressivist interpretation
66 See, for example, McManus (1995), and Diamond (1991), pp.13-38. Diamond argues that 'The idea 
of Wittgenstein's philosophy as inherently consewative is nutty. At the heart of his discussion of that 
most profoundly rule-governed of all our intellectual activities, mathematics, is his account of 
interesting mathematical questions and mathematical developments that are initiated by them as 
involving kinds of new move that can illuminatingly be compared with riddles. The interpretation of 
his philosophy as conservative results in part from lack of attention to what he says about mathematics; 
but it is supported also by what I earlier described as the imposition on philosophy itself of the 
philosophical requirement that it lay down requirements. And that is the refusal of the kind of liberation 
that he hoped philosophy might bring.' (p.34). However, this aside, it would seem to be easier to 




However, in the hands of Wittgensteinians, this 'natural tendency' often becomes a 
point of dogma, used to resist not only radical possibilities for language and linguistic 
practice, but even any proposed novelty or potential mutability (such as, in fact, I am 
proposing).
However, without getting drawn into a battle for Wittgenstein's philosophical estate 
(and over what Wittgenstein did and did not mean - which I have neither the space 
nor inclination to undertake), I would like to propose that a modified understanding of 
Wittgenstein's picture of social and epistemic practices (which I considered above in 
his river analogy) would give us a better framework for considering the possible scope 
of redefinition of the concepts of self and death.
For instance, in my discussion of what I termed the 'expanded self, I argued that a 
certain concept of the self prevalent in literature and religious texts envisaged the 
conquering of death by identification with the wider processes of life itself. However, 
if we were to apply a Phillipsian/Wittgensteinian approach to this, we would find such 
identification would take on a purely 'poetic' or 'expressivistic' sense, and any 
divergent interpretation would then be contrasted with the everyday sense in which 
terms such as T, 'death', and 'survival' make sense. However, in exposing 
Wittgenstein's conservatism (or the conservative interpretation of Wittgenstein - 
whichever you prefer), it is possible to advance a more dynamic relationship between 
these notions. In this way, 'death' and 'self become more fluid concepts; still 
determined by human practices (and the way in which values and epistemic concerns 
are intertwined at a deep level), but more open to change and innovation. In this way, 
we avoid what I think is the somewhat artificial division that arguably arises out of an 
application of Wittgenstein's ideas to religion. Phillips has sometimes been accused of 
'Wittgensteinian fideism', where, because we cannot criticise religious practices from 
an external rational perspective (but only understand them on their own terms), they 
would seem to represent a form of rationally unfounded, unimpeachable belief. 
However, by removing the conservative element, we open up the whole debate, 
connecting these fundamental concepts at deep levels. In other words, no longer is 
religious language 'playing a game' that rational discourse cannot join in (or ruin); 
rather, ontological and epistemic assertions can form part of the same discourse.
To attempt to illustrate this, consider this notion of the expanded self. From an 
'everyday' linguistic perspective, we might consider this to be no more than a 
metaphor, and that many things argue against its interpretation in a literal sense: the 
fact that our bodies are separate entities (and that our notion of personal identity is 
dependent upon this); the fact that we can only see things from our own perspective 
(and not from others'); the fact that we cannot feel what it is like to be other than 
ourselves. However, as I hope I have shown, these criteria do not possess the 
inviolable status that some philosophers seem to assume: for instance, if we were to 
adopt some of Parfit's conclusions regarding personal identity, take into account a 
Nietzschean critique of the Cartesian self, and entertain a Buddhist account of 
causation, then the inviolable nature of these concepts begins to unravel: all living 
things share the same substratum of matter; consciousness may not necessarily be the 
sine qua non of personal identity, and qualia (as indicating an individual, experiential 
self) may be considered an illusion. Furthermore, if we attempt to appeal to 'deeper' 
notions, then these can in turn be questioned, thus throwing the whole nature of self 
and death open to change. In other words, if Nietzsche and Buddhism are right, and
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the notion of the 'atomic' self is a metaphysical assumption which requires 
investment, then why can't such an investment be made elsewhere in order to produce 
a different idea of self? As I have argued in my earlier discussion of Emerson's point, 
it is social and cultural factors (in combination with other contingent factors) which 
determine and maintain the rigid need for an individual self, and these are certainly 
open to change.
I would not want it to be thought that I am proposing a 'shop-window' view of 
concepts here, where I may pick and choose what I want to consider as myself, or 
arbitrarily decide how or when I might die. The force of (for example) Wittgenstein's 
and Searle's arguments considering the importance of the social community as a 
whole (be it in terms of 'collective intentionality' or 'forms of life') is hard to deny: 
we need a linguistic community in order to have meaning at all. However, just what 
this linguistic community believes, or what its concepts of 'self and 'death' are (I 
argue) are considerably broader than it seems either of these philosophers would 
concede.
Also - and I think this is an important consideration in the current context - it should 
be borne in mind that the type of 'expanded' concepts that I have been considering 
here do traditionally arise from specific linguistic communities or individuals in 
isolation (e.g. monasteries, religious groups and institutions, etc.). Furthermore, where 
the practice is especially determined and 'serious', the secluded nature of these 
religious communities, the physical and mental disciplines involved, etc., further 
suggest that the focus of effort is on changing the individual mind-set in line with 
goals prescribed by the linguistic community as a whole (or else the individual's 
mental and linguistic attachment to the 'old' community). In this way, there is 
possibly more chance of these concepts coming 'alive' for the practitioner, and 
leaving the land of mere metaphor.
Death and the Future: Science-Fiction
In my discussion of religion, I have attempted to show that it is possible to consider 
certain religious attitudes as presenting us with possible alternative conceptions of the 
self and death. In doing this, I have also tried to argue that a non-conservative 
application of a Wittgensteinian approach to language and social practices can give us 
a framework for understanding how these changes are possible.
However, just as religious concepts are influenced by accepted dogmas and traditions, 
different conceptions of the self and what it means to die will be found in areas which 
are influenced by different assumptions and values. Therefore, I would now like to 
consider the concept of death in relation to certain scenarios in the realms of scientific 
hypothesis and science-fiction.
In a sense, there is no clear distinction between science fiction and science fact. For, 
whilst there are certain areas of the sci-fi genre which present us with outlandish and 
unlikely possible futures, many of the most effective plots and envisionings involve 
scenarios which are only marginally advanced beyond our own time. Therefore, 
because technological advance in modern societies seems to progress at an 
exponential rate, the idea that such future realities are potentially just around the 
corner lends a greater credibility to the ideas and situations portrayed.
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In relation to death, however, science fiction's notion of immortality traditionally 
focuses on the way in which existing life might be prolonged and improved: so, if 
religion can be said to focus on 'dying to the self and the immortality of the 'soul', 
then science fiction considers the ways in which the life of the mundane personality 
and physical self might be extended. In the followings sections, therefore, I will focus 
on certain suggestive scenarios from scientific research, film, and literature which 
propose different ways in which the concepts of 'self and 'death' may be revised. 68
The Immortal Body
The flip-side of spiritual immortality is, of course, bodily survival. However, whilst 
different possibilities as to what we mean by death and survival in a 'spiritual' sense 
may be said to rely on the potential mutability of the concept of self, the equivalent 
possibilities as related to bodily immortality are shaped by technology. As James J. 
Hughes succinctly notes: 'Technology is problematizing death'. 69 Of course, this is 
itself something which I have already stressed in earlier chapters; advances in medical 
technology have resulted in novel situations in which traditional notions of 'person', 
'dead', 'alive', etc., have been split apart, and the criteria which were thought to 
constitute them exposed and set at variance with each other. However, if we now 
consider the possibility of physical immortality (or, more humbly, just the extension 
of life), then technology (and its projection into the future: science fiction) is the main 
vehicle for our doing so.
First of all, let us consider the possible means of extending life: 70 we have cryonics, or 
the freezing of all or part of the body, in the hope that future scientists will be able to 
revive and treat patients with conditions that we currently think of as irremediable; 
calorie restriction, which notes that the lives of many animals are extended by 
restricting food intake; the use of nutritional supplements as antioxidants; the 
possibility of genetic manipulation to overcome biologically programmed cell death; 
the use of cloning to replace aging body parts; and so-called 'mind uploading', where 
it is imagined that one day we will be able to upload the information contained in an 
individual's brain so that they can continue to exist on a more durable physical 
vehicle (e.g. a computer hard drive).
Obviously, some of the above represent more immediate possibilities than others. 
However, whilst all of them share the premise that individual survival consists in the 
prolongation of physical aspects of the human being, 71 there are differences as to what 
exactly constitutes physical survival. Interestingly, therefore, the different approaches 
also reveal different possibilities of selfhood and personal identity. For instance, 
James J. Hughes argues that whilst the problems we face in determining death were 
revealed by technological advances,
68 Obviously, this is only a general characterization, and the opposite of this is also true in some 
respects: some forms of Christianity believe in physical, bodily resurrection, whilst some science- 
fiction scenarios consider the possibility of disembodied consciousness.
69 Hughes (2001), p.8.
70 What follows is a sample of the range of approaches currently favoured by life extensiomsts - see
Saunders (2002).
71 In the 'mind upload' scenario, where we are thinking of mind as an organisation of physical neurons, 
it is the physical organisation we are preserving, not some immaterial entity.
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Technology did not really create this gray area, but extended it and made 
it manifest. Death has always been a process, rather than a clearly binary 
state. In the Buddhist or Parfitian (1984) view to which I am partial, there 
is no essential or real identity in things. The boundaries we draw around 
"life" and the "self are arbitrary, motivated by specific interests and 
purposes. Life and the self have no essential reality which can be 
definitively discerned, or boundaries which can be definitively marked. 
Rather there are a variety of processes involved in being born or dying, 
processes involved in the illusion of continuous self- identity. The lines 
that get drawn have mostly to do with the politics, economics, culture 
and technology of those doing the drawing. 72
It can be seen from the above that this is a position that I have a great deal of 
sympathy with: as I have argued, even if we adopt a realist view of the world, we 
cannot consider death to be an intrinsic feature of it; as for death, so for self. Hughes 
also argues that the death boundary will be constantly challenged as science and 
technology find new ways of preserving life.
Eventually victims of devastating neurological damage, who would 
previously have been declared hopeless or even dead, will be seen as still 
potentially living patients deserving of a trial of reparative therapy, 
unless portions of the brain holding identity-critical structures are 
demonstrably and thoroughly destroyed. If the restoration is unsuccessful, 
the patient may then be allowed to completely die. 73
Death therefore occurs when we can do nothing more - at this time. If we accept such 
views, then we are therefore faced with a redefinition of death in relation to two 
aspects: (1) in accordance with technological advances (such as the ability to treat 
previously irremediable conditions, repair cell death, etc.); and (2) in relation to 
shifting notions of self and personal identity.
Point (1) is obviously something that we already face, and will arguably continue to 
face in the future; it seems silly to deny the possibility of technological advances 
whose application will rescue those whom we now consider to be beyond treatment. 
Point (2), however, represents a more controversial claim, and involves accepting the 
argument that I have been advancing - i.e. that death is not an intrinsic feature, that it 
is tied to equally shifting notions of personal identity and selfhood, and that we 
therefore face multiple possible 'redefinitions' of death and self. Since it is this latter 
point that I am primarily interested in here, I will therefore consider what the 
possibility of such science-fiction type futures mean for the concepts of death and self.
Problems and Solutions
It may be argued that technological advance and scientific knowledge are mixed 
blessings: for every benefit, there is also a corresponding problem, and boon and bane 
seem to go hand in hand. Obviously, this twofold character is best illustrated by the
72 Hughes (2001), p.8. 
73 Ibid.,p.l3.
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application of scientific knowledge to medicine and military defence respectively; 
atom bomb and the MRI scanner spring from the same root. 74
In terms of the potential expansion and revision of the cluster of concepts with which 
we are concerned in understanding death, science-fiction scenarios therefore present 
us with both solutions and problems. For instance, in the 'mind upload' scenario we 
are faced with the possibility of almost indefinite survival of the personality (and 
possibly consciousness - depending on the theory of philosophy of mind that is held). 
However, we are also simultaneously presented with the problem of loss of identity: if 
it is possible to codify the personality and brain waves of an individual using digital 
technology, then - because the information is digital - it can also be copied. We are 
therefore presented with a typical Parfitian-style example of 'survival without identity'. 75
However, a similar scenario is also presented by physical cloning. In the film The 
Sixth Day, Arnold Schwarzenegger plays Adam Gibson, a helicopter pilot, who is 
unknowingly cloned. The plan is for Gibson to be killed, and for the clone to take his 
place (and thereby fulfil some nefarious purpose that the bad guys have in mind); 
however, by mistake, someone else is killed, Gibson survives, and we are left with 
two Gibsons. So, the question is, who is the real one? As Mark Rowlands points out,
Suppose we ask the question, 'Who is the real Adam Gibson?' Chances 
are we'll come up with the answer: 'The one who was around first.' The 
fact that one Adam Gibson was around before the other strongly 
suggests that the first one is kosher, and the second one a mere copy. So, 
let's amend the story slightly. Let's suppose, as the cloning baddies 
assumed, that the body of the original Adam Gibson is destroyed, and 
his memories are implanted into a custom-made clone. Does Adam 
Gibson survive? Or, rather, if the [memory-based theory of personal 
identity] is true, does this mean that Adam Gibson survives?
Obviously, if we argue that some version of the psychological-continuity theory of 
personal identity must be subscribed to, then this clone is indeed Adam Gibson. Of 
course, we might seek to get around this by arguing that psychological continuity isn't 
enough; we must also have physical continuity. However, as Rowlands also points 
out, 78 we can further amend the scenario so that the clones are created at the same 
time, and both of them receive a 'download' of Adam Gibson's memories. Which, 
then, is the 'real' Adam Gibson? As Rowlands notes - in line with Parfit before him - 
we have no criteria for distinguishing between the two (in terms of status), and in 
addition we are left with another situation where there is survival, but no personal 
identity.
James J. Hughes takes this type of scenario as conclusive, and argues that, in the 
development of technological means of stretching the boundaries of death, we are




77 Rowlands (2003), p.lll. 
78 Ibid.,p.ll3.
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faced with a profusion of possible definitions of death and self, each driven by 
individual choice:
Once technology has fully teased out the constituent processes and 
structures of memory, cognition and personality, and given us control 
over them; once we are able to share or sell our skills, personality traits 
and memories; once some individuals begin to abandon individuality for 
new forms of collective identity; then the edifice of Western ethical 
thought since the Enlightenment will be in terminal crisis. 779
Hughes sees the sort of conceptual freedom 1 have suggested exists as the basis of a 
number of what he terms 'technological threats to liberal individualistic assumptions', 
leading to such things as:
Identity Malleability: Parental, social and personal control of memory, identity 
and personality
Posthuman Persons: Radically enhanced minds
Identity Sharing: Memories, thoughts and skills, sold or shared
Identity Cloning: Persons multiply copied into new media
Distributed Identity: Distinct persons distributed over, or sharing, a set of 
bodies and machines
Group Identity: Multiple bodies and machines integrated into a collective 
identity, without clear personal identity, e.g. Borg or "hive minds"80
Of course, many of these scenarios have already been explored in science-fiction 
literature and film: in Star Trek: The Next Generation? 1 the 'Borg' are a collective 
consciousness into which individuals are 'assimilated' (Group Identity); in The 
Lawnmower Man?2 a young, mentally-retarded gardener is subjected to a computer 
training programme which increases his intelligence to an almost god-like level 
(Posthuman Persons); in Phillip K. Dick's short story, We Can Remember it for You 
Wholesale 83 (later filmed as Total Recall)?4 memories are bought and sold, and the 
experiences are seamlessly interwoven into the subject's own personal history.
A similar scope for conceptual expansion is proposed by 1960s LSD guru Timothy 
Leary in his final book, Design for Dying? 5 which was written while the author was 
dying of prostate cancer. Leary's perspective is, as can be imagined, that of 




82 Leonard (1992). The original title of the film was Cyber God, but since the production company also 
owned the rights to Stephen King's short story of the same name, the title became Stephen King's 
Lawnmower Man. However, since the film bears almost no resemblance to King's story, the author 
successfully sued to have his name removed.
83 Dick (2000), pp.157-74.
84 Verhoeven(1990).
85 Leary and Sirius (1997).
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considers how the advent of the internet and related cyber technologies have impacted 
upon - and will continue to expand - our mundane perceptions of self and identity; 
' delocalizing the self, 86 as he puts it. Imagine, he says, that we can build a 
'simulacrum' of ourselves; a robot surrogate that can go anywhere we want, and to 
which we are remotely connected; seeing through its 'eyes', having its experiences 
relayed to us as we sit in the operator's room. However, now imagine that, instead of 
sending it out to some distant place, we go in search of ourself.
You walk your simulacrum down the street, which looks familiar. Hey, 
it's the street that the apartment with your operator's room is on. You 
walk down the familiar corridor often travelled by your meat machine 
and open the door to the room where your body hangs in suspension. 
You peer into the suspension chamber and you see... what?87
Leary suggests that this 'feedback loop' will cause you to disassociate from your real 
body:
the physical body operating the machine would seem alien, as distinct 
from self as from other artefacts in the world. The sensation of self would 
be in the simulacrum, where the viewpoint is. 8
Therefore, for Leary, the conclusion is that, 'You exist where your viewpoint is'. This 
means that, potentially, 'you', removed from the 'traditional boundaries of the body', 
could exist anywhere that could support your awareness. This is ultimately because 
the self is an arbitrary concept.
Of course, where one chooses to draw the line distinguishing inside from 
outside, self from other-than-self is formally arbitrary, a matter of 
operational convenience. In certain mystical states, self expands to fill 
the universe. In death, phenomenologically speaking, the universe 
encroaches to diminish self to nothingness. The effect of removing the 
distinction of self in both instances is identical in the limit. There is no 
difference and so we might presume that in fact the experiences are 
equivalent. 89
What Leary is pointing to here is an almost exact parallel to the religious practice of 
'dying to the self: the extinction of self is effectively the same as the identification of 
the self with the universe. The only difference lies in the means adopted (i.e. cyber 
technology).
It is perhaps pertinent here to consider a common objection to such 'delocalization', 
which is also a potential criticism of the 'expanded self hypothesis considered earlier. 
It is all very well, you might say, to consider delocalization whilst the body is alive to 
provide the vehicle for consciousness, but that itself suggests the limits to the 
experiment: the potential for consciousness is located in the body; therefore, the self
86 Ibid., p.27.
87 Ibid., p.27-8.
00 . . . _ _
iDia z/ o
88 Ibid., p.28.
89 Ibid., p.29-30 (my italics).
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cannot itself exist outside the body in anything but a metaphorical sense. Is there 
anything the advocate of delocalization can say in response to this?
There are a number of possible responses, and they would differ according to the 
approach favoured: one approach is obviously to consider the possible existence of an 
alternative vehicle for consciousness. In religious terms, this would obviously be a 
disembodied spirit; in sci-fi terms, an artificial body or digital brain. However, 
stemming from my earlier discussion of the competing criteria that we are faced with 
in determining what exactly the essential nature of our concept of a 'person' is in 
relation to the definition of death debate, we might argue that consciousness is not 
necessarily a key ingredient. It might be argued, for example, that the biological links 
between one human being and another are more significant than the existence of 
personal consciousness. As Leary argues:
The DNA code is a three-billion-year-old time capsule of consciousness. 
The DNA code is the miniaturized, invisible essence of wisdom of life. 
Most of the characteristics formerly attributed to "soul" describe the 
functions of DNA. 90
Therefore, if DNA can be considered the essence of who we are (our 'soul'), and our 
living has played a part in its evolution, then does the suggestion that we live on in its 
continued existence grant us a form of'immortality'?
The point to be grasped here is that, even if we consider the capacity for phenomenal 
consciousness as a sine qua non of any definition of the self, it must be realised what 
sort of move this is. It is not, as it is tempting to think, an analytical observation, as if 
we were simply analysing the concept of self; it is rather, as Gervais has argued, a 
'decision of significance'. 91
Therefore, whilst it might seem odd - and counterintuitive in the extreme - to do so, 
there is nothing logically unsound in Leary's proposition that the self can be 
expanded (and survival thought possible) in ways which exclude personal 
consciousness.
What's it like, phenomenologically, to be dead? [...] Let's presume for 
the sake of argument that you're not in Algiers. Fine, then you are, right 
now, dead in Algiers. You experience no input from there, you affect 
nothing. People and things are unaware of you. You don't exist there.
This argument can be extended. You are dead most places in the 
universe at this moment. Dead in Paris. Dead in New York. ̂ (Assuming 
you don't happen to be reading this in either of those places.) "
So, if we entertain the converse of this, then it is also possible to be 'alive' in other 
senses:
90 Ibid., p.20.
91 Gervais (1986), p.2.
92 Leary and Sirius (1997), pp.33-4.
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Of course, this "liveness" has degrees. Timothy Leary is on television right 
now in Paris. Somebody is reading an R. U. Sirius essay in Algiers. Phone a 
friend in China. You are alive there - a little bit. 93
Therefore, if we accept this continuum of life/death, self/not-self, then we might 
consider that survival may lie in a point at which a certain aspect of you lives on (a 
photograph, a memory held by someone else, a book you wrote, and so on), whilst 
consciousness does not. However, because 'liveness' (and 'selfness') is a continuum, 
then there would seem to be an element of choice as to where we choose to draw the 
line - if we draw it at all.
What's more, Leary sees technology - especially telecommunications and the internet 
- as playing a key role in this expansion of self and death:
The beauty of information/communications technologies is their ability 
to extend the boundaries of self, to diminish distance and other physical 
limitations, and permit an individual to reach out nearly undiminished 
across time and space at the speed of light. 94
The above position is similar, in some ways, to that advanced by the French Jesuit 
Priest and palaeontologist, Pierre Teilhard de Chardin. Teilhard observed, in what 
some have taken as a remarkably prescient prediction of modern developments (such 
as the internet), that mankind was evolving toward greater unity. So, whilst evolution 
in the animal kingdom seemed to continue to embody divergence, human evolution 
seemed to progress along lines of convergence?5 Furthermore, as we become aware 
of each other as part of the same global community, mankind begins to think of itself 
more and more as a single entity. As N. M. Wildiers puts it in his introduction to 
Teilhard:
The great body of mankind must be built up out of the many cells which 
now lead their separate existences. Just as the human brain consists of 
millions of neurons which have been composed into a unity through 
innumerable connections and combinations and thus make possible the 
unitary consciousness in man, so must men combine with one another to 
form a kind of super-organism in which a communal consciousness, a 
suprapersonal unity, would be manifested - with this difference: that the 
cells which constitute our brain no longer have an individual existence, 
whereas man, in virtue of his reflective consciousness, retains his 
individual freedom and separate existence, even within the larger 
organization.
However, within this global organization of individuals, there is a unifying point of 
reference: what Teilhard calls the omega point. It is this focus which therefore acts as 
the true centre of global unity, forming 'a suprapersonal centre on which the whole of
93 Ibid., p.34.
94 Ibid.
95 See Wildiers (1968), pp.83-108.
96 Ibid.,pp.lOO-l.
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evolution converges.' 97 In this sense, Teilhard's vision is almost an actualisation of 
the poet John Donne's famous picture of humanity as a continent, where
No man is an island, entire of itself; every man is a piece of the continent, 
a part of the main. If a clod be washed away by the sea, Europe is the less' 
as well as if a promontory were, as well as if a manor of thy friend's or of 
thine own were. Any man's death diminishes me, because I am involved 
in mankind; and therefore never send to know for whom the bell tolls' it 
tolls for thee.
Some of the above ideas may seem far fetched - and they are. There is nothing 
mundane about the notions of self and death involved in such scenarios However if 
my earlier arguments concerning the status of these concepts are accepted then these 
possibilities would seem to be real (albeit 'far-fetched') possibilities.
In one sense, we might argue that such 'survival' is not really immortality at all: it is 
like, to take a literary example, assuming that the young man to whom Shakespeare 
promised immortality in his sonnets actually did live on:
But thy eternal Sommer shall not fade, 
Nor loose possession of that faire thou ow'st, 
Nor shall death brag thou wandr'st in his shade, 
When in eternal lines to time thou grow'st,
So long as men can breath or eyes can see,
So long live this, and this gives life to thee."
Here, the poet promises that the poems themselves shall give the subject a certain 
immortality; elsewhere, a similar argument is made for siring children (so that the 
subject can 'live on' in their likeness). 100 It might be tempting to dismiss this as a 
form of vicarious immortality; as A. G. N. Flew might say, this sort of immortality 
would be of the same interest to me as 'the news that my appendix would be 
preserved eternally in a bottle' 101 (i.e. none). However, even so, this would be to 
ignore the central point: the question of immortality, and the nature of self and death, 
are determined by what is important to us. So, whilst Flew might be disappointed by 
such a 'get-out clause' from the traditional notions of immortality and survival (and 
what he considers to be their inherent confusions), this does not impugn the validity of 
the arguments themselves.
Techno-Utopia and Group Minds
There would therefore seem to be a range of potential ways in which the traditional 
notion of self can be expanded, and thereby - in some cases - 'overcome' death. 
However, the prevalence or ingenuity of these ideas does not necessarily argue for 
their coherence, and we need not follow Leary and Hughes's enthusiastic acceptance 
of the way that such potentialities will shape our collective future.
97 Ibid., p.108.
98 John Donne, 'Meditation XVII', from Donne (1999).
99 William Shakespeare, 'Sonnet 18', in Seymour-Smith (1963), p.49.
100 This is largely the subject of the first seventeen sonnets.
101 Flew (1955), p.270.
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Having so far argued that the concept of death is a more potentially variable one than 
is commonly thought, and that the notions of self and personal identity are equally 
open to change, I want now therefore to point out what I think are limits to this 
exercise. Hughes's 'techno-utopia', 102 whilst logically - and maybe even 
technologically - possible, is nonetheless driven by a human fear of death. As Rodney 
A. Brooks perspicaciously observes:
my former postdoctoral research student Pattie Macs gave a talk titled 
"Why Immortality is a Dead Idea." She took as many people as she could 
find who had publicly predicted downloading of consciousness into 
silicon, and plotted the dates of their predictions, along with when they 
themselves would turn seventy years old. Not too surprisingly, the years 
matched up for each of them. Three score and ten years from their 
individual births, technology would be ripe for them to download their 
consciousness into a computer. Just in the nick of time! They were each, 
in their own minds, going to be remarkably lucky, to be in just the right 
place at the right time. 103
This overestimation of the speed of scientific progress (and the psychological 
motivations for it) aside, such envisionings also place a limitless faith in the potential 
of scientific advance - which may, ultimately, turn out to be misplaced:
This strong version of salvation seems plausible in principle. However, 
we may yet be hundreds of years off in figuring out just how to do it. It 
takes computational chauvinism to new heights. It neglects the primary 
role played by the bath of neurotransmitters and hormones in which our 
neuronal cells swim. It neglects the role of our body in placing 
constraints and providing noncomputational aspects to our existence. 
And it may be completely missing the juice. 104
Therefore, whilst we cannot dismiss such possibilities out of hand, we must consider 
that it is just as likely that science may find out that such things may prove - for some 
as-yet-unknown reason (e.g. the inability to replicate that which makes something 
consciously alive - the 'juice') - technologically impossible. For these reasons, I 
would wish to distinguish between the possibilities that science-fiction scenarios 
present us with, and the conclusions that we may draw from them; it may never prove 
possible (for purely technical reasons) to 'upload' minds into a computer, but this 
does not invalidate the conclusions of the thought-experiment that we could draw 
from it. Therefore, whilst those reasons remain 'purely technical', then the Parfitian 
conclusions that spring from them are valid; but if it should be realised that there is a 
logical impossibility in such a supposed scenario, then our conclusions must be 
revisited. So, as things stand, I would endorse the logical possibility of Hughes and 
Parfit's visions of self (and therefore death), whilst holding reservations about the 
achievability of such situations.
102 As Rodney A. Brooks terms it, see Brooks (2002), p.205.
103 Brooks (2002), p.206.
104 Ibid.
-163-
Aside from practical considerations, however, we must also consider a different sense 
of likelihood. Hughes talks as if such total revisions of'self and 'death' were merely 
round the corner. However, in a similar way to the mind-upload enthusiasts in 
Brooks's example, there is an over-enthusiasm which blinds him to what is actually 
involved in such a process of change.
As I intimated in the discussion of the expanded self in relation to religious 
perspectives, the different notions that such approaches to self and death employ are 
embedded in daily practices as part of what Wittgenstein and Phillips would term 
'forms of life'. In arguing that such changes are possible, therefore, I have not glibly 
accepted that death is about to be conquered, or that 'cosmic consciousness' is just an 
attitude of mind. Rather, I have tried to argue that such revisions, whilst potentially 
possible (given a certain interpretation of things), represent a subterranean shift of 
deep-seated values and attitudes that are embedded in an individual's deepest habits 
of mind and body. In light of this, I argued, we can best understand traditional 
religious/mystical discipline and life as an attempt to change and evolve the individual 
at these very depths. However, the techno-glibness aside, Hughes's contentions 
represent an almost cavalier ignorance of what is involved in such potential change.
To illustrate this, imagine what would be involved in the production of a 'hive mind'. 
If we set aside the question of consciousness for the moment, the whole of society 
would have to function as a collective, with clearly defined roles for 'workers', 
'soldiers', and their attitude towards the 'queen'. This would involve a suppression or 
weeding-out of individuality, together with prescriptive behaviour for every member 
of the collective, and some sort of method of bonding individuals together and to their 
common purpose. Even if this were undertaken on a small scale, the habits of identity 
and role would have to be embedded into every aspect of life.
Robert Rupert also points out certain problems for the current enthusiasm for 
attributing collective unity to existing or potential 'group minds' and the possibility 
that they may possess 'mental states'. As he argues, the ability to form mental 
representations would seem to be central to our concept of a mind, and yet
our best accounts of mental content seem to exploit architectural 
features that groups typically lack: many of our best explanations of 
how mental representations get their content assign a privileged role to 
perceptual or quasiperceprual processing, thereby requiring a cognitive 
architecture that group systems typically do not possess. Problems 
specific to the application of the various theories of content further 
dim the hopes that group systems, considered as genuinely 
autonomous cognitive systems, might comprise representational
. . 105states.
106
This might not be an insuperable problem - for instance, Simon J. Evnine has also 
argued that, since individuals certainly possess mental states, it may be possible to 
think of persons as groups, thereby supplying a model for group minds which 
includes individual 'nodes' of representation which are focused and organised around
105 Rupert (2005), p. 184.
106 Evnine (2005).
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a central purpose (a Teilhardian 'Omega point', perhaps). In fact, the idea of persons 
as groups may provide an understanding of the split brain phenomena considered 
earlier at the end of chapter 6: if persons already are conglomerates of distinct 
conscious entities, then the model for a group mind is already there. However, even if 
this is the case, getting the global (macrocosm) to mirror the personal (microcosm) is 
no little task.
A further aspect of difficulty is therefore involved in why individuals would seek to 
undertake such a task. Arguably, we are already driven by evolutionary and biological 
needs, and so there would have to be good reasons (in these terms) for us to alter or 
tailor our behaviour in this way - unless, in some way, such developments represented 
an actual development of those same drives, and were in fact an expression of them. 
However, Hughes does not (unlike Nietzsche) l07 seem to entertain this latter 
possibility, but merely advocates a sort of 'catalogue' of possible choices which a 
consumer-like entity or entities could choose from. In this sense, ironically, his 
contention that the 'liberal individualistic assumptions' are under threat is actually 
undermined by this notion that we can choose to 'evolve' in this way; in other words, 
what lies at the bottom of his various alternative futures is the notion of liberal- 
individualistic choice.
Conclusion
In this chapter, I have argued that there are various different possible conceptions of 
'death' and 'self which, given the observer-relative nature of such concepts, are 
logically possible - if not immediately (or ever) likely. I have also tried to show that 
the notion of immortality as embodied in the religious notion of the 'expanded self 
(as I have called it) is not in itself irrational. In fact, such traditions as embody this 
attitude may simply be advocating a non-essentialist picture of identity and 
personhood, whilst following it through to more radical yet legitimate conclusions. 
This, obviously, leaves open a pathway for reassessing religious attitudes to self and 
death - to what I have termed 'multiple parallel redefinitions'. I do not want to 
necessarily argue that my interpretation of religious doctrine and practice in all cases 
is the 'correct' one - and thus commit what I take to have been the Wittgensteinian 
fallacy - yet I think it fair to argue that, given certain current and accepted 
assumptions of a scientific picture of the world, such 'expanded' notions of self are 
rational and possible.
In addition to the religious picture, I have also considered various science-fiction-type 
examples of ways in which the notions of self and death can be diversified. However, 
in doing so, I have also argued for a distinction between logical possibility (on the one 
hand) and likelihood and achievability (on the other); the first, I argue, reveals the true 
nature of self and death, whilst the latter involves a sort of 'leap of faith' - in fact, 
both the religious and technological concepts share this aspect (though one for 
spiritual immortality, the other for physical survival). Finally, therefore, I criticised 
the idea (found in such Hughes and Leary), that such possible revisions were both 
imminent and likely.
107 Though, of course, Nietzsche distinguishes between 'will to power' and 'will to survive' - see, for 
instance, Nietzsche (1990a), section 13.
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But where does all this leave us in relation to the definition of death? This is the 
subject of the next and final chapter.
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9. Conclusion: Redefinitions of Death
Introduction
Having concluded that the concept of death is an observer-relative one - and is 
therefore potentially variable in relation to a wide range of factors - it remains for me 
to briefly outline what possible consequences this will have for the practical 
determination of death, and to provide some suggested avenues for future 
consideration.
However before doing so, I will first summarise the arguments which have led me to 
this point.
Summary of Arguments
Firstly, I point out that the current problem we face in defining death has arisen in 
relation to advances in medical technology, but such advances have merely revealed a 
latent problem (which in turn is linked to the nature of concept formation). I have 
then argued that most suggested resolutions of the debate to date have involved an 
attempt to isolate sufficient criteria to disambiguate problematic scenarios in favour of 
one or the other of the traditional binary oppositions ('alive' or 'dead'). In addition, 
these attempts have mainly taken a strictly biological approach, seeking to define 
death in terms which are independent of any moral, social, or other value-driven 
concerns. However, as we have seen, such an approach is problematic.
Firstly, it assumes that the essential features of a living human being can be isolated to 
the exclusion of such 'observer-relative' features (to use Searle's term), and that a 
concept of death as an 'intrinsic' feature of the world is therefore possible. However, 
as Gervais has rightly argued, such a strictly-biological approach mistakenly assumes 
that all of the essential features of a living human being are strictly biological, 
whereas in fact the attempt to ring-fence one set of criteria (and to exclude another) 
always involves an extra-biological 'decision of significance': what is significant to 
one observer may not be so to another, and - more importantly - this variance cannot 
be resolved in a way which excludes observer-relative features.
This conclusion, I argued, is further supported by an analysis of the nature of the 
strictly-biological approach, which is essentialist in nature, and therefore open to the 
well-established criticisms that all forms of essentialism face. So, treating the problem 
of the definition of death as basically a form of the problem of category membership, 
I showed that the former concern can be seen to be similarly misguided: there are no 
means whereby what we mean by 'death' can be fixed, and there would seem to be a 
potential variance in the nature of the concept which resists the essentialist approach. 
In other words, what we mean by death is not to be understood by reference to a fixed 
set of criteria (strictly-biological or otherwise), but is rather an 'epistemically-thick' 
concept the application of which is much more potentially diverse and changeable 
than has previously been supposed.
A point independently made by Hughes (2001), p.8.
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To further enhance this observation, I next looked at various candidates for death 
criteria which could in turn be considered 'intrinsic' (borrowing Searle's ontology), 
and thus which could be used to argue that (a) death consisted of the cessation of 
certain intrinsic (non-observer-relative) features of the world, and (b) the goal of 
philosophers in the definition of death debate should be to identify these criteria 
(thereby 'fixing' the notion of death - in both senses). However, as was shown, even 
if we adopt a moderate realist position such as Searle's, the main feature which we 
would seek to base an intrinsic definition of death upon (i.e. function) cannot itself be 
considered an intrinsic feature. This conclusion represents the death knell of the 
functional approach, and thereby the strictly-biological approach itself, which is itself 
function centred. What we are left with, then, is the contention that biological features 
are, at best, relevant to a definition of death (what I term the 'partly-biological view').
With the above, we reach a point whereby the possibility of a unified definition of 
death for all organic life becomes extremely problematic, for it is the cessation of 
functions necessary for life which would unite human death with that of animals, 
plants, etc. However, with the demise of the notion that function can be a non- 
observer-relative feature of the world (and thus exist without humans), we are left 
with - at best - a two-fold definition, involving humans and the remainder of living 
entities. However, admitting this state of affairs, we need not (it is argued) thereby 
abandon the search for the set of intrinsic features which determine human death. This 
approach therefore ushers in two further criteriological candidates: the capacity for 
consciousness and personal identity respectively. Analysis of the former, however, 
revealed that, whilst it may be possible to consider the capacity of phenomenal 
consciousness (to use David Chalmers's distinction) as an intrinsic feature of human 
beings (and even certain animals), there would appear to be no necessary reason to 
identify this capacity as essential to a human being: living human beings certainly 
exist without it, and to base a definition of death upon its absence would be highly 
controversial - and moreover, arbitrary. Furthermore, this approach fails to 
conclusively resolve the problem diagnostically. Capacity for psychological 
consciousness involves an observer-relative attribution of function, and so cannot play 
a part in a definition of death involving intrinsic features; however, not only do we 
face extreme difficulties in distinguishing between those features which do or do not 
involve conscious participation (phenomenally speaking), we face similar difficulty in 
being able to ascertain the presence (or absence) of phenomenal consciousness itself. 
Thus, the criterion fails on a number of fronts.
Notions of personal identity and the capacity for personhood however, do not fare any 
better. In as much as we would seek to identify a physical basis for personhood, the 
brain would seem to be the obvious locus; and yet, once again, why should the vehicle 
for consciousness be the only or central feature of significance? This aside, however, 
there are a host of other problems highlighted not only by Parfitian thought 
experiments, but also by findings in so-called 'split-brain' experiments. It is these 
latter issues which suggest that we do not in fact need science fiction scenarios to 
show us that the notion of a unified self or 'person' is - arguably - a convenient 
fiction. The failure of this approach is therefore the final stop in the search for 
potentially intrinsic features - in relation to all forms of death - and with it, we reach 
the conclusion that death cannot be an intrinsic feature of a mind-independent, 
human-independent world.
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Following this, and the conclusion that death must be - even according to a realist's 
position such as Searle's - a non-intrinsic feature of the world, I suggested what I take 
to be more apt models for understanding the concept of death and its potential 
variability. In doing this, I applied Searle's notion of constitutive and regulative rules, 
and showed that, in comparison with such social practices as the game of football, the 
main difference between football and death is not one of kind, but rather the 
intransigency which we consider the respective constitutive rules to have. In other 
words, football may change much more freely than death simply because the 
constitutive rules which define death practice are informed by deeper and more 
entrenched values, and are more closely tied in with other 'deep' concepts (such as 
self) which - whilst being similarly observer relative - are similarly resistant to 
change. Furthermore, it was shown that the type of ambiguity we face in defining 
death has similar parallels in the development of the rules in football - an ambiguity 
which can be resolved, but perhaps only if we give up the notion that death is a 
completely different type of debate.
However, whilst such change is slow-moving, this is not to say that it is not possible, 
or that it is not in fact already taking place. In chapter 8, I therefore set out various 
alternatives to traditional and accepted notions of death and self in an attempt to show 
that such alternatives (if interpreted in certain ways) are in fact much more viable and 
legitimate than may be supposed - or, at least, no more illegitimate (logically 
speaking) than the traditional notions themselves. Finally, however, I strike a note of 
caution: to argue that the notions of self and death are potentially variable and 
mutable is still not to argue that such variance and mutability will inevitably come 
about. So, whilst I argue that, in fact, it has come about in certain places (notably in 
religious contexts), this in rum is linked to deeply embedded changes in lifestyle and 
habits of thought. In this sense, I reject what I take to be the glib liberal individualist 
position as represented by Hughes and others. So, in conclusion, whilst we are faced 
with multiple parallel possible redefinitions of death, the extent to which we must 
accommodate them is currently relatively limited (though this may not always be so).
Given the above summary, it may be seen that my main concern in this thesis has 
been with resisting prevalent contemporary approaches to the definition of death 
which, in my eyes, distort and misrepresent the nature of the problem. They do this, I 
argue, out of a desire to maintain certain features of the traditional notion of death - 
though, of course, in as much as they differ, the features which they favour differ also. 
Most seek to maintain the binary opposition between 'alive' and 'dead', with no 
possible intermediate state (which, incidentally, I have shown is an extra-logical 
assumption); most also seek to maintain the notion that death must also be 
'irreversible' (which, again, the combination of technological advance and the role 
played by function would seem to make highly problematic); some favour a unified 
definition, whereby human death is shared with all other living creatures, whilst 
others admit that an at-least-twofold definition is necessary (both of which would, in 
the light of subsequent discussion, seem to be highly optimistic); finally, to varying 
degrees, most commentators seem to hold that death is something that should exist 
separately from human concerns, and may in fact be an intrinsic feature of a mind- 
independent world (which has also been shown to be problematic).
However, having sought to resist these various approaches and their attendant 
metaphysical and ontological assumptions, it now remains to briefly outline some
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possible avenues whereby the above conclusions may have some practical benefit for 
medical practice. Obviously, given my above conclusions concerning the potential 
variability of death, it would be inappropriate for me now to identify what I take to be 
the 'correct approach' to defining death. Furthermore, even in suggesting operative 
parameters for medical practice, I do not have space to do respective issues involved 
adequate justice - such an undertaking would represent a considerable one in itself, 
for which the foregoing arguments may only be seen as a sort of basis or 'stepping 
off point. What I wish to do, therefore, is merely to outline what I take to be the 
central concerns for medical practice. It may be objected that, in doing so, my 
approach has been purely 'negative', and that I have not, as such, 'resolved' the 
problem of the definition of death. However, if I have performed this negative duty 
effectively, then I will consider my arguments to have done their job - after all, as the 
Hippocratic Oath states, 'First, do no harm.' Therefore, in resisting what I take to 
have been heavy-handed approaches to resolving the debate, and which furthermore I 
take to have misrepresented the nature of the debate for their own purposes, I am 
content to have shown these to have been problematic, and thereby to set future 
debate on a different course.
An Informed Death
To contrast two literary examples, few would share Hamlet's view that death is to be 
considered a 'consummation devoutly to be wished'; many, however, would agree 
with Casanova's observation in his voluminous memoirs:
Death is a monster which drives an attentive spectator from the great 
theater before the play in which he is infinitely interested is over. This 
alone is reason enough to hate it. 2
It is this reluctance to face our inevitable demise, therefore, combined with fear of 
pain and suffering (and what might lie beyond), that colours the public perception of 
death. Consequently, the thought that there might be any potential ambiguity in 
determining death, let alone in defining it, creates understandable anxiety and concern.
One task for the definition of death is therefore to provide unambiguous criteria which 
not only act as a clear means of determining death in ambiguous cases, but also 
reassure the public that the decisions involved are capable of standard application to 
all potential situations. For instance, if we adopt a criterion of death which allows for 
variance in application of- for instance - concepts of 'viability' or 'quality of life', or 
that even allow for moral or economic concerns to influence decision making, then 
this would undoubtedly cause widespread unease. What is needed, therefore, is the 
agreement of a uniform definition which would not allow for variations of application.
However, given my conclusions concerning the nature and status of the concept of 
death, is this in fact possible? As I have so far argued, whilst certain situations may 
seem to reveal no problematic ambiguities as regards the life-status of the individual, 
there are others which - as we have seen - reveal the determination of death to be a 
highly-fraught exercise.
: Casanova (1966), vol.1, p.35.
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To bring these issues to life (as it were), I will now return to the scenario that I first 
outlined in my introduction. 3 If you recall, I envisaged the case of a young woman 
who had fallen into a coma and suffered brain anoxia and subsequent brain damage. 
She was kept alive on a respirator, fed naso-gastrically, and otherwise maintained in a 
deep coma. After a while, she partially 'revived', and entered a persistent vegetative 
state, whereby she could breath unaided, and responded to stimuli. However, all tests 
revealed that she had suffered irreversible damage to the cerebral hemispheres (the 
'upper' brain) and would never again resume cognitive function.
It should first of all be noted that it is not intended here that this example represent a 
diagnostic dilemma. That there may be diagnostic problems involved (such as the 
extent of brain function lost, the possibility of partial recovery) may be true of such a 
case, but for my purposes we shall consider these to be irrelevant, and the focus to be 
primarily one of definition. In other words, given that she will never recover, what 
status do we consider her to have?
As already noted, it is possible to respond to this situation in a number of different 
ways, and for the response to determine the future course of action. For instance, she 
may be considered 'dead', in light of the permanent incapacity for cognitive function 
(and personhood), and allowed to die; she may be considered 'alive', in view of her 
continued spontaneous function, and her life-support maintained; we may even talk of 
the death of the 'person' and the survival of the 'organism'. However, as I hope I have 
shown, all these moves represent value-based assertions as to the nature of a human 
being, quality of life, etc. Which, then, should represent public policy and accepted 
medical practice, and how should we decide between them?
In relation to the above situation, therefore, I will argue that we are faced with a 
number of possible avenues. As I have suggested, I consider these various 
possibilities to involve what I term 'multiple parallel redefinitions of death'. They are 
parallel in the sense of having equal status (logically speaking) and in that they 
embody legitimate but divergent expressions of value. Therefore, since (I argue), a 
unified definition may be impossible, we are faced with two options: to impose a 
unified definition; to legislate for diversity. Of course, the latter is the more 
democratic and liberal move, whilst the former will no doubt be the one favoured by 
those who hold that the wise must legislate for the less so. However, in reality, a 
compromise will be the best approach: individual liberty and choice must always be 
constrained by its effect on society as a whole, and authoritarian prescription will 
always be challenged by the need for such individual liberty. Accordingly, I will 
express my suggestions as a brief list of concerns which future debate may centre 
around.
(1) Embedded Values. Owing to the prevalent traditional concept of death, 
medical practice and public policy reflect a similar set of entrenched values 
to the ones already questioned. In rejecting these, therefore - or at least, 
their status - practice in both these areas would need to be revised. The 
long-term goal of such revision would be to more clearly distinguish 
between factual pronouncements (the patient permanently lacks capacity for 
cognitive function) and value-based assertions (the patient is 'really' dead).
See chapter 1, 'A Hypothetical Case'.
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The latter, obviously, should not be assumed by medical practitioners or 
those who influence and decide public policy. That the patient is 'really' 
dead may be a conclusion that family and friends may arrive at, but in the 
above scenario, is it not one that could be arrived at by strictly-biological 
criteria. Such decisions should not therefore form part of a rationale for 
certain medical decisions. In other words, we should not declare death 
because we need hospital beds, or organs for transplant, or even because 
cognitive function is permanently lacking. Consequently, if decisions to 
remove life support are made for (ultimately) financial or logistical reasons, 
then this should be made explicit, and the debate shift to its appropriate 
arena (i.e. funding), and not be masked by shifting the definition of death.
(2) Expertise and Authority. Similarly, there should be an attempt to make, as 
far as possible, a clear distinction between those decisions which are in the 
hands of friends and family (or personal preference - of which more 
shortly) and those which are determined by medical facts. Out of necessity 
and habit, the families and friends of the individual will look to the advice 
of doctors, medical professionals, and the dictates of public policy for 
advice on what to do. Therefore, such advice should reflect the observer- 
relative status of death and its consequent potential variability. As far as 
possible, expertise should advise (and bodies legislate) for the degree of 
choice which the nature of the concept of death would seem to imply. 
Therefore, in identifying those situations where individuals have choice as 
to what is to be done, this should be explicitly stated in terms which make 
clear to those making the decision that the 'facts' can only decide so much 
for them, and that there are cases where pronouncement of 'death' involves 
a value-based 'decision of significance'. Obviously, this will necessarily 
involve a public programme of education - both to inform the public of 
situations where decisions may have to be made, and in those where public 
policy takes such decisions out of their hands. Once again, in the latter case, 
the decision should be clearly depicted for what it is (e.g. motivated by 
extraneous factors), and not concerning the definition of death itself. 
Incidentally, this would differ from Gervais's call for a programme of 
education in that (a) its purpose would not necessarily be to arrive at a 
unified definition of death, or to 'inform' the public of one already arrived 
at by experts, (b) the form of contractarianism would be focused on 
increasing freedom of choice and public awareness in relation to death.
(3) Death and the Individual. As implied by the previous point, admitting that 
there is a leeway for interpretation as to what death is, it would make sense 
to allow individuals to determine exactly what should be their fate should 
they find themselves in a regrettably ambiguous near-death state. In such 
cases, a version of the organ donor card might be employed (a 'Death 
Card'), or some sort of 'living will' which informed those left with the 
decision-making of the wishes of the individual who cannot now express his 
wishes. Once again, this would have to be based on informed choice, and 
there would have to be strict legal guidelines in place to forestall abuse of 
the process. However, seeing as we are simply talking about decisions 
which are currently made or influenced by medical professionals and public 
policy (and should perhaps not be), we are merely here empowering
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individual choice in an area where such a thing is most apt (i.e. the 
individual's own fate).
Obviously, the above points are not exhaustive of the concerns and issues, but they do 
at least suggest a fruitful area of future research and debate. If I could pick out a main 
theme, however, it would centre on a clearer distinction between those decisions 
which are motivated by a consideration of the medical facts, and those which seem to 
go illegitimately beyond them. Both, I have argued, are valued based, but the former 
admit of a wider commonality of human response, whereas the latter would seem to 
attempt to force matters.
For instance, we might say that the majority of individuals would agree that a person 
who had irreversible brain damage to both higher and lower brain, could only breathe 
with the assistance of a respirator, and whose only signs of life consisted of certain 
individual 'low-level' processes (such as tissue growth) should be allowed to die. 
However, to call the woman in our scenario 'dead' and to allow that status to form the 
basis of switching off light support, seems to me to be an illegitimate move, and an 
abuse of the concept. By all means, if it is agreed by all parties (especially, perhaps, 
based on some previously stated wish of the individual herself), then life-support 
should be withdrawn, but to call such a status 'dead' is to define death not in line with 
technological inability (that 'we can do nothing more'), but rather in relation to a 
dubious set of metaphysical and value-based assumptions of which we are barely 
conscious. Commonly, I feel, death is partly defined by technological inability: 
therefore, as technology advances, so will possible redefinitions of death change and 
multiply. It is therefore this greater awareness of our implicit assumptions that we 
should strive for; not so that we can define death 'objectively' - that, arguably, will 
never be possible - but so that we can approach our final end in an informed way, 
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